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Abstract 
Whilst considerable research has found that people tend to underestimate their task 
completion times (e.g., Buehler et al., 1994), factors that might influence the accuracy of 
temporal predictions have received little empirical treatment. The research presented in this 
thesis identified two distinct factors that mediated time estimation accuracy and bias. One 
factor was task duration, whereas the other factor was the person*s prior experience of the 
task. There was evidence that having prior experience of performing all or a substantial 
part of the same task enabled participants to more accurately estimate its duration. 
Additionally, predictions were more accurate when participants viewed tasks before 
making time estimates. Contrary to the theory of the planning fallacy (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979), these findings suggest that people do take account of their previous task 
performance, and use such distributional information to good effect. However, there was 
evidence of time prediction bias when unrelated tasks were completed beforehand, 
suggesting that erroneous information about previous task performance was used when 
making a subsequent estimate. 
The directional nature of time estimation bias was also highlighted in the present research. 
In general, there was some evidence of temporal overestimation on tasks with a duration of 
up to four or five minutes, whereas participants tended to underestimate their completion 
times on tasks that took between eight and 16 minutes to complete. These findings indicate 
that task duration influences the direction in which time estimates are biased (i.e., under or 
overestimation), with the temporal underestimation indicative of the planning fallacy 
occurring on tasks of at least eight minutes' duration. The present research has potential 
implications for task duration estimation in everyday life, and outlines conditions under 
which prediction bias can be reduced. The present findings are discussed in relation to the 
theory of the planning fallacy and the potential role of cognitive judgemental heuristics in 
determining temporal misestimation. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
The process of estimating how much time an upcoming task will take to complete 
has been the focus of considerable research (e.g., Byram, 1997; Josephs & Hahn, 1995; 
Koole & Van't Spijker, 2000). Such research has found that people are generally over-
optimistic, that is, they tend to underestimate their task completion times. A closely related 
and well established cognitive judgement phenomenon is the planning fallacy, which was 
identified by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
The planning fallacy is the tendency to make optimistically biased estimates of the 
duration of a current task despite being aware that previous similar activities took more 
time than predicted. Kahneman and Tversky suggest that the planning fallacy is a 
consequence of heuristic information processing whereby information concerning the 
current task becomes the focus of attention at the expense of information pertaining to 
previous similar tasks. Whilst there is considerable research evidence of the planning 
fallacy (Buehler, Griffin & Ross, 2002), there has been little empirical treatment of factors 
that might influence the accuracy of task completion time estimates. 
This thesis focuses on a number of potentially important factors thought to mediate 
the accuracy of people's estimates of their task completion times. Principally, these factors 
concern the nature of the task itself, and people's prior experience of the task that is about 
to be performed. The factors of interest in relation to task experience are pre-exposure to 
an identical task, and prior experience of performing similar or dissimilar tasks. In relation 
to the nature of the task, the factors of interest are task complexity and task duration. In 
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addition to these factors, one study (Experiment 3) examines the impact of monetary 
rewards on time estimation bias. By investigating these potential mediating factors, the 
present research aims to provide information concerning the reasons for temporal 
misestimation as well as highlighting conditions under which the accuracy of judgements 
of task duration can be improved. 
Given the lack of research into factors that might mediate time estimation accuracy, 
it is necessary for a extensive range of literature to be reviewed in this chapter. For 
example, it is necessary to consider research into the accuracy of judgements without a 
time element, as such research has identified a number of factors that mediate judgement 
bias. However, given the focus of this thesis, the bulk of the chapter will be devoted to the 
subject of temporal rather than non-temporal judgements. 
The chapter begins with a section that emphasises the prevalence of temporal 
misestimation and poor task planning in everyday life. In addition to outlining some 
explanations for temporal misestimation, this section highlights the adverse consequences 
associated with poor task planning and inaccurate time estimation. The next section 
focuses on research into the planning fallacy and time estimation bias, with the aim of 
demonstrating the extent of empirical support for temporal underestimation. Research 
reviewed in this section suggests that people tend to be over-optimistic when estimating 
the duration of tasks as diverse as college coursework assignments, anagrams and income 
tax forms. The prevalence of poor time estimation is further emphasised in the next 
section, which focuses on the subject of human time perception. In addition to highlighting 
the extent of poor time perception, this section will consider the cognitive processes that 
are involved in judging the length of temporal intervals. 
In order to demonstrate that bias is not confined to temporal estimates, the issue of 
inaccuracy in non-temporal judgements is briefly outlined in the next section. This section 
highlights the prevalence of biases such as overconfidence and provides some explanations 
for judgement inaccuracy. Given the prevalence of inaccuracy in temporal and non-
temporal judgements, the next section focuses on techniques that are intended to debias 
estimates of task duration and task performance. Whilst some research concerning non-
temporal judgements will be considered in this section, the emphasis will be on the success 
of strategies that are intended to improve the accuracy of judgements of task duration. 
Research reviewed in this section will demonstrate that techniques have largely been 
unsuccessful in debiasing time estimates, whereas debiasing strategies have met with 
greater success in relation to non-temporal judgements. 
In the next section, the cognitive heuristics and biases that contaminate the 
judgement and decision making process are considered. The research presented in this 
section demonstrates that using cognitive heuristics not only leads to judgement bias, but 
also tends to be characterised by a neglect of relevant information such as base rate data. 
This section will also show that the anchoring and adjustment cognitive heuristics are 
applicable to judgments of task duration. The final section of the literature review focuses 
on factors that have been found to influence bias and accuracy in non-temporal 
judgements. Research presented in this section demonstrates that factors such as task 
complexity and task experience have been found to affect judgement bias, and could thus 
be important determinants of time estimation accuracy. 
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1.2 Background 
Estimating how much time an activity will take to complete is one of the most 
common judgements made by humans. In the course of daily life people are required to 
estimate the duration of a variety of tasks such as crossing the road safely (Zakay & Block, 
1996), arranging a dinner party (Byrne, 1977) and shopping for groceries (Hayes-Roth & 
Hayes-Roth, 1979). Making accurate estimates of personal task performance is of 
considerable importance in terms of the enhancement of feelings of self-efficacy and well-
being (Armor & Taylor, 2002; Taylor & Brown, 1988), and personal and professional 
achievement. Similarly, it is necessary to schedule activities effectively i f people are to 
fulf i l work and personal obligations. 
The existence of a profitable self-help industry (Macan, Shahani, Dipboye & 
Phillips, 1990) highlights the benefits of effective time management (e.g., stress reduction), 
which are also well supported empirically (Burt, 1993; Burt & Kemp, 1994; Francis-
Smythe & Robertson, 1999; Shahani, Weiner & Streit, 1993). Research also emphasises 
the prevalence o f procrastination (e.g., Lay, 1986; Schouwenberg, 1992), which has been 
observed in relation to task planning and time estimation (Pychyl, Morin & Salmon, 2000). 
Hence, it seems that people do not always begin tasks as planned. However, when tasks are 
commenced, research suggests that estimates of task duration are often over-optimistic 
(e.g., Koole & Van't Spijker, 2000), with actual task duration exceeding the amount of 
time predicted. Although judgements of task completion times are an important part o f 
everyday life, it seems that the ability to make accurate temporal estimates is far from 
universal. 
The prevalence of temporal misestimation is highlighted by the late completion of 
several high profile projects, such as the construction o f the Channel Tunnel. The late 
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completion of such projects is not only characterised by massive delays and overspend, but 
is also likely to have adverse consequences for those organisations involved, such as a loss 
of profits (Markham, 1997). However, in the workplace, it may be beneficial to 
underestimate the duration of a project in order to secure a lucrative contract via 
competitive tendering systems. For example, within the private and public sectors, 
contracts to undertake construction projects are often awarded on the basis of the lowest 
cost and the shortest time scale for completion (Markham, 1997). 
Although it may be beneficial to underestimate task duration, it is becoming common 
practice for the legal contracts that accompany large scale organisational projects to 
contain penalty clauses for late completion. In such instances, the organisation undertaking 
the project will be penalised financially i f the project is not completed on schedule 
(Grundy & Brown, 2002). Hence, the potential financial benefits of underestimating the 
duration of large scale organisational projects must be evaluated against the adverse 
consequences associated with late task completion. 
There is empirical evidence of temporal misestimation and poor task planning within 
organisations (Ariely, Lx)ewenstein & Kahneman, 2000; Das & Teng, 1999; Kahneman & 
Lovallo, 1993; Klayman & Schoemaker, 1993). Research by Kidd (1970) revealed that 
professional engineers were over-optimistic about the amount of time needed to overhaul 
electricity generating equipment. That is, the actual duration of equipment maintenance 
projects was longer than the amount of time that the engineers had planned for such 
overhauls. However, such findings are not confined to organisations, as poor task planning 
has also been observed at the level of the individual. Considerable research has found that 
plans for task completion are often over-optimistic, that is, people predict that they will 
finish more tasks than they actually complete within a given period of time (Goldin & 
Hayes-Roth, 1980; Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1979; Smith, 1996). 
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Research by Hayes-Roth (1980) revealed that the number of errands that participants 
predicted they would complete within a certain period of time was less than the number 
that were actually finished. Such over-optimism is attributed to a tendency to focus 
attention on higher-level aspects of the planning process at the expense of lower-level 
aspects (Hayes-Roth, 1980). Hayes-Roth suggests that higher-level aspects include 
deciding the order in which the errands are to be performed, whereas lower-level aspects 
include factors that might delay task completion. For example, a higher-level aspect of the 
planning process would be going shopping for groceries followed by a trip to the 
gymnasium, whereas a lower-level aspect would be the delay caused by traffic congestion 
en route to the gymnasium. In addition to overestimating the number of errands that could 
be accomplished, participants in Hayes-Roth's (1980) research tended to underestimate the 
duration of each errand, suggesting that poor planning was accompanied by temporal 
misestimation. 
Time estimation has been the subject of considerable research (e.g., Byram, (1997; 
Josephs & Hahn, 1995; McClain, 1983; Zakay, 1989), with studies revealing evidence of 
poor judgement accuracy. There are two distinct areas of time estimation research, one of 
which concerns estimates of task completion times whilst the other concerns the perception 
of temporal intervals. Research into time perception has found that estimates of temporal 
intervals where no task is performed are generally inaccurate, suggesting that people tend 
to misperceive the passage of time (Block, 1989; Hawkins & Tedford, 1976; Poynter, 
1989; Zakay & Block, 1997; Zakay & Fallach, 1984). For example, AschofF(1985) found 
that participants were inaccurate when pressing a buzzer to signal the end of temporal 
intervals that ranged in duration fi-om a few seconds to two hours. 
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Research concerning estimates of task completion times has also found evidence of 
judgement inaccuracy, with many studies revealing that people tend to underestimate task 
duration. For example, Buehler, Grififin and Ross (1994) found that student participants 
underestimated the duration of real world tasks such as college coursework assignments. 
Such research provides support for the existence of the planning fallacy and the prevalence 
of temporal underestimation. Research into task completion time estimation will now be 
considered. 
1.3 Task Completion Time Estimation 
Research in this area has generally focused on the planning fallacy (e.g., Buehler et 
al., 1994), with an optimistic time prediction bias being observed on a variety of tasks. The 
planning fallacy was identified by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their research into the 
cognitive heuristics and biases that contaminate experts' judgements. They found that 
experts such as stockbrokers underestimated their task completion times despite possessing 
information about the late completion of previous similar activities. Kahneman and 
Tversky distinguish between two kinds of data that are available to people when planning 
tasks: information such as previous task performance (i.e., distributional information); and 
information concerning the task at hand (i.e., singular information). 
An aspect of singular information is the amount of work involved in completing a 
current task, whereas the duration of previous similar activities is an aspect of 
distributional information. Kahneman and Tversky suggest that the planning fallacy is a 
consequence of heuristic information processing whereby case-specific or singular 
information becomes the focus of attention at the expense of distributional information, 
which is neglected. Hence, the planning fallacy occurs because the current task is treated as 
a unique event, which is dissociated from previous similar activities (Buehler et al., 1994). 
Although Kahneman and Tversk/s (1979) research concerned experts'judgements, 
there is considerable evidence that non-experts also tend to make optimistically biased 
predictions of task duration (Buehler, Griffin & MacDonald, 1997; Byram, 1997; Griffin & 
Buehler, 1999; Koole & Van't Spijker, 2000). Using real worid tasks that ranged in 
duration from a number of days to several weeks, Buehler et al. (1994) found that 
participants tended to underestimate their completion times. For example, student 
participants underestimated the duration of various college coursework assignments 
including their final year dissertation. Analyses of verbal protocols revealed that 
participants tended to construct detailed mental scenarios of how a current task would 
proceed without impediments, suggesting that time predictions were based on singular 
information. 
Buehler et al. suggest that people tend to neglect information about past experiences 
because the process of predicting and planning naturally involves looking forward. 
However, Buehler et al. also found that temporal underestimation was reduced when 
participants were instructed to identify similarities between the current task and previous 
similar activities. They suggest that this focus of attention manipulation forced participants 
to take account of distributional information (e.g., previous task duration), which was 
incorporated into their time estimates, leading to a reduction in over-optimism. 
Temporal underestimation has also been observed on laboratory tasks that are of 
shorter duration (i.e., less than two hours) than the real worid tasks used by Buehler et al. 
(1994). Research by Josephs and Hahn (1995) revealed that student participants tended to 
underestimate the duration of tasks such as solving anagrams and proof-reading a 
manuscript. Likewise, Byram (1997) found evidence of temporal underestimation on 
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laboratory tasks as diverse as building self-assembly ftimiture and folding paper (i.e., 
origami). 
The role of motivational incentives was also investigated by Byram, who found that 
temporal underestimation was exacerbated when monetary rewards were contingent on the 
speed of task completion. That is, estimates were more over-optimistic among participants 
who were offered a financial bonus for completing an origami task within a pre-specified 
period of time. However, Byram also found that time estimates were lower in the speed 
incentive condition, whereas actual task completion times were not. Byram explains this 
finding by suggesting that the monetary incentive motivated participants to engage in 
wishftil thinking (Price, 2000). 
The interplay between cognition and motivation was investigated by Buehler et al. 
(1997), who also found that monetary incentives influenced time estimation bias. For 
example, individuals who expected to receive an income tax refiind underestimated the 
duration of completing their income tax form to a greater extent than people who did not 
anticipate a reftind. In a laboratory-based study, Buehler et al. found that participants' 
motivation for completing an anagram task influenced the direction in which their time 
estimates were biased. That is, over-optimism was evident when monetary incentives were 
contingent on the speed of task completion (speed incentive), whereas judgements were 
pessimistically biased when incentives were dependent on the accuracy of temporal 
estimates (accuracy incentive). 
Consistent with the notion of motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990), Buehler et al. 
suggest that the performance-contingent incentives affected the kind of reasoning strategy 
that participants adopted. Analyses of verbal protocols revealed that the speed incentive 
motivated participants to use a goal-oriented reasoning strategy in which attention was 
focused on information concerning successful task completion. For example, the number 
of vowels in each anagram became the focus of attention at the expense of other relevant 
information such as the person's ability to solve word puzzles. Conversely, Buehler et al. 
found that participants in the accuracy incentive condition used a more deliberative 
reasoning strategy in which information such as potential impediments to successful task 
completion was considered and incorporated into temporal estimates. 
Interestingly, whilst Buehler et al. found that over-optimism was eliminated in the 
accuracy incentive condition, time estimation bias was not reduced in absolute terms. That 
is, the magnitude of the pessimistic bias associated with the accuracy incentive condition 
was similar to the degree of over-optimism observed in the speed incentive condition. 
Although Buehler et al. offer no explanation for this finding, their research indicates that 
motivational incentives can influence the direction, i f not the magnitude, of time estimation 
bias. 
Given Buehler et al.'s (1997) research, it seems that motivational incentives for 
accurately estimating task duration can eliminate the temporal underestimation indicative 
of the planning fallacy. However, there is considerable research evidence of the planning 
fallacy in the temporal judgements of experts and non-experts, suggesting that it is a robust 
cognitive phenomenon, which is applicable to various long (Buehler et al., 1994) and short 
duration tasks (Byram, 1997). Thus, it seems that experts and non-experts alike lend to be 
inaccurate when making predictions of task duration. In a similar vein, there is a sizeable 
body of research which suggests that people are poor at judging or perceiving the passage 
of time (e.g., Curton & Lordahl, 1974; McClain, 1979; Poynter, 1989). That is, people are 
generally inaccurate when judging the length of temporal intervals. Research into human 
time perception will now be considered. 
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1.4 Time Perception 
The major areas of time perception that have been studied are the psychophysical 
aspects of temporal stimuli (Allan, 1979) and the cognitive processes involved in 
estimating temporal intervals (Block & Zakay, 1997; Kawamura, 2000; Zakay, Nitzan & 
Glicksohn, 1983). A number of contextual factors have also been studied including time 
estimation paradigm (Zakay, 1989) and the method of estimation (McConchie & 
Rutschmann, 1971). 
The most widely used methods of time estimation are the verbal estimation of an 
impending or just-completed interval, producing an upcoming interval, or reproducing a 
just-completed interval. The production and reproduction estimation methods involve 
experimental participants pressing a buzzer for pre-specified periods of time. There is 
evidence that time perception is equally poor with each of the three time estimation 
methods. McConchie and Rutschmann (1971) found that the extent to which participants 
misestimated the duration of temporal intervals was similar across all estimation methods. 
Hence, it seems that poor time perception is evident regardless of the manner in which 
people estimate the length of temporal intervals. 
Research into the type of time estimation paradigm has generally focused on 
differences in the length of estimates given at the end of an interval as a function of 
receiving some prior warning (Block & Zakay, 1994). Two distinct estimation paradigms 
have been employed: prospective and retrospective. In the prospective paradigm, 
participants receive advance warning that an estimate will be required at the end of a 
temporal interval, whereas no such prior warning is given in the retrospective paradigm. 
Research by Zakay (1989) revealed that the way in which temporal information is 
cognitively processed differed according to the presence or absence of an advance warning 
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about a subsequent time estimate. Zakay claims that people possess temporal and non-
temporal information processing mechanisms, which compete for cognitive resources. 
Zakay (1989) presents a model of time perception that highlights the importance of 
the presence or absence of an advance warning of a subsequent estimate in explaining the 
way in which temporal information is cognitively processed. This model suggests that, in 
the retrospective paradigm, greater cognitive resources are devoted to processing non-
temporal information because, during the temporal interval, people are unaware that they 
will have to estimate time subsequently. Conversely, in the prospective estimation 
paradigm, greater cognitive resources are devoted to processing temporal information 
because the prior warning of having to give an estimate subsequently serves as a cue to 
monitor the passage of time. 
Zakay's model also highlights the impact of the type of time estimation paradigm on 
the kind of information that is held in working memory. On the basis of a series of 
experiments, Zakay suggests that, in the prospective paradigm, the advance warning means 
that temporal information is retained in working memory and is used as a basis for 
estimating time subsequently. Conversely, in the retrospective paradigm, the absence of 
any prior warning means that temporal information is not the focus of attention and is thus 
ignored. Zakay suggests that retrospective time estimates are based on non-temporal 
information such as the amount of work involved in completing a task, which is retained in 
working memory. 
Zakay also found that information processing load interacted with the length of 
prospective temporal estimates. That is, compared to temporal intervals where no task was 
performed, prospective estimates were found to be shorter when a proof-reading task was 
performed during an interval. Zakay suggests that greater cognitive resources are devoted 
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to processing non-temporal information when a task is performed during an interval, 
leaving fewer resources available to monitor the passage of time. Thus, concurrent task 
performance means that fewer cognitive resources are available to process temporal 
information, which results in shorter prospective estimates. 
Research concerning the presence or absence of an advance warning about a 
subsequent time estimate has highlighted the cognitive processes involved in judging 
temporal intervals (Block & Zakay, 1996). Zakay's (1989) research indicates that 
performing a task during a temporal interval leaves fewer cognitive resources available to 
monitor the passage of time, which affects the length of prospective estimates. 
Extrapolating firom the findings of Zakay, it could be that task complexity influences 
estimates of task duration. That is, given that greater cognitive resources are needed to 
perform complex tasks (Maynard & Hakel, 1997), fewer attentional resources should be 
available to monitor the passage of time. Hence, estimates given at the end of a complex 
task should be based on non-temporal information such as the amount of work involved in 
task completion. 
Research into time perception has demonstrated that people are poor at estimating 
the duration of temporal intervals. Poor time perception is evident when a task is 
perfonmed during a temporal interval (Hicks & Brundige, 1974), or when task performance 
does not occur (Curton & Lordahl, 1974; Michon, 1965). Consistent with research into 
estimates of task duration (e.g., Byram, 1997), time perception research suggests that 
people tend to make inaccurate temporal judgements. Given that experts and non-experts 
make biased estimates of their own task completion times, it is unsurprising that there is 
considerable evidence of bias in non-temporal judgements of task performance (e.g., 
Einhom & Hogarth, 1978). Research in this domain will now be considered in order to 
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provide some explanations for non-temporal judgement bias, and highlight the prevalence 
of overconfidence. 
1.5 Bias in Non-Temporal Judgements 
There is evidence of bias or inaccuracy in non-temporal judgements of performance 
on a variety of tasks (Pulford & Coiman, 1997). Considerable research has found that 
people tend to display an overconfidence bias, that is, judgements of personal task 
performance are in general greater than actual task performance (Gilovich, Kerr & 
Medvec, 1993; Sniezek, Paese & Switzer, 1990; Trafimow & Sniezek, 1994). For example, 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips (1982) report that the number of general knowledge 
test questions that participants answered correctly was less than the number that they 
judged to be correct. Judgement overconfidence has been observed on tasks as diverse as 
answering general knowledge questions (Wright & Wisudha, 1982), memorising text 
(Winman, 1999) and predicting future events (Griffin, Dunning & Ross, 1990). 
This overconfidence bias has been attributed to inadequate cognitive processing of 
task-related or relevant information, that is, people of^en use sub-optimal information 
processing strategies when making judgements of personal task performance (Koriat, 
Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980). Support for this suggestion comes fi-om Sniezek et al. 
(1990) who found that overconfidence was reduced when attention was focused on 
information that was relevant to the task at hand. Sniezek et al. manipulated participants' 
focus of attention by providing differing numbers of cues on a multiple choice test and 
found that judgement overconfidence was greater when attention was focused on only one 
possible answer Sniezek et al. suggest that focusing attention on all possible answers 
meant that participants engaged in more thorough information processing, which resulted 
in greater judgement accuracy. 
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There is also evidence of judgement inaccuracy in real world settings such as 
business and commerce (Lawrence & O'Connor, 2000; Loffler, 1998). Research by 
Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg (1988) revealed that entrepreneurs were over-optimistic 
when predicting the chances of success for a new business venture. Cooper et al. suggest 
that, because entrepreneurs devote considerable financial resources to a new business 
venture, they are motivated to base their plans on the potential benefits of business success 
whilst neglecting information such as the high incidence of bankruptcy among new 
businesses (Busenitz & Murphy, 1996). 
In a similar vein, Baron (1998) found that entrepreneurs were over-optimistic when 
making various business-related decisions including how much work could be completed 
within a certain period of time. Baron suggests that entrepreneurs are prone to cognitive 
biases such as overconfidence because they make professional judgements under 
conditions of uncertainty. For example, when forecasting sales figures for a novel product, 
entrepreneurs have little or no task-related information upon which the base their 
judgement. 
Judgement inaccuracy is also apparent in the domain of expert judgement where 
medical decision making has been the focus of considerable research (Eistein, Shulman & 
Sprafka, 1990; Harries, Evans, Dennis & Dean, 1996). In general, such research has 
revealed that physicians fail to take account of all relevant information when making 
professional judgements (Wigton, 1996). For example, Speroff, Connors and Dawson 
(1990) found that judgements of levels of cardiac functioning differed from estimates that 
were derived from a statistical modelling procedure. Speroff et al. suggest that these 
judgements were based on information derived from medical records and physical 
examinations at the expense of information derived from specialist medical testing 
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procedures, which was overlooked. The findings of such research indicate that judgement 
inaccuracy occurs because experts such as physicians and entrepreneurs fail to consider all 
information that is relevant to the task at hand. 
There is also evidence that non-experts (i.e., experimental participants) make 
inaccurate judgements because they too neglect information that is relevant to the task at 
hand (Sniezek et al., 1990), Hence, it seems that experts and non-experts are often 
inaccurate when making non-temporal judgements of task performance. Indeed, given the 
findings of research into the planning fallacy (e.g., Buehler et al., 1994), it seems that 
people's temporal judgements also tend to be biased. In view of the prevalence of 
inaccuracy in temporal and non-temporal judgements, it is unsurprising that a number of 
techniques intended to improve judgement accuracy have been proposed. The success o f 
debiasing techniques in relation to temporal judgements will now be considered. In 
addition, some techniques that have been successful in debiasing non-temporal judgements 
of task performance will be specified. 
1.6 Debiasing Techniques 
Techniques intended to improve the accuracy of task performance judgements have 
been the focus of considerable research (Balzer, Doherty & O'Connor, 1989; Mumpower 
& Stewart, 1996; Shanteau, 1992; Shanteau & Stewart, 1992). In the domain of expert 
judgement, a number of strategies intended to reduce overconfidence in temporal and non-
temporal judgements were specified by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). These procedures 
are based largely on the principles of statistical prediction such as regression towards the 
mean. In essence, these procedures entail experts accessing or being provided with 
information about previous forecasts, which is then used as a basis for a current task 
prediction. Consistent with their research into the planning fallacy, Kahneman and Tversky 
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suggest that using such distributional information leads to more accurate judgements 
because experts are able to relate the current task to previous similar tasks rather than treat 
it as a unique event. 
The use of base rate data such as personal performance on previous similar tasks has 
been found to improve the accuracy of judgements of future life events such as getting 
married and obtaining employment (e.g., Osberg & Shrauger, 1986; Vallone, Griffin, Lin 
& Ross, 1990). Similarly, using information about previous task performance has met with 
some success in reducing temporal misestimation (Buehler et a l , 2002). As previously 
mentioned, Buehler et al. (1994) found that over-optimism was attenuated among 
participants who were instructed to link the current task to their performance on previous 
similar activities. Specifically, prior to estimating the duration of an upcoming college 
assignment, student participants were required to describe in detail a plausible scenario of 
task completion. Buehler et al. found that time estimates were less optimistically biased 
among participants who generated mental scenarios in which elements that were common 
to previous and present tasks were identified. 
The impact of information about previous similar tasks on time estimation bias was 
also studied by Byram (1997), who found that over-optimism was not attenuated when 
participants acquired task experience before predicting the duration of an origami task. 
However, as the task experience manipulation involved viewing the task instructions on 
two occasions only, it might have been insufficient as a method for providing task-related 
information. That is, as participants did not actually perform the origami task beforehand, 
they would not have possessed information about their previous task performance. 
The effects of prior task experience were also studied by Josephs and Hahn (1995), 
who found that time estimates made af^er 10 minutes of task performance were less 
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optimistically biased than estimates given beforehand. Josephs and Hahn also found that 
the accuracy of on-line time estimates interacted with actual task performance, as over-
optimism was only reduced among participants who had completed more of a proof-
reading task in 10 minutes. Josephs and Hahn suggest that time prediction accuracy was 
greater among the faster readers because these participants possessed greater task-related 
information, which was used as a basis for their on-line estimate. The findings of Buehler 
et al. (1994) and Josephs and Hahn suggest that using information about personal 
performance on previous tasks can lead to time estimates that are less optimistically biased, 
and thus more accurate. 
Instructing people to generate mental scenarios of task performance is another 
debiasing technique that has been studied in relation to temporal judgements. This 
technique essentially involves constructing mental scenarios of task completion that are 
less over-optimistic (Buehler et al., 2002). Research by Newby-Clark et al. (2000) used a 
mental scenario generation technique where participants were required to construct 
optimistic, realistic and pessimistic scenarios about the completion of various real world 
tasks such as college coursework assignments. 
The pessimistic scenario manipulation used by Newby-Clark et al. required 
participants to think about and document potential pitfalls that could delay task completion 
such as computer failure. Newby-Clark et al. found that pessimistic scenarios were rated as 
less plausible than optimistic ones when manipulated between-groups or as a repeated-
measure. Specifically, participants reported that pessimistic scenarios were unlikely to 
actually occur. Pessimistic mental scenarios were also found to be no more accurate than 
optimistic scenarios, that is, the magnitude of temporal underestimation did not differ 
according to the type of mental scenario generated. Newby-Clark et al. also found that 
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participants tended to focus attention on optimistic mental scenarios, suggesting that time 
estimates were based on best-case scenarios, which led to optimistically biased predictions. 
A similar debiasing technique was employed by Byram (1997), who instructed 
participants to think about and document potential pitfalls that might impede the 
completion of a self-assembly furniture task. However, Byram found that listing factors 
such as a broken task component did not reduce temporal underestimation. Whilst these 
findings suggest that thinking about potential pitfalls and setbacks does not reduce 
temporal underestimation, one study (Taylor & Armor, 1997, as cited in Taylor, Pham, 
Rifkin & Armor, 1998) has found that mentally simulating the task completion process can 
attenuate the planning fallacy. 
The research reported by Taylor et al. (1998) revealed that nearly half of all 
participants who received training in a mental simulation technique finished a college 
coursework assignment as predicted. This debiasing technique entailed thinking about the 
process of task completion, and carefully visualising all parts of the task. Participants were 
also required to rehearse this technique several times before task performance commenced. 
In contrast, fewer than 15 percent of participants who did not use this mental simulation 
technique completed a college coursework assignment as predicted. 
Taylor et al. suggest that mentally simulating the task completion process is 
beneficial in terms of goal attainment because it gives people the opportunity to consider 
how potential obstacles to successful task performance can be overcome. For example, the 
potential obstacle of not being able to obtain a recommended textbook from the college 
library can be overcome by ordering the book from the library well before the deadline for 
coursework submission (Taylor et al., 1998). However, as the majority of participants in 
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the mental simulation condition underestimated task duration, this technique reduced but 
did not ehminate the planning fallacy. 
The findings reported by Taylor et al. and those of Byram (1997) and Newby-Clark 
et al. (2000) provide rather equivocal evidence concerning the effectiveness of such 
techniques in debiasing time estimates. The limited success of mental scenario generation 
techniques contrasts with other research where thinking about alternative task outcomes 
has been effective in improving the accuracy of non-temporal judgements such as the 
prediction of future life events (Griffin et al., 1990). 
The generation of possible alternative outcomes has been found to improve the 
accuracy of judgements on various tasks including general knowledge questions (Koriat et 
al., 1980), clinical diagnosis (Arkes, Faust, Guilmette & Hart, 1988), future career 
prospects (Hoch, 1985) and life events (Dougherty, Gettys & Thomas, 1997; Hoch, 1984; 
Vallone et al., 1990). These debiasing techniques involve participants having to think 
about, and often list, reasons contradicting an impending judgement or a judgement that 
had just been made. The ensuing reduction in overconfidence and improvement in 
judgement accuracy has principally been attributed to greater cognitive processing of task-
related information, which occurs when alternative outcomes are considered and 
incorporated into judgements (Sniezek et al., 1990). 
Research by Koriat et al. (1980) revealed that overconfidence in judgements of 
general knowledge test questions was reduced among participants who had to choose 
between multiple-choice answers compared to those who had to generate their own 
answer. Koriat et al. also found that, relative to participants who produced a single answer 
each to general knowledge test question, judgement overconfidence was reduced among 
those individuals who had to generate two answers to each question. Koriat et al. suggest 
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that considering alternative answers eliminates the tendency to seek out information 
supporting a chosen answer and selectively neglect contradictory evidence. Likewise, 
Arkes et al. (1988) claim that having to list reasons favouring different medical diagnoses 
meant that neuropsychologists cognitively processed task-related information in greater 
depth, which resulted in less overconfidence and greater judgement accuracy. 
Whilst there is evidence that generating alternative task outcomes attenuates 
overconfidence in judgements of future events (Fischhoff & MacGregor, 1982; Koehler, 
1991), generating mental scenarios of task completion has met with limited success in 
relation to time estimation bias (Buehler et al., 2002). It has been suggested that 
individuals have more of a vested interest in accurately estimating the duration of college 
coursework assignments than answering general knowledge test questions (Newby-Clark 
et al., 2000). Hence, the personal relevance of the task could be responsible for the 
differential success of such techniques. Although this explanation seems intuitively 
plausible, there is evidence that judgements concerning personally-relevant tasks are less 
biased when such techniques are used. 
Research by Hoch (1985) revealed that generating alternative task outcomes was 
successful in improving the accuracy o f judgements of participants' future career 
prospects. This finding suggests that the personal relevance of a task cannot explain the 
differential success of such debiasing techniques. Support for this suggestion derives from 
the widespread and successful use of multiple scenario generation techniques within 
business settings (Kuhn & Sniezek, 1996; Schnaars & Topol, 1987; Schoemaker, 1993), 
where decision makers often have a vested interest in the outcome of judgement tasks 
(Cooper et al., 1988). Whilst the reasons for the differential success of mental scenario 
generation techniques are not clear, there is evidence that such debiasing strategies are 
relatively ineffective in relation to judgements of task duration (Byram, 1997). 
-21 -
Other debiasing techniques have been employed, but have in general been 
unsuccessful in reducing the temporal underestimation indicative of the planning fallacy. 
Although research suggests that aggregate or frequentist non-temporal judgements are less 
biased than probabilistic ones (Griffin & Tversky, 1992; Reeves & Lockhart, 1993; 
Sniezek & Buckley, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), Griffin and Buehler (1999) found 
that frequency-based time predictions were no less optimistically biased than predictions 
made in a probabilistic format. 
Using a variety of everyday tasks such as shopping. Griffin and Buehler's 
participants were required to predict the duration of each task and then either estimate how 
many of the tasks would be completed on time, or judge the probability of each task being 
completed within the time predicted. Griffin and Buehler found evidence of temporal 
underestimation regardless of the judgement format. They suggest that, because the tasks 
were self-selected, participants ignored the statistical nature of the experimental 
manipulation and focused attention instead on information concerning successful task 
completion. 
Task decomposition has been found to improve the accuracy of non-temporal 
judgements on tasks such as quantity estimation (MacGregor & Armstrong, 1994; 
MacGregor, Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1988), and is widely used as an organisational decision 
making aid (Klayman & Schoemaker, 1993). In relation to temporal judgements, this 
debiasing technique was employed by Byram (1997) who divided a furniture assembly task 
into three discrete components according to information presented in a step-by-step 
instruction booklet. Participants had to predict the duration of each of the components and 
then provide an estimate of the duration of the whole task. Byram found that this technique 
was unsuccessful in reducing judgement bias, as predictions for each of the three task 
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components were no less optimistically biased than estimates concerning overall task 
duration. Whilst Byram offers little in the way of an explanation for this finding, it seems 
that this task decomposition technique was unsuccessful in reducing time estimation bias. 
As can be seen above, research has employed several techniques intended to debias 
temporal and non-temporal judgements. There is evidence that considering information 
about previous task performance can improve the accuracy of time predictions (Buehler et 
al., 1994) and non-temporai judgements (Vallone et al., 1990). Consistent with the work of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), it thus seems that taking account of such distributional 
information can help to overcome the plarming fallacy. 
Whilst the use of such distributional information has been shown to be an effective 
technique for debiasing time estimates, other strategies that have been employed have not 
in general been successful in improving prediction accuracy. For example, making 
probabilistic time predictions does not seem to reduce over-optimism (Griffin & Buehler, 
1999), a finding that contrasts with other research where this technique has been successful 
in reducing overconfidence in non-temporal judgements (e.g.. Reeves & Lockhart, 1993). 
Likewise, techniques such as task decomposition and generating alternative task outcomes 
have met with considerable success in debiasing non-temporal judgements (e.g., Koriat et 
al., 1980), whereas similar techniques have not been successful in reducing time estimation 
bias (Byram, 1997; Newby-Clark et al., 2000). Thus, it seems that the majority of 
techniques employed have been unsuccessful in debiasing estimates of task duration. 
Since the planning fallacy is due to an over reliance on singular information and the 
neglect of distributional information (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), heuristic information 
processing is presumably used when estimating task duration (Buehler et al., 2002). That 
is, people tend not to take account of all pertinent information available to them, and so 
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base their time estimates on incomplete data. Given this suggestion, time estimation bias 
may well be influenced by judgemental heuristics such as anchoring and adjustment. Since 
heuristic information processing tends to result in judgement bias (Gilovich, Griffin & 
Kahneman, 2002), it is important to understand how cognitive heuristics operate in order to 
fully explore the time estimation process. To this end, research into judgemental heuristics 
and biases will now be considered. 
1.7 Judgemental Heuristics and Biases 
Considerable research suggests that people tend to use cognitive heuristics or mental 
shortcuts when making judgements under conditions of uncertainty (Chapman & Johnson, 
1994; 1999; 2002; Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). in essence, 
judgements under conditions of uncertainty entail an element of intuition and speculation. 
For example, a condition of uncertainty exists when a publisher predicts the future sales 
figures for a new book (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In an extensive review of the early 
work in this domain, Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) found that judgements which 
are based on cognitive heuristics tend to result in error or bias. That is, judgements based 
on heuristic information processing of^en fail to meet the standards of normative theories 
such as probability calculus (Tversky & Kahneman, 2002), which results in biases such as 
overconfidence and the neglect of base rate data. 
Cognitive heuristics have been found to influence judgements of performance on 
tasks as diverse as forecasting financial growth (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993) and editing 
text (Switzer & Sniezek, 1991). Judgemental heuristics have also been observed in a 
variety of settings such as business and commerce, and several academic disciplines 
including law, medicine and economics (Gilovich et al., 2002). Kahneman et al. (1982) 
suggest that cognitive heuristics are essentially information processing strategies, which 
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enable people to make judgements in a fast and efficient manner. However, the heuristic 
nature of such information processing means that judgements are contaminated by error or 
bias because they are based on limited amounts of information (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) identified three major cognitive heuristics that 
influence judgements made under conditions of uncertainty: representativeness; 
availability; anchoring and adjustment. 
The representativeness heuristic refers to the fact that judgements are often based on 
the degree of similarity between a criterion such as a personality characteristic and 
membership of a target category such as a vocational occupation (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1982b). Kahneman and Tversky (1982b) found that the use of the representativeness 
heuristic was characterised by the neglect of prior probabilities such as population base 
rate data, which led to judgement bias. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973) found that, when participants took account of base 
rate data, representativeness was not used and judgements were consequently less biased. 
Although the representativeness heuristic has not been studied in relation to time 
estimation, it is characterised by a neglect of base rate data, which i f utilised leads to 
greater judgement accuracy. Thus, there are similarities between this cognitive heuristic 
and the planning fallacy in that both are characterised by a neglect of information such as 
base rate data, which leads to biased judgements. 
The availability heuristic occurs because judgements about a target event are often 
based on the ease with which information about the event is brought to mind. For example, 
an individual might judge their chances of contracting a particular illness using readily 
available information such as the number of family members who have suffered from the 
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illness (Tversky & Kahneman, 2002). Kahneman and Tversky (1982a; 1982b) suggest that 
the ease with which event-consistent information is brought to mind stems from memory 
retrieval and mental simulation processes. Consistent with this suggestion, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973) found that participants who had just read a newspaper article about a 
house fire tended to overestimate the probability of their involvement in such an incident. 
Tversky and Kahneman suggest that such overestimation occurred because 
information concerning the target event was primed by reading the newspaper article and 
could easily be brought to mind. Moreover, they suggest that participants mentally 
simulated the target event and recalled event-consistent information. Such information was 
then incorporated into participants' judgements at the expense of probabilistic information 
(e.g., the likelihood of being involved in a house fire), which was neglected. 
Whilst the availability heuristic has not been studied in relation to time estimation, it 
has been suggested as a reason for temporal underestimation. That is, when estimating task 
duration, people focus attention on information about the current task because it is readily 
available to them, a strategy that results in an optimistic bias (Byram, 1997). Indeed, there 
is evidence that over-optimism occurs because time predictions are based on information 
about how a task will proceed without impediments (Buehler et al., 1994; Newby-Clark et 
al., 2000). Given this evidence, people may well rely on singular information when 
estimating task duration because such case-specific data can readily be brought to mind. 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristics refer to the undue influence of prior 
information such as a numerical value on subsequent judgements of a target stimulus or 
event (George, Duffy & Ahuja, 2000). The use of these heuristics results in judgements 
being based or anchored on prior information about the target stimulus or event with 
- 2 6 -
insufficient adjustment for other relevant information about the target stimulus or event 
(Carlson, 1990; Schwarz & Wyer, 1985). 
A simple but elegant study of the anchoring and adjustment heuristics was conducted 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). This study revealed that estimates of the percentage of 
African countries in the United Nations were influenced by irrelevant numerical values, 
which were ostensibly derived at random by spinning a 'wheel of fortune'. Prior to giving 
a percentage estimate, participants received either a high (65) or a low (10) numerical 
value from spinning the *wheel of fortune'. Tversky and Kahneman found that estimates 
were lower in the low anchor condition, whereas estimates were higher among participants 
who received the high numerical value. Tversky and Kahneman suggest that judgements 
were insufficiently adjusted from the numerical values, which thus served as anchors. 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristics have been observed on a variety of tasks 
(Kruger, 1999), and have been used when information that is relevant to the judgement 
task serves as an anchor. For example, Northcraft and Neale (1987) found that estate 
agents tended to base their estimates of property prices on previously-received information 
concerning property prices. Northcraft and Neale suggest that the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristics are not confined to artificial laboratory tasks, but also lead to biased 
judgements in real worid settings. 
In contrast to the standard anchoring paradigm (Chapman & Johnson, 2002), there is 
evidence that being presented with numerical information is not a pre-requisite for 
judgement bias to occur as a result of anchoring and adjustment. A series o f studies by 
Epley and Gilovich (2002) revealed that the anchoring and adjustment heuristics were used 
by participants who had to generate their own numerical answers to general knowledge 
questions. Epley and Gilovich suggest that bias was a consequence of judgements (i.e., 
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answers) being insufficiently adjusted from self-generated numerical anchor values, which 
concerned incorrect information about the target questions. 
The applicability of the anchoring and adjustment heuristics to judgements of task 
duration was highlighted by Buehler, MacDonald and Griffin (1994, as cited in Buehler, 
Griffin & Ross, 1995). Buehler et al. (1995) report that esfimates of the duration of a 
college computer-based assignment were anchored on either a long or a short temporal 
interval, which was supposedly chosen at random, hi actual fact, prior to estimating task 
duration, student participants were assigned a low (4) or high (17) number by the 
researchers, which concerned the number of days in which the assignment had to be 
completed. Buehler et al. (1995) report that time estimates were insufficiently adjusted 
fi-om these numerical values, with participants who were assigned the low value giving 
lower predictions than those who were assigned the high value. However, there was no 
difference in prediction accuracy or the direction of bias (i.e., optimistic or pessimistic) as 
a function of anchoring, with both groups underestimating task duration to a similar extent. 
Since the planning fallacy has been attributed to heuristic information processing 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), cognitive heuristics can provide potentially important 
information concerning the reasons for temporal misestimation. For example, as suggested 
by Byram (1997), the over reliance on singular information when estimating task duration 
could be explained by the use of the availability heuristic. Moreover, there is evidence that 
the use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristics leads to biased estimates of task 
duration (Buehler et al., 1995). 
Although it is not known whether the representativeness heuristic is applicable to 
time estimation, judgements made using this strategy are characterised by a neglect of base 
rate data, which results in bias. However, when people take account of base rate data, there 
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is evidence that the representativeness heuristic is not used and judgement bias is reduced 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Given that the neglect of distributional information is a key 
determinant of the planning fallacy (Buehler et al., 1994), it seems appropriate to highlight 
instances where such information has been used to good effect, that is, to reduce judgement 
bias. 
Whilst the use of task-related information has been successful in reducing bias in 
judgements of task duration (Buehler et al., 2002), few other factors that influence the 
accuracy of time estimates have been identified. However, a number o f factors that 
mediate bias in non-temporal judgements of task performance have been studied (e.g., 
McMackin & Slovic, 2000; Payne, Johnson & Bettman, 1993). Given the focus of this 
thesis, it is necessary to consider such research in order to identify factors that might also 
mediate the accuracy of temporal judgements. To this end, research concerning factors that 
influence bias in non-temporal judgements will now be discussed. 
1.8 Factors That Influence Bias in Non-Temporal Judgements 
Task complexity is one factor that has been found to influence judgement bias 
(B^nabou & Tirole, 2002; Juslin, Winman & Olsson, 2000; Soil, 1996; Suantak, Bolger & 
Ferrell, 1996). Considerable research has found that judgement confidence differs 
according to the level of difficulty of tasks as diverse as answering general knowledge test 
questions (Bomstein & Zickafoose, 1999; Peterson & Pitz, 1988; Pulford & Colman, 1997; 
Wright & Wisudha, 1982), memorising text (Winman, 1999) and predicting future events 
(Fischhoff & MacGregor, 1982). Consistent with the phenomenon known as the difficulty 
effect (Griffin & Tversky, 1992), such research indicates that task complexity is positively 
related to judgement confidence. That is, judgements of performance on difficult tasks tend 
to be overconfident, whereas underconfidence prevails on easier tasks. 
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Empirical support for the impact of task difficulty on judgement bias comes from 
Suantak et al. (1996). Suantak et al. categorised several multiple-choice general knowledge 
test questions according to their level of complexity and asked participants to estimate their 
degree of confidence in the chosen answers being correct. They found evidence of 
overconfidence on questions classified as being difficult, whereas underconfidence 
occurred on test items classified as being easy. 
Suantak et al. provide an anchoring and adjustment explanation for this hard-easy 
effect by suggesting that judgement confidence is insufficiently adjusted according to 
changes in the difficulty of tasks (or test questions). That is, overconfidence occurs when 
task complexity increases because judgements are anchored on the perceived lower level of 
difficulty of the previous task, with insufficient adjustment for the greater complexity of 
the next task. Conversely, insufficient adjustment leads to underconfidence when task 
complexity decreases because judgements are anchored on the perceived greater level o f 
difficulty of the previous task. 
Performance feedback is another factor that has been found to mediate judgement 
bias (Bomstein & Zickafoose, 1999; Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989; Sharp, Cutler & Penrod, 
1988), with different types of feedback being studied. For example, self-feedback gained 
through prior task experience has been found to reduce overconfidence on tasks including 
judging other people's behaviour (Paese & Sniezek, 1991) and answering general 
knowledge test questions (Pulford & Colman, 1997). 
Research has also revealed that outcome feedback can reduce overconfidence thus 
improving judgement accuracy (Radhakrishnan, Arrow & Sniezek, 1996). Radhakrishnan 
et al. found that predictions of examination performance were more accurate once the 
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results of previous examinations were available to participants. They propose a model of 
performance self-evaluation, which integrates cognitive factors such as a biased search of 
memory, and temporal factors such as the time lapse between task performance and the 
receipt of feedback. They suggest that outcome feedback will only reduce judgement bias 
i f it is objective and unambiguous, and is presented shortly after a task has been performed. 
There is also evidence that temporal factors influence task performance (Ariely & 
Loewenstein, 2000; Ariely & Zakay, 2001; Das, 1991; Libenman & Trope, 1998; Trope & 
Liberman, 2000) and judgement bias (Bemsden & van der Pligt, 2001; Savitsky, Medvec, 
Charlton & Gilovich, 1998). Research by Shepperd, Oullette and Fernandez (1996) 
revealed that students' judgements of their future career prospects went from being over-
optimistic to pessimistic as the time of college graduation drew nearer. Similarly, using 
tasks such as memory recall and college examinations, Gilovich et al. (1993) found that the 
temporal interval between task prediction and task perfomiance mediated judgement bias. 
That is, judgements were overconfident when task performance occurred at a later date, 
whereas an underconfidence bias prevailed when task performance was imminent. 
Gilovich et al. propose that, as task performance approaches, people think about 
factors that might impede successful task completion such as inadequate examination 
revision, which results in pessimistically biased judgements. Gilovich et al. also suggest 
that such defensive pessimism (Norem & Cantor, 1986a; 1986b) is a coping strategy, 
which is employed to maintain self-esteem, and is exacerbated by the prospect of one's 
performance being objectively evaluated. Consistent with this suggestion, research has 
revealed that judgement confidence is reduced when people feel accountable for their 
decisions (Lemer & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1985; Tetlock & Boettger, 1994). Hence, 
judgements could be pessimistically biased when task performance is imminent because 
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people do not wish to feel and appear incompetent, or be held accountable for their poor 
performance. 
The impact of task experience on judgement accuracy and actual task performance 
has been the focus of considerable research (e.g., Littlepage, Robison & Reddington, 1997; 
Nembhard, 2000). Various forms of task experience have been studied including task 
practice or pre-exposure (Johnson & Kanfer, 1992; King, Zechmeister & Shaughnessy, 
1980), expertise (Chi, Glaser & Rees, 1982; Lesgold, Glaser, Rubinson, Klopfer, Feltovich 
& Wang, 1988) and expert-novice differences (Abemathy, Neal & Koning, 1994; Ste-
Marie, 1999). In general, task experience has been found to be positively related to 
judgement accuracy, with experience leading to greater accuracy. Research by Smith and 
Kida (1991) revealed that, relative to novices, judgements made by experts were less 
susceptible to cognitive heuristics such as representativeness and biases such as the neglect 
of base rate data. Smith and Kida suggest that experts rely less on cognitive heuristics than 
novices because they possess greater task-related information, which forms the basis of 
judgements that are more accurate. 
Evidence of a link between task experience and the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristics comes fi-om Mussweiler and Strack (2000). They found that anchoring effects 
were attenuated among participants who had experience of judgement tasks such as general 
knowledge tests. Mussweiler and Strack suggest that when task experience is minimal or 
absent, judgements are anchored on irrelevant information such as a numerical value 
because of a lack of task-related information. Similar effects were observed by Wilson, 
Houston, Etling and Brekke (1996), who found a relationship between the level of prior 
task-related knowledge and reliance on numerical anchor values. For example, judgements 
made by participants who possessed greater knowledge of the number of countries in the 
United Nations were less influenced by pre-specified numerical anchor values than 
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participants with less knowledge of the judgement task. Hence, such findings indicate that 
uncertainty about a task increases the reliance on cognitive heuristics, which in turn leads 
to judgement bias. 
The research reviewed in this section highlights the fact that several factors have 
been found to mediate bias in non-temporal judgements. It has been shown that different 
types of feedback about task performance can reduce overconfidence in judgements (e.g., 
Radhakrishnan et al., 1996). Research has also revealed that temporal factors such as the 
interval between predicted and actual task performance can affect the direction in which 
judgements are biased (Gilovich et al., 1993; Shepperd et a l , 1996). The direction of 
judgement bias has also been found to differ according to the level of difficulty of various 
tasks, with overconfidence being evident on more complex tasks and underconfidence 
prevailing on simpler ones (Suantak et al., 1996). Whilst it is not known whether the 
difficulty effect (Griffin & Tversky, 1992) is applicable to judgements of task duration, it 
could be that task complexity influences the length of estimates made at the end of 
temporal intervals (Zakay, 1989). In addition to emphasising the cognitive processes 
involved in time estimation, the work of Zakay suggests that task complexity might 
influence the length of temporal judgements. 
The research reviewed in this section also demonstrates that task experience is a 
factor that mediates bias in non-temporal judgements. There is evidence that task 
experience reduces the reliance on cognitive heuristics, thus improving judgement 
accuracy (Smith & ICida, 1991). Given that the planning fallacy occurs because 
distributional information is overlooked (Ross & Buehler, 2001), it is interesting that 
having some experience of a task has been found to reduce temporal underestimation 
(Josephs & Hahn, 1995). This finding suggests that people not only consider information 
about their previous task performance, but can also use it to make time estimates that are 
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less optimistically biased. Whilst factors such as task experience and task complexity have 
been found to influence bias in non-temporal judgements, it is notable that mediating 
factors have received little empirical treatment in relation to time estimation. This issue is 
addressed in the present programme of research, where a number of factors that might 
influence the accuracy of people's task completion time estimates are investigated. 
1.9 Research Programme 
This research programme focuses on a number of potentially important factors that 
might mediate the accuracy of people's time predictions. Principally, the effects of task 
complexity, duration and prior experience on time estimation accuracy are examined, hi 
addition, the issues of monetary incentives and the order in which similar and dissimilar 
tasks are performed are addressed. The research programme comprises a total of nine 
experiments. The tasks used in all these studies are well structured, that is, they consist of 
well defined components and must be completed sequentially. In order to accurately 
measure task duration, tasks were performed within a laboratory environment in all studies. 
Since task experience has been found to improve the accuracy of non-temporal 
judgements (Smith & Kida, 1991), it may also lead to a reduction in time estimation bias. 
Given the findings of Smith and Kida, it could be that people with task experience do not 
engage in heuristic information processing when judging task duration. For example, task 
experience may provide people with some kind of distributional information, which could 
be incorporated into their time estimates. On the basis of Buehler et al.'s (1994) research, 
time predictions should be more accurate when information about personal performance on 
previous tasks is taken into account when estimating task duration. 
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Given the role of distributional information in detennining the planning fallacy 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), it is notable that the issue of task experience has received 
little empirical treatment in relation to time estimation bias. Whilst Josephs and Hahn 
(1995) found that on-line time estimates were more accurate than those made in advance of 
task performance, previewing task instructions does not seem to reduce time prediction 
bias (Byram, 1997). However, tasks on which participants had no prior experience of 
performing have often been employed in previous research. For example, the college thesis 
used by Buehler et al. (1994) was a task on which participants were unlikely to possess 
distributional information when predicting its duration. That is, Buehler et al.'s student 
participants were unlikely to have completed a college thesis prior to the experiment. In 
such circumstances, the person can only rely on information about the current task when 
making a time prediction, a strategy that would be expected to result in temporal 
underestimation (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
In order to address the issue of task experience, it is thus appropriate for research to 
employ tasks on which participants have or can acquire some prior experience. To this end, 
participants in the present studies performed similar tasks in succession, or experienced the 
same task before making a time estimate. Such methods ensured that participants had some 
kind of information about the upcoming task when they estimated its duration. 
Whilst temporal underestimation has been observed on tasks as diverse as self-
assembly furniture (Byram, 1997), college assignments (Koole & Van't Spijker, 2000), 
anagrams and income tax forms (Buehler et al., 1997), the issue of task complexity has not 
been studied in this domain. Given that bias in non-temporal judgements differs according 
to task complexity (Bomstein & Zickafoose, 1999; Peterson & Pitz, 1988; Suanlak, et a!., 
1996), it could be that task difficulty also mediates time estimation bias. Hence, the 
difficulty effect (Griffin & Tversky, 1992) may well generalise to judgements of task 
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duration. That is, time predictions might be over-optimistic or overconfident on more 
complex tasks, whereas a pessimistic bias or underconfidence may prevail on simpler 
tasks. The existence of the difficulty effect provides a sound rationale for studying the 
impact of task complexity on time estimation bias, hi the present research, the issue of task 
complexity was addressed by using different versions of the same task, which differed in 
cognitive complexity. 
I f research is to accurately measure the extent of time estimation bias, then tasks on 
which objective measures of duration can be obtained should be employed. Whilst it is 
laudable that previous research has used real world tasks such as college theses (Buehler et 
al., 1994) and income tax forms (Buehler et al., 1997), many studies have used self-report 
measures of task duration. For example, Newby-Clark et al. (2000) contacted participants 
by telephone to ascertain when they had completed a college coursework assignment. 
The use of such self-report measures meant that there was little or no verification of 
actual task duration. Moreover, as the self-report measures used previously were often 
obtained some time after task completion, it is possible that participants might have 
misremembered their completion times. Consistent with this suggestion, there is evidence 
that retrospective self-reports are characterised by the inaccurate recall of information 
(Ross, 1989). Hence, in research where task duration was self-reported (e.g., Koole & 
Van't Spijker, 2000), participants may well have incorrectly recalled their completion 
times, hi order to accurately measure participants' task completion times, laboratory-based 
tasks were employed throughout the present research programme. 
Given the variety of tasks used in previous research (e.g., Buehler et al., 1994; 1997), 
it is surprising that many of them do not lend themselves to the study of time estimation 
and task planning. That is, many of the tasks used previously do not consist of sequential 
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components, thus making it difficult for participants to construct a plan before making a 
time prediction (Hayes-Roth, 1980). Although some research has employed tasks with well 
defined components that can be performed sequentially (Byram, 1997), several other 
studies have used tasks that are less well structured. For example, Buehler et al. (1997) 
used an anagram task, but research by Kelley and Jacoby (1996) suggests that such tasks 
are i l l structured and solved using the intuitive mode of cognition associated with insight 
problems. Hence, participants in Buehler et al.'s study may not have perceived the 
components necessary for successful completion when predicting task duration. If, as 
seems likely with certain tasks, plamiing is problematic, it is not clear what information 
people use as a basis for estimating their completion times. In order to facilitate task 
planning, tasks that are well structured were employed in the present research programme. 
The Tower of Hanoi is a classic example of a well structured laboratory-based task, 
which has been the subject of considerable research into planning processes (Davies, 
2000a; 2000b; Goel & Grafinan, 1995; Simon, 1975). This task comprises a number of 
different-sized disks, which must be moved across three vertical pegs to complete a 
specified pattern using only permitted moves. The rules of the task specify that larger disks 
must not be placed on top of smaller ones, and that disks can only be moved one at a time. 
The Tower of Hanoi lends itself to the study of task planning because successful 
completion involves reaching a goal by performing a series of actions (Karat, 1982). The 
Tower of Hanoi is also well suited to the manipulation of task complexity because the 
number of disks that must be moved varies between different versions of the task (Davies, 
2000a). Given that the Tower of Hanoi has been used to study task planning, and is a 
suitable tool for manipulating task complexity, it was employed in the present research 
programme. 
37 
The research presented in the next chapter of this thesis comprises three studies, 
which investigate a number of factors that might mediate the accuracy of time estimates on 
the Tower of Hanoi task. Given the findings of Josephs and Hahn (1995), the issue of task 
experience was the focus of Experiment 1. Using the three-disk version of the Tower of 
Hanoi, the impact of task practice and pre-exposure on time estimation bias were 
examined. The issue of task complexity was addressed in Experiment 2, where the more 
cognitively complex four-disk version was employed alongside the three-disk task. In this 
study, task experience was also manipulated by allowing some participants to be exposed 
to the three-disk and four-disk tasks beforehand. In the light of Buehler et al.'s (1997) 
research, Experiment 3 included a manipulation of monetary incentives in order to flirther 
examine the link between motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) and time estimation bias. 
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Chapter Two 
The Effects of Prior Experience, Task Complexity and Motivational Incentives on Time 
Estimation Bias 
2.1 Overview 
The research presented in this chapter comprises three experiments, which 
investigate a number of factors that might influence time estimation accuracy. Since 
performance on previous similar tasks is an aspect of distributional information 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), task experience may well be an important determinant of 
time estimation bias. Indeed, it has been shown that time predictions are less optimistically 
biased when the similarities between current and previous tasks are recognised (Buehler et 
al., 1994). Likewise, temporal underestimation has been found to be reduced when people 
have experience of performing a task (Josephs & Hahn, 1995). These findings indicate that 
time estimation bias is attenuated when people possess some kind of prior task experience. 
Hence, it seems that such distributional information is not only incorporated into task 
duration judgements, but can also be used to good effect, that is, to improve prediction 
accuracy. 
The issue of task experience was further addressed in the present research, where 
different types of task experience were experimentally manipulated. Experiment 1 focused 
on the issue of prior experience of the three-disk Tower of Hanoi task, whilst prior 
experience of the more complex four-disk version was explored in Experiment 2. Using 
two different versions of the Tower of Hanoi meant that the issue of task complexity was 
also addressed in Experiment 2. 
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Another aim of the present research was to examine the impact of motivational 
incentives on time estimation bias. There is evidence that temporal underestimation is 
exacerbated when monetary rewards are contingent on the speed of task completion 
(Byram, 1997), suggesting that motivational incentives can induce wishflil thinking (Price, 
2000). It has also been demonstrated that monetary incentives are linked to the direction in 
which task duration estimates are biased (Buehler et al,, 1997). That is, an optimistic time 
prediction bias occurs when rewards are dependent on estimation accuracy, whereas a 
pessimistic bias is evident when rewards are contingent on the speed o f task completion. 
Given that these findings have been observed on an anagram task (Buehler et al, 
1997), it could be that motivational incentives are an important determinant of time 
estimation bias on laboratory tasks. For example, when faced with a relatively unfamiliar 
task, the prospect of receiving a monetary reward could motivate participants to engage in 
wishfiil thinking, which results in an optimistic prediction bias. The issue of motivational 
incentives was addressed in Experiment 3, which aimed to confirm the findings of Buehler 
et al. (1997) concerning the link between motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) and the 
direction of time prediction bias. 
2.2 General Introduction to Experiments I , 2 and 3 
Whilst temporal underestimation has been observed on laboratory tasks as diverse as 
anagrams (Buehler et al., 1997; Josephs & Hahn, 1995) and self-assembly ftimiture 
(Byram, 1997), some of the tasks used previously do not comprise well defined 
components, meaning that task planning may be problematic (Hayes-Roth, 1980). For 
example, there is evidence that anagram and word puzzle tasks are i l l structured and are 
solved using the intuitive mode of cognition associated with insight problems (Kelley & 
Jacoby, 1996). Hence, people might not perceive the components necessary for task 
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completion when predicting the duration of such tasks. Although it is not known whether 
time estimation accuracy differs according to the type of task that is about to be performed, 
it is appropriate for research to employ tasks on which planning is possible. In order to 
facilitate task planning, the present research used a well structured task, that is, a task with 
well defined components. 
The Tower of Hanoi is a laboratory-based task that has been the subject of 
considerable research into planning and cognitive processes (Davies, 2000a; 2000b; Goel 
& Grafinan, 1995; Kotovsky, Hayes & Simon, 1985; Simon, 1975). In its most common 
form, the task involves moving a number of disks across three vertical pegs in a specified 
manner. Disk movement is constrained by the rules of the task, which state that disks must 
be moved individually and cannot be placed on a peg when it is covered by a smaller disk. 
A closely related task that has been used in research into planning and cognitive 
processes is the Tower of London (e.g., Phillips, Wynn, Gilhooly, Delia Sala & Logic, 
1999; Phillips, Wynn, McPherson & Gilhooly, 2001; Ward & Allport, 1997). Like the 
Tower of Hanoi, this task involves transferring different numbers of disks between three 
vertical pegs. Such tasks lend themselves to the study of planning because successful 
completion involves reaching a goal by performing a series of steps. For example, on the 
Tower of Hanoi, some kind of planning is likely to be necessary in order to move the disks 
in accordance with the rules of the task (Karat, 1982). Since the Tower of Hanoi task has 
been the subject of considerable research into task planning (e.g., Davies, 2000a; Sohn & 
Gaudiot, 1992), it was employed in the present studies. 
The Tower of Hanoi task is also well suited to the manipulation of task complexity, 
as different versions vary in the number of subgoals that must be created. Subgoals are 
established whenever disks cannot be placed on the destination peg because such a move 
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would violate the rules of the task (Goel & Grafman, 1995). Thus, as the number of disks 
increases, task completion involves establishing a greater number of subgoals (Spitz, 
Minsky & Bessellieu, 1984). Given that there are only three vertical pegs, and disk 
movement is constrained by the rules of the task, it is necessary to establish more subgoals 
as the number of disks increases (Simon, 1975). Similarly, as the number of disks 
increases, people's ability to mentally represent the disk moves necessary for task 
completion is likely to be constrained by working memory limitations (Davies, 2000a). 
These findings suggest that different versions of the Tower of Hanoi task differ in 
cognitive complexity. Thus, it seems appropriate to use this task when studying the impact 
of task complexity on time estimation bias. 
On the basis of previous research (e.g., Byram, 1997; Koole & Van't Spijker, 2000), 
it could be that time estimates on the Tower of Hanoi will be optimistically biased, but this 
is not yet known. Indeed, Lesgold (1988) found that, on problems with well defined initial 
and end states, people were able to form a mental representation of the problem structure 
and the actions needed for task completion. Thus, on well structured tasks such as the 
Tower of Hanoi, time estimates may be more accurate because people have a mental 
representation of what the task entails when predicting task duration. Conversely, on less 
well structured tasks such as anagrams, time estimates might be more biased as people are 
unable to construct a mental representation beforehand. A key aim of the present research 
was to investigate the direction and extent of time estimation bias on the Tower of Hanoi 
task. 
Given the findings of previous research (e.g., Buehler et al., 1997), motivational 
incentives may well be an important determinant of time estimation bias. Motivational 
incentives in the form of monetary rewards have been linked to an increase in temporal 
underestimation on tasks as diverse as origami (Byram, 1997) and income tax forms 
- 4 2 -
(Buehler et al., 1997). It has been proposed that monetary incentives can motivate people 
to engage in wishful thinking when predicting task duration, which results in greater over-
optimism (Byram, 1997). Monetary incentives have also been found to affect whether time 
estimates are optimistically or pessimistically biased. Buehler et al. (1997) found that, 
when incentives were dependent on prediction accuracy, a deliberative reasoning strategy 
was employed, which led to a pessimistic judgement bias. Conversely, when motivational 
incentives were contingent on the speed of task completion, a goal-directed reasoning 
strategy was adopted, which resulted in an optimistic judgement bias. 
Motivational incentives have also been found to influence the accuracy of non-
temporal judgements of task performance (Ashford, 1989; Henry, 1994; Sniezek & 
Buckley, 1991; Stone & Ziebart, 1995; Wright & Anderson, 1989; Wright & Aboul-Ezz, 
1988). Research by Heruy and Sniezek (1993) revealed that predictions were over-
optimistic when participants were offered a monetary incentive for completing a general 
knowledge task. Henry and Sniezek suggest that, in the presence of incentives, judgements 
of performance are distorted to represent the desired level of achievement rather than the 
level that is attained. Similarly, Henry (1994) suggests that motivational incentives such as 
money may encourage a sense of unrealistic optimism leading to an overestimation of 
personal task performance ability. That is, when incentives are offered people tend to 
predict a higher level of task performance in order to attain a goal that has a favourable 
outcome. 
These findings indicate that motivational incentives can lead to over-optimism in 
time estimates (e.g., Byram, 1997) and other judgements of task performance (e.g., Henry, 
1994). There is also evidence that monetary rewards can motivate people to engage in 
different reasoning strategies, which in turn affects the direction in which their time 
estimates are biased (Buehler et al., 1997). Given such findings, a key aim of the present 
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research was to ascertain whether monetary incentives influenced time estimation bias on 
the Tower of Hanoi task. This issue was addressed in Experiment 3, where monetary 
incentives that were contingent on either the speed of task completion or the accuracy of 
time estimates were offered. 
Given that distributional information is a important component of the plaiuiing 
fallacy (Buehler et al., 2002), it is notable that the issue of task experience has received 
little empirical treatment in relation to time estimation. Whilst the neglect of distributional 
information is a possible cause of the planning fallacy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), there 
is evidence that over-optimism is attenuated when base rate data are incorporated into 
temporal judgements. Specifically, Buehler et al. (1994) found that a focus of attention 
manipulation led to information about previous task performance being considered and 
used to make predictions that were more accurate. Buehler et al.'s research indicates that, 
when estimating the duration of a current task, people can draw upon their experience of 
performing similar tasks previously. 
A different type of task experience was studied by Josephs and Hahn (1995), who 
found that time estimates given on-line were less optimistically biased than those made 
prior to task performance. Josephs and Hahn attribute this finding to the fact that 
participants possessed greater task-related information when making an on-line time 
estimate. Whilst this finding suggests that prior task experience can reduce prediction bias, 
research by Byram (1997) indicates that previewing task instructions does not reduce 
temporal underestimation. Such equivocal findings contrast with other research where 
prior task experience or task familiarity has been found improve the accuracy of non-
temporal judgements of task performance (e.g., Johnson & Kanfer, 1992). 
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Research by King et al. (1980) revealed that predictions concerning the recall of 
memory test items were more accurate when participants were given practice trials of a 
memory-monitoring task. That is, reading word lists beforehand resulted in greater 
accuracy when predicting the subsequent recall of the previously-presented words. In a 
similar vein, prior task experience has been found to improve the accuracy of judgements 
of task performance by reducing people's reliance on the anchoring and adjustment 
(Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000; Wilson et al., 1996) and 
representativeness cognitive heuristics (Smith & Kida, 1991). These findings suggest that 
having some experience of a task enables people to make more accurate non-temporal 
judgements of their task performance. 
In the present studies, different forms of task experience were investigated in order to 
confirm some of the findings of previous research. Given that time predictions are more 
accurate when the similarities between previous and current tasks are recognised (Buehler 
et al., 1994), it could be that prior performance of a similar task leads to a reduction in bias 
on a subsequent task. In order to address this issue, the order in which different versions of 
the Tower of Hanoi were performed was manipulated in Experiments 2 and 3. As different 
versions of this task share the same structure (Kotovsky et al., 1985), it was anticipated that 
performing the first task would provide participants with some kind of information that 
was relevant to the second task. That is, participants would recognise the similarities 
between the just-completed task and the upcoming task. By employing different versions 
of the Tower of Hanoi, the impact of prior performance of a more or less complex version 
of the same task on time prediction bias was also investigated. 
The issue of prior experience of the same task was also addressed in the present 
research. Following the work of Byram (1997), the impact of previewing a task and its 
instructions on time estimation bias was further investigated in Experiments 1 and 2. Given 
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the findings of Josephs and Hahn (1995), the impact of task practice on time estimation 
bias was also examined in Experiment I . In this study, prior task experience was 
manipulated by having some participants perform the three-disk Tower of Hanoi 
beforehand, whilst others studied the task and its instructions before estimating the 
duration of a target trial. 
2.3 Experiment 1 
This study investigated whether time predictions were optimistically biased on a well 
structured laboratory task, the three-disk Tower of Hanoi. Since over-optimism has been 
observed on several laboratory tasks (Byram, 1997; Buehler et al., 1997; Josephs & Hahn, 
1995), it was hypothesised that there would be a general underestimation of task duration. 
That is, predictions were expected to be shorter than completion times on the three-disk 
task. In order to confirm some of the findings of previous research (e.g.. Smith & Kida, 
1991), the issue of prior experience of the same task was also addressed. 
Task experience was manipulated by allowing some participants to mentally plan or 
actively practise performing the three-disk Tower of Hanoi beforehand. Participants in the 
mental planning condition were able to view the task apparatus and an instruction sheet 
before estimating task duration. These participants were also asked to mentally plan the 
task completion process during the pre-exposure period. Given that mentally simulating the 
task completion process has been found to attenuate the plaiming fallacy (Armor & Taylor, 
1997, as cited in Taylor et al., 1998), it was anticipated that the present mental planning 
method would result in less temporal underestimation on the three-disk task. 
Consistent with the findings of Josephs and Hahn (1995), it was hypothesised that 
time estimation accuracy would be greater when the same task had been performed 
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beforehand. Hence, temporal underestimation was expected to be reduced among 
participants who actively practised performing the three-disk task beforehand. There was a 
total of three levels of task experience: active practice; mental planning; and no experience. 
Participants in the no experience condition performed an unrelated distracter task (i.e., a 
word association checklist) before estimating the duration of the three-disk task. 
2.4 Method 
2.4.1 Participants 
Sixty (53 female and 7 male) students at the University of Plymouth participated 
voluntarily in partial fijlfilment of a psychology course requirement. No biographical 
information other than gender was recorded. 
2.4.2 Materials 
The three-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi was used. This task consists of three 
wooden disks of different sizes with a hole in the middle of each one, and a flat rectangular 
wooden board containing three equidistantly-spaced vertical pegs of equal length. In the 
starting position, the three disks were stacked in descending order of size on the left-hand 
peg. The aim of the task was to transfer the disks to the same position on the right-hand 
peg by moving one disk at a time, but without placing a larger disk on top of a smaller 
disk. A word association checklist (Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1990) comprising 40 words was 
also used. A digital stopwatch was used to measure participants' task completion times. 
2.4.3 Design and Procedure 
A 2 (time: estimated vs. actual task duration) x 3 (task experience: active practice vs. 
mental planning vs. no experience) mixed factorial design was used. The time factor was a 
repeated-measure, with participants giving a time estimate and producing an actual task 
- 4 7 -
completion time. The task experience factor was manipulated between groups, with 
participants being randomly assigned to one of the three equal-sized conditions. 
Participants were tested individually. Once in the laboratory, they sat at a table and 
read the briefing sheet, which explained the experimental rationale. Participants then read 
and signed the participation consent form. No participants withdrew from the experiment 
or withdrew their data following participation. Participants were then asked to remove their 
watches and place them out of sight. The task instructions were then presented, and 
participants were given 20 seconds to read them. The researcher then placed the task 
apparatus on the table in front of participants and demonstrated the permissible and non-
permissible Tower of Hanoi disk moves. There then followed a two-minute period that was 
different for the three task experience conditions. 
Before the task pre-exposure period began, participants in the mental planning 
condition were informed that they had a short period of time to think about how to 
complete the task. However, these participants were instructed not to move any disks 
during the planning period. Prior to the pre-exposure period, participants in the active 
practice condition were informed that they had a short period o f time to practise 
performing the task. Al l participants in this condition completed the task at least once 
during the practice period. After the Tower of Hanoi task apparatus was placed out of 
sight, participants in the no experience condition were presented with the word association 
checklist. These participants were informed about the nature of this task and were then 
given two minutes to perform it. 
At the end of the two-minute period, the Tower of Hanoi task apparatus was placed 
on the table in front of all participants and they were asked to estimate how much time it 
would take to complete. Participants then began performing the task and the stopwatch was 
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activated at this point. Once the task was completed, the researcher stopped the stopwatch 
and manually recorded participants' task completion times. Participants were then 
debriefed about the experimental rationale. Once the debriefing sheet had been read, the 
researcher answered any questions posed by the participants. Each testing session lasted 
approximately 15 minutes. 
2.5 Results 
Basic descriptive statistics of estimated and actual duration per task experience 
condition are presented in Table 2.1 below. Al l test statistics used in Experiment I are 
contained in Appendix 1. 
Task Experience Condition 
Active Practice Mental Planning No Experience 
M = 23.90 M = 19.20 M = 61.65 
SD= 11.09 SD= 14.78 SD = 42.77 
Time Estimate 
Mdn = 22.50 Mdn = 15.00 Mdn = 60.00 
N = 20 N = 20 N = 20 
M = 14.80 M = 12.25 M = 21,70 
SD = 56.41 SD = 5.48 SD= 14.15 
Completion Time 
Mdn = 13.00 Mdn = 10.00 Mdn = 17.50 
N = 20 N = 20 N = 20 
Table 2.1 
Time estimates and completion times per task experience condition (in seconds) 
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As Table 2.1 shows, estimates exceeded completion times in all task experience 
conditions, suggesting that participants overestimated the duration of the three-disk Tower 
of Hanoi. Hence, there was no evidence of the temporal underestimation indicative of the 
planning fallacy on this task. The standard deviations in Table 2.1 indicated that there was 
considerable variability within the data. Indeed, the Levene test statistics from the 
estimated and actual completion time data were significant (p < .05), suggesting that the 
parametric statistical assumption of homogeneity of variance had not been met. The 
majority of histograms concerning these data were positively skewed, and the majority of 
normality test statistics were significant (ps < .05). These findings indicated that the 
parametric assumption of normality of distributions was also violated. 
The prediction and completion time data were thus subjected to a logarithmic 
transformation, which improved the normality of distributions. The majority of histograms 
were normally distributed, and the majority of normality test statistics were non-significant 
(ps > .05). Homogeneity of variance also improved as a result of this transformation, as the 
Levene test statistic from the completion time data was not significant (p > .05). Since the 
logarithmic transformation improved homogeneity of variance and the normality of 
distributions, these data were statistically analysed. For ease of interpretation, all means 
reported in the text in all experiments in this thesis pertain to the untransformed data. A bar 
graph of predicted and actual completion times per task experience condition is presented 
in Figure 2.1 below. 
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Figure 2.1 
Bar graph of predicted and actual completion times per task experience condition 
In order to determine how many participants predicted the duration of the three-disk 
task using whole minutes, the frequency distribution of time estimates was calculated. A 
histogram of time estimates is presented below in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 
Histogram of time estimates 
The log-transformed data were subjected to a 2 (time) x 3 (task experience) mixed 
design factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA). The overestimation of task duration was 
confirmed by a main effect on the time factor, F(I,57) = 38.37, MSE = .24, p < .001, which 
revealed that estimates exceeded completion times (Ms = 34.92 and 16.25 seconds, 
respectively). There was also a main effect of task experience, F(2,57) = 13.11, MSE = .51, 
p < .001, with overall time being longer in the no experience condition. Scheffe pairwise 
comparisons revealed significant mean differences between the no experience condition 
and the other conditions (ps < .05). No other condition mean differences were significant 
(ps>.10). 
There was also a significant interaction, F(2,57) = 5.39, MSE = .24, p < .01, which 
revealed that the difference between estimated and actual duration was greatest in the no 
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experience condition (see Figure 2.1 above). Planned comparisons (LSD t-tests, all two-
tailed) revealed a significant difference between estimated and actual duration in the no 
experience and active practice conditions (ps < .05). However, there was no significant 
difference between estimated and actual duration in the mental planning condition (p > 
.10). This finding suggests that time predicfion accuracy was greatest among participants 
who viewed the task and its instructions beforehand. 
2.6 Discussion 
There was no evidence that time predictions on the three-disk version of the Tower 
of Hanoi task were optimistically biased. This finding contrasts with research supporting 
the planning fallacy (e.g., Buehler et al., 1994; Newby-Clark et al., 2000), which has found 
evidence of an optimistic time prediction bias on various other tasks. In the present study, a 
pessimistic time prediction bias was observed on the three-disk task in all prior experience 
conditions. A plausible explanation for the absence of temporal underestimation is that a 
relatively simple task was used here. 
The three-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi task can be correctly completed by 
making a minimum of only seven disk moves, and took approximately 20 seconds to 
finish. Hence, it was not only a simple task, but was also of much shorter duration than the 
laboratory tasks used previously. For example, the anagram task used by Buehler et al. 
(1997) took about eight minutes to complete, whereas the duration of the laboratory tasks 
used by Byram (1997) ranged firom 10 minutes to over one hour. Given that such tasks 
took more time, they presumably comprised more components and completion may have 
required greater cognitive effort. Thus, participants may have been over-optimistic when 
estimating the duration of such tasks because of cognitive processing limitations. 
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Empirical support for this notion comes from Sniezek et al. (1990), who found that 
judgement overconfidence was reduced when participants were encouraged to consider all 
possible alternative answers to complex multiple choice questions, thus increasing the 
amount of information being cognitively processed. Sniezek et al. suggest that judgement 
overconfidence is positively related to task complexity, and occurs because people are 
unable or unwilling to devote sufficient cognitive resources to predicting their performance 
on complex tasks. 
Such research lends credence to the notion that the greater complexity of the tasks 
used in previous studies (e.g., Byram, 1997) could be responsible for the temporal 
underestimation that was observed in such research. That is, on tasks that are more 
complex than the three-disk Tower of Hanoi, people may not be able to mentally represent 
the task completion process at the outset. Similarly, the existence of the difficulty effect 
(Griffin & Tversky, 1992) highlights the role of task complexity in determining bias in 
non-temporal judgements. I f an optimistic judgement bias is only evident on more complex 
tasks than the present one, then the difficulty effect might be applicable to predictions of 
task duration. In order to ascertain whether over-optimism occurs on a more complex task, 
the four-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi task was employed in Experiments 2 and 3. 
The frequency distribution of time estimates revealed that almost one-third of the 
participants used whole minutes when predicting task duration. For example, 13 
individuals estimated that the three-disk task would take them one minute to complete. 
Given that the task itself took about 20 seconds to finish, temporal overestimation would 
be expected as a consequence of using longer units of time such a one, two or three 
minutes. A more fine-grained analysis of the issue of whole minutes and longer temporal 
units being used to judge task duration will be discussed later in this thesis. 
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Despite the lack of temporal underestimation, time prediction accuracy was found to 
be greater when participants had some prior task experience. There was evidence that 
actively practising or mentally planning how to complete the three-disk task resulted in 
time estimates that were less pessimistically biased. That is, relative to participants who 
performed the word association task beforehand, participants who had some experience of 
the three-disk task overestimated their completion times to a lesser extent. Presumably, 
prior task experience gave these participants the opportunity to mentally represent the 
correct solution of the task during the pre-exposure period (Lesgold, 1988), which enabled 
them to estimate its duration more accurately. Moreover, the pre-exposure period might 
have given these participants time to consider factors that could delay optimal task 
performance such as incorrectly moving a disk. 
Given that the difference between actual and estimated duration was lowest in the 
mental planning condition, thinking about the task completion process seemed to improve 
time prediction accuracy. This finding is broadly in line with the research of Armor and 
Taylor (1997, as cited in Taylor et al., 1998), which revealed that mentally simulating the 
steps involved in writing an essay reduced the planning fallacy. Consistent with the work 
of Josephs and Hahn (1995), the present research also emphasises the role of prior task 
performance in improving time prediction accuracy. That is, temporal overestimation was 
reduced among participants who performed the three-disk task at least once during the pre-
exposure period. This finding suggests that practising the task beforehand enabled 
participants to acquire pertinent information such as the number of disk moves, which was 
used to good effect. 
Two potentially important findings have emerged from this study. Firstly, there was 
no evidence of temporal underestimation on the three-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi 
task. In fact, a pessimistic time prediction bias was evident on this simple well structured 
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task. Secondly, prior task experience resulted in greater time prediction accuracy. That is, 
the pessimistic time prediction bias was greatest among participants who performed an 
unrelated task before the target trial. Since time estimation accuracy was greatest in the 
mental planning condition, this method of task experience was used again in Experiment 2. 
This study sought to ascertain whether prior experience attenuated time prediction bias on 
the more complex four-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi task. The impact of task 
complexity on time prediction bias was also investigated in Experiment 2, where the three-
disk and four-disk tasks were performed consecutively. 
2.7 Experiment 2 
The aims of this study were twofold: to investigate the impact of task complexity on 
time prediction bias; and to further address the issue of prior task experience. Given the 
findings of Experiment 1, it was decided to ascertain whether time prediction accuracy was 
greater when participants mentally planned how to complete the three-disk and four-disk 
versions of the Tower of Hanoi task. It was suggested that the pre-exposure period in 
Experiment 1 enabled participants to mentally represent the disk moves needed to 
complete the three-disk task, which resulted in greater time prediction accuracy. 
Whilst this explanation seems feasible given the relative simplicity of the three-disk 
task, it is not known whether any such mental representation will be possible on the more 
complex four-disk task. Thus, it is not clear whether the mental plamiing method from 
Experiment I will reduce time estimation bias on the four-disk task. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that cognitive processing limitations might preclude mental preplanning as the 
cognitive complexity of the Tower of Hanoi task increases (Davies, 2000a). 
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Research by Davies (2000a) revealed that participants did not preplan their disk 
moves on the five-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi task. Davies suggests that people 
engage in concurrent planning on this task (and more complex versions of the Tower of 
Hanoi task) because the number of disk moves required for completion exceeds working 
memory capacity. In a similar vein, Phillips et al. (1999) found that less time was devoted 
to mental preplanning on the Tower of London task when memory tasks such as random 
number generation were performed simultaneously. In other research, Phillips et al. (2001) 
found that participants could mentally preplan a maximum of seven disk moves on this 
task. Phillips et al. (2001) suggest that on-line planning strategies place fewer demands on 
working memory processes and may thus be used on this task. 
Given the structural similarity of the Tower of London and Tower of Hanoi tasks 
(Welsh, Satterlee-Cartmell & Stine, 1999), the findings of Phillips et al. (1999; 2001) may 
well be applicable to both tasks. Indeed, the work of Davies (2000a) indicates that mental 
preplanning is unlikely to occur on versions of the Tower of Hanoi that require greater 
cognitive resources. It could be that people are unable to mentally represent the disk moves 
on tasks that are more complex than the three-disk version of this task because of working 
memory limitations. 
On the basis of previous research (e.g., Phillips et al., 1999), people may use on-line 
planning strategies as task complexity increases. Extrapolating fi-om such research, mental 
preplanning might not reduce fime estimation bias on versions of the Tower of Hanoi that 
are more complex than the three-disk task. That is, when the number o f disk moves 
exceeds working memory capacity, a mental representation of the task completion process 
may not be possible. Hence, people might be unable to accurately predict the duration of 
more complex versions of this task because of a lack of task-related information. 
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hi the present study, task experience was manipulated by allowing some participants 
to preview each task and its instructions for two minutes, whereas others performed a 
distracter task beforehand. Consistent with the findings of Experiment 1, it was anticipated 
that time estimates on the three-disk task would be more accurate in the mental planning 
condition. Whilst mental preplanning is not evident on the five-disk version of the Tower 
of Hanoi task (Davies, 2000a), it is not known whether it will occur on the less complex 
four-disk task. Given the findings of Davies, no prediction was made about the impact of 
prior task experience on time estimation bias on the four-disk task. In order to determine 
whether prior experience of performing a more or less complex similar task influenced 
time prediction bias, the order in which the three-disk and four-disk tasks were presented 
was also manipulated. 
By employing the three-disk and four-disk tasks, the impact of task complexity on 
time prediction bias was examined. Given that task complexity has been found to mediate 
bias in non-temporal judgements (e.g.. Soil, 1996; Suantak et al., 1996), time estimation 
bias might also differ according to task complexity. Since non-temporal judgements on 
complex tasks tend to be optimistically biased (Griffin & Tversky, 1992), time estimates 
might be pessimistically biased only on simple tasks such as the three-disk version of the 
Tower of Hanoi. 
Pilot testing revealed that there was more than a threefold increase in duration on the 
four-disk task relative to the three-disk task (Ms = 70.56 and 20.25 seconds, respectively). 
This finding suggests that different versions of the Tower of Hanoi task differ in duration 
as well as cognitive complexity. Given the findings of Experiment 1, it was hypothesised 
that temporal overestimation would be evident on the three-disk task. However, as non-
temporal judgements are over-optimistic on complex tasks (Suantak et al., 1996), it was 
anticipated that temporal underestimation would be evident on the four-disk task. 
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2.8 Method 
2.8.1 Participants 
Sixty-six (53 female and 13 male) students at the University of Plymouth 
participated voluntarily. Forty-seven participants took part in partial fulfilment of a 
psychology course requirement whilst the remainder were paid £1.50 each. No 
biographical information other than gender was recorded. 
2.8.2 Materials 
A wooden Tower of Hanoi apparatus containing four different-sized disks was used. 
The largest disk was removed to form the three-disk task. The rules of both tasks were 
identical to those which applied to the three-disk task from Experiment 1. Two word 
association checklists (Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1990) each comprising a different set of 40 
words were used. A digital stopwatch was used to measure task duration. 
2.8.3 Design and Procedure 
A 2 (time: estimated vs. actual) x 2 (task experience: mental planning vs. no 
experience) x 2 (task: three-disk vs. four-disk) x 2 (task performance order: three-disk first 
vs. four-disk first) mixed factorial design was used. The time and task factors were 
repeated-measures. The order in which the tasks were performed was fijlly 
counterbalanced. The task performance order and task experience factors were 
manipulated between groups, with participants being randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions. 
Except for the following differences, the procedure was identical to that of 
Experiment 1. The two-minute mental planning procedure was applicable to both the three-
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disk and four-disk tasks. After being shown the relevant task apparatus and reading the 
instructions, participants in the no experience condition performed one of the two word 
association tasks for two minutes. The other word association task was performed for two 
minutes before the second experimental trial. Once each two-minute period had elapsed, 
the relevant Tower of Hanoi apparatus and its instruction sheet was placed in front of all 
participants, who were then asked to give a time estimate before performing the task. This 
procedure was applicable to both experimental trials. 
2.9 Results 
Basic descriptive statistics of estimated and actual duration per task performance 
order and prior experience conditions on the three-disk and four-disk tasks are presented 
below in Tables 2.2 and 2.3, respectively. Al l test statistics used in Experiment 2 are 
contained in Appendix 2. 
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Task Performance 
Order 
Task Experience Condition 
Mental Planning No Experience 
Three-disk First 
Time Estimate 
M = 25.94 
Mdn = 15.00 
SD = 29.20 
N = 33 
M = 36.50 
Mdn = 40.00 
SD = 22.34 
N = 33 
Completion time 
M = 14.94 
Mdn = 11.00 
SD=11.17 
N = 33 
M = 18.38 
Mdn = 16.50 
SD =8.16 
N = 33 
Three-disk Second 
Time Estimate 
M = 20.19 
Mdn = 17.50 
SD= 11.79 
N = 33 
M = 48.76 
Mdn = 50.00 
SD = 33.96 
N = 33 
Completion Time 
M = 9.31 
Mdn = 8.50 
SD = 2.39 
N = 33 
M = 14.47 
Mdn = 13.00 
SD = 5.72 
N = 33 
Table 2.2 
Time estimates and completion times on the three-disk task per perfonnance order and 
experience condition (in seconds) 
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Task Performance 
Order 
Task Experience Condition 
Mental Plaiming No Experience 
Four-disk First 
Time Estimate 
M = 60.63 
Mdn = 40.00 
SD = 48.30 
N = 33 
M = 142.06 
Mdn =150.00 
SD = 79.71 
N = 33 
Completion Time 
M = 83.44 
Mdn = 75.00 
SD = 50.49 
N = 33 
M = 90.94 
Mdn = 75.00 
SD = 55.87 
N = 33 
Four-disk Second 
Time Estimate 
M = 50.00 
Mdn = 30.00 
SD = 40.89 
N = 33 
M = 57.75 
Mdn = 60.00 
SD = 42.84 
N = 33 
Completion Time 
M = 53.59 
Mdn = 51.00 
SD = 31.85 
N = 33 
M = 61.94 
Mdn = 63.00 
SD = 25.03 
N = 33 
Table 2.3 
Time estimates and completion times on the four-disk task per performance order and 
experience condition (in seconds) 
Table 2.2 shows that estimates exceeded completion times in all cells on the three-
disk task. This finding is consistent with that of Experiment 1, where there was evidence of 
a pessimistic prediction bias on this task. However, there was some evidence of an 
optimistic prediction bias on the four-disk task, as completion times exceeded estimates in 
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three of the four cells in Table 2.3. Bar graphs of predicted and actual completion times on 
the three-disk and four-disk tasks are presented below in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. 
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Figure 2.3 
Bar graph of predicted and actual completion times per task performance order and task 
experience condition (data from the three-disk task) 
-63 -
160 
tf> 120 
• Predicted Time 
• Actual Time 
Mental Planning No Experience 
Figure 2.4 
Bar graph of predicted and actual completion times per task performance order and task 
experience condition (data from the four-disk task) 
In order to determine how many participants predicted task duration using whole 
minutes, fi-equency distributions of time estimates were calculated. Histograms of time 
estimates on the three-disk and four-disk tasks (regardless of performance order and prior 
experience condition) are presented below in Figures 2.5 and 2.6, respectively. 
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Figure 2.5 
Histogram of time estimates on the three-disk task 
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Figure 2.6 
Histogram of time estimates on the four-disk task 
For the same reasons that were specified in Experiment 1, the estimated and actual 
completion time data were subjected to a logarithmic transformation before being 
statistically analysed. The log-transformed data from the first trial were analysed in order 
to address the issues of prior experience and task complexity. A 2 (task) x 2 (time) x 2 
(experience) mixed design ANOVA produced a main effect of time, F(l,62) = 5.27, MSE 
= .30, p < .05, with estimates exceeding completion times (Ms = 66.28 and 51.91 seconds, 
respectively). This finding suggests that there was general temporal overestimation on the 
first trial. The main effect of task experience was also significant, F(l,62) = 10.48, MSE = 
.65, p < .01, with overall time being longer in the no experience condition. There was also 
a main effect of task, F(1.62) = 96.31, MSE = .65, p < .001, which revealed that overall 
time was longer on the four-disk task. 
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The interaction between time and experience was significant, F(l,62) = 7.40, MSE = 
.30, p < .01. This revealed that, across both tasks, the difference between estimated and 
actual duration was greater in the no experience condition. The time by task interaction 
was also significant, F(l,62) = 5.53, MSE = .30, p < .05 (see Figure 2.7 below). This 
revealed that estimates exceeded completion times to a greater extent on the three-disk task 
(Ms = 31.22 and 16.66 seconds, respectively) than on the four-disk version (Ms = 101.35 
and 87.19 seconds, respectively). Planned comparisons (LSD t-tests, both two-tailed) 
revealed that the difference between estimated and actual duration was significant on the 
three-disk (p < .05), but not the four-disk task (p > .10). This finding suggests that time 
predictions were less pessimistically biased on the more complex task. 
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Figure 2.7 
Bar graph depicting the interaction between the time and task factors (data from the first 
task) 
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There was also a significant interaction between the task, time and experience 
factors, F(l,62) = 4.22, MSE = .30, p < .05 (see Figure 2.8 below). This revealed that the 
direction of prediction bias differed according to prior experience on the four-disk task 
only. That is, temporal underestimation was evident in the mental planning condition, 
whereas overestimation occurred in the no experience condition. In contrast, temporal 
overestimation was evident on the three-disk task regardless of prior experience. Planned 
comparisons (LSD t-tests, all two-tailed) revealed that the difference between the estimated 
and actual duration of each task was significant in the no experience condition (ps < .05), 
but not in the mental planning condition (ps > .10). This finding indicates that time 
predictions were more accurate among participants who previewed each task and its 
instructions. The ANOVA produced no other significant main effects or interactions (Fs < 
2, ps>.10). 
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Figure 2.8 
Bar graph depicting the interaction between the time, task and experience factors (data 
from the first task) 
In order to ascertain whether prior performance of a different version of the Tower of 
Hanoi affected prediction bias, the log-transformed data from the second task were 
analysed. A 2 (time) x 2 (task) x 2 (experience) mixed design ANOVA produced a main 
effect of time, F(l,62) = 12.63, MSE = .32, p < .001, with estimates exceeding completion 
times (Ms = 44.18 and 34.83 seconds, respectively). Thus, general temporal overestimation 
was evident on the second trial. The main effect of task was also significant, F(l,62) = 
95.97, MSE = .36, p < .001, with overall time being longer on the four-disk task. There 
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was also a significant main effect of experience, F(l,62) = 15.32, MSE = .36, p < .001, 
which revealed that overall time was longer in the no experience condition. 
The task by experience interaction approached significance. F(l,62) = 3.14, MSE = 
.36, p < . 09. The interaction between time and task was significant, F(1.62) = 25.41, MSE 
= .32, p < .001 (see Figure 2.9 below). This revealed that, regardless of prior task 
experience, temporal underestimation was evident on the four-disk task, whereas 
overestimation occurred on the three-disk task. Planned comparisons (LSD t-tests, both 
two-tailed) revealed that the difference between estimated and actual duration was 
significant on the three-disk (p < .05), but not the four-disk task (p > .10). This finding 
suggests that, on the second trial, time predictions were less biased on the four-disk task. 
The ANOVA produced no other significant interactions (Fs < 1.5, ps > .10). 
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Figure 2.9 
Bar graph depicting the interaction between the time and task factors (data from the second 
task) 
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2.10 Discussion 
As was the case in Experiment 1, previewing the three-disk version of the Tower of 
Hanoi task and its instructions for two minutes resulted in greater time prediction accuracy. 
That is, on the first trial, the extent of temporal overestimation on this task was 
significantly reduced in the mental planning condition. It seems likely that the pre-
exposure period enabled these participants to mentally represent the disk moves necessary 
for task completion, which resulted in them making more accurate time predictions. 
This suggestion is broadly consistent with Phillips et al.'s (2001) research, which 
revealed that participants could mentally preplan up to seven disk moves on the Tower of 
London task. Since a minimum of only seven disk moves is needed to complete the three-
disk version of the Tower of Hanoi task, previewing this task and its instructions for two 
minutes may well have facilitated mental preplanning. Moreover, given the relative 
simplicity of this task, the disk moves might have been retained in working memory 
(Davies, 2000a) during the pre-exposure period, and recalled to make a more realistic time 
estimate on the first trial. 
Task experience was also found to be beneficial on the more complex four-disk 
version of the Tower of Hanoi task. That is, on the first trial, time estimates were more 
accurate among participants who previewed this task and its instructions for two minutes, 
A possible explanation for this finding is that, during the pre-exposure period, participants 
acquired task-related information, which was used to good effect. For example, 
participants may have worked out how to complete the task, calculated the amount of time 
needed to move all the disks in the correct pattern, and based their first temporal estimate 
on such information. 
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Although it was suggested that cognitive processing limitations might preclude 
mental preplanning on the four-disk task, Davies (2000a) found that this was definitely the 
case on the five-disk task, which involves a minimum of 31 disk moves compared to 15 on 
the four-disk task. Given this difference in complexity, cognitive processing limitations are 
likely to preclude mental preplanning on the five-disk task. For example, the 31 disk 
moves required for optimal task completion will exceed working memory capacity. Whilst 
the issue of mental preplanning on the four-disk task has not been addressed in previous 
research, the present study suggests that time prediction accuracy improves when people 
are encouraged to think about the task completion process for two minutes beforehand. 
There was ftirther evidence of temporal overestimation on the three-disk task in the 
present study. In fact, a pessimistic time prediction bias occurred on this task regardless of 
prior experience or task performance order. This finding suggests that the temporal 
underestimation indicative of the planning fallacy does not occur on this task. A plausible 
explanation for the absence of an optimistic time prediction bias on this task is its 
simplicity relative to the laboratory tasks used in previous research (e.g., Francis-Smythe 
& Robertson, 1999). That is, the greater complexity of the laboratory tasks used previously 
could be responsible for the temporal underestimation that was observed in such research. 
Thus, over-optimism might only be evident on tasks that are more complex than the three-
disk version of the Tower of Hanoi task. 
Consistent with this suggestion, there was a hint of an optimistic time prediction bias 
on the more complex four-disk task. However, the direction in which time predictions were 
biased on this task seemed to differ according to the order in which it was performed. 
Specifically, there was a hint of temporal overestimation when the four-disk task was 
performed first, whereas there was a hint of temporal underestimation when it was 
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performed second. A possible explanation for the latter finding is that time estimates were 
based on information about the just-completed three-disk task. For example, the number of 
disk moves needed to complete this task may have formed the basis of estimates on the 
four-disk task. Given the difference between the tasks in terms of the number of disk 
moves, using such a judgement strategy would be expected to result in temporal 
underestimation. However, as temporal overeslimation was evident on the three-disk task 
regardless of performance order, there was no evidence of such a judgment strategy being 
used on this task. 
The relative simplicity of the four-disk task could explain why there was some 
evidence of temporal overestimation on this task when it was performed first. That is, 
participants were able to devote sufficient cognitive resources to the process of estimating 
task duration, a strategy that has been shown to reduce and eliminate overconfidence in 
non-temporal judgements (e.g., Koriat et al., 1980). Since the four-disk task took less than 
two minutes to complete, it was of shorter duration than the laboratory tasks used in 
previous research (e.g., Byram, 1997). As complex tasks are generally of longer duration 
than simple ones (Buckhalt & Gates, 2002), the four-disk task was presumably also less 
difficult than the laboratory tasks used previously. Hence, this task may have been too 
simple to induce overconfidence in participants, a notion that is consistent with previous 
research (Sniezek et al., 1990). 
There was also evidence of greater time prediction accuracy on the four-disk task. 
That is, on both trials, the extent of temporal misestimation was significantly greater on the 
three-disk task. Whilst it is unclear why the extent of temporal underestimation on the 
four-disk task should be less than the magnitude of temporal overestimation on the three-
disk task on the second trial, the finding fi-om the first trial is broadly consistent with the 
difficulty effect (Griffin & Tversky, 1992). Specifically, time predictions were less 
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pessimistic (i.e., less underconfident) on the more complex task, suggesting that 
participants were more confident as well as more accurate when estimating its duration. In 
order to confirm the existence of a relationship between task complexity and time 
prediction accuracy, the three-disk and four-disk tasks were employed again in Experiment 
The frequency distributions of time estimates revealed that several participants 
judged the duration of the three-disk and four-disk tasks using whole minutes. For 
example, almost 25 percent of the participants judged that the three-disk task would take 
them one or two minutes to complete. Similarly, half o f all participants used temporal units 
of one to four minutes when judging the duration of the four-disk task. Given that each 
task took less than two minutes to complete, general temporal overestimation would be 
expected to occur as a consequence of using units of time such as two or three minutes 
when judging task duration. As previously mentioned, a more in-depth discussion of this 
issue will be provided later in this thesis. 
The lack of general temporal underestimation on the three-disk and four-disk tasks 
could be due to the fact that no motivational incentives were on offer in Experiments 1 and 
2. Support for this suggestion comes from Buehler et al. (1997), who found that time 
predictions on an anagram task were optimistically biased only when a monetary incentive 
was dependent on the speed of task completion. In a similar vein, Byram (1997) found that 
temporal underestimation was exacerbated when participants were offered a monetary 
reward for completing an origami task within a certain period of time. 
These findings indicate that performance-contingent incentives can affect time 
estimation bias on laboratory tasks. Hence, the absence of such incentives could be 
responsible for the findings of Experiments I and 2, that is, participants failed to make 
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over-optimistic time predictions because of insufficient motivation (Henry & Sniezek, 
1993), In order to detemiine whether motivational incentives influenced time estimation 
bias on the Tower of Hanoi task, monetary rewards that were either contingent on the 
speed of task completion or on the accuracy of time predictions were offered in 
Experiment 3. 
2.11 Experiment 3 
A principal aim of this study was to ascertain whether motivational incentives 
influenced time estimation bias on the Tower of Hanoi task. Research has studied the 
impact of motivational incentives such as money on judgements of performance on tasks 
including general knowledge and almanac tests (e.g., Henry, 1994). Such research has 
found that incentives can improve the accuracy of numerical estimates (Wright & Aboul-
Ezz, 1988; Wright & Anderson, 1989), strengthen a person's commitment to a goal, and 
lead to judgement overconfidence (Henry & Sniezek, 1993). Henry and Sniezek found that 
participants who were offered money for accurately predicting their performance on a 
general knowledge test tended to overestimate the number of questions that they would 
answer correctly. Henry and Sniezek suggest that people are motivated to increase their 
performance predictions in order to secure an incentive, which results in judgements that 
are overconfident. 
Research by Wright and Anderson (1989) revealed that probabilistic judgements of 
the outcome of future events were less biased when participants were offered a monetary 
reward for prediction accuracy. Wright and Anderson suggest that the monetary incentive 
motivated participants to devote more cognitive resources to predicting their task 
performance, which resulted in greater judgement accuracy. Support for this suggestion 
derives from the fact that, relative to the no incentive condition, judgements of the 
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incentive condition were less influenced by previously-presented (and irrelevant) 
numerical anchor values. This finding indicates that motivational incentives can improve 
the accuracy of non-temporal judgements of performance on various tasks, as well as 
reducing people's use of the anchoring and adjustment cognitive heuristics (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982a). 
Given the findings of previous research (e.g., Byram, 1997), it was suspected that 
monetary incentives might mediate time estimation bias on the three-disk and four-disk 
versions of the Tower of Hanoi task. Consistent with the work of Buehler et al. (1997), 
monetary incentives that were contingent on the speed of task completion (speed incentive) 
or the accuracy of time estimates (accuracy incentive) were offered in the present study. It 
was anticipated that participants would engage in different reasoning strategies according 
to the type of incentive offered, which in turn would influence the direction in which their 
time estimates were biased. Following the findings of Buehler et al., it was hypothesised 
that temporal underestimation would be evident in the speed incentive condition, whereas 
temporal overestimation would occur in the accuracy incentive condition. 
The issue of task complexity was further addressed in this study, where the three-
disk and four-disk tasks were employed. Whilst there was a hint of an optimistic time 
prediction bias on the four-disk task in Experiment 2, temporal underestimation was only 
observed when the task was performed second. However, on the first trial, the magnitude 
of temporal overestimation was less on this task compared to the three-disk task. In order 
to confirm this finding, participants performed either the three-disk or the four-disk task 
initially. Consistent with the results of Experiment 2, it was hypothesised that temporal 
overestimation would be evident on both tasks, but that the extent of this pessimistic time 
prediction bias would be greater on the three-disk task. 
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The issue of prior task experience was also ftirther addressed by manipulating the 
order in which the three-disk and four-disk tasks were performed. Experiment 2 revealed 
that the extent and direction of time prediction bias differed according to the relative 
complexity of a just-completed version of the same task. That is, on the second trial, the 
extent of temporal underestimation on the four-disk task was less than the magnitude of 
overestimation on the three-disk task. Given this finding, the impact of prior performance 
of a more or less complex similar task on subsequent time estimates was examined in this 
study. 
2.12 Method 
2.12.1 Participants 
Ninety-nine (80 female and 19 male) students at the University of Plymouth 
participated voluntarily. Forty-eight participants took part in partial ftilfilment of a 
psychology course requirement whilst the remainder were paid £1.50 each. No 
biographical information other than gender was recorded. 
2.12.2 Materials 
The materials were the same as those used in Experiment 2, with the exception of the 
word association task, which was not employed. 
2.12.3 Design and Procedure 
A 2 (time: estimated vs. actual) x 2 (task: three-disk vs. four-disk) x 2 (task 
performance order: three-disk first vs. four-disk first) x 3 (incentive: speed vs. accuracy vs. 
no incentive) mixed factorial design was used. The time and task factors were repeated-
measures, with the order of task performance being fiilly counterbalanced. Task 
performance order was a between-groups factor, with participants being randomly assigned 
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to one of two conditions. The incentive factor was also manipulated between groups, with 
participants being randomly assigned to one of three equal-sized conditions. 
Except for the following differences, the procedure was identical to that used in 
Experiment 2. Since the mental planning condition produced the most accurate time 
estimates in Experiments 1 and 2, all participants were given two minutes to view each 
task and its instructions before estimating their completion times. At the end of each pre-
exposure period, the performance-contingent incentives were introduced (where 
applicable) before task duration was estimated. 
Regardless of whether they participated in return for money or as part of a course 
requirement, participants in the accuracy incentive condition were informed that they 
would receive a financial bonus of 50 pence for accurately estimating the duration of the 
current task. In order to qualify for this bonus, estimates on the three-disk task had to be 
within (plus or minus) two seconds of actual task duration, whereas estimates on the four-
disk task had to be within seven seconds of actual completion lime. The criteria for time 
prediction accuracy were based on pilot study data, and were within approximately 10% of 
the mean completion times of the three-disk and four-disk tasks (Ms = 20.25 and 70.56 
seconds, respectively). Participants in this condition were informed of the relevant criteria 
for time prediction accuracy before making a temporal estimate on each task. 
Regardless of whether they participated in return for money or as part of a course 
requirement, participants in the speed incentive condition were informed that they would 
receive a financial bonus of 50 pence i f their completion times on the upcoming task were 
within the upper quartile of completion times observed in a pilot study. However, these 
participants were not given any information about the actual task completion times from 
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the pilot study. Participants in the speed and accuracy incentive conditions could thus 
receive a bonus of £1 for fli lfi l l ing the relevant criteria on both tasks. 
At the end of the second trial, all participants in the accuracy and speed incentive 
conditions received the f l i l l monetary reward regardless o f task performance or time 
prediction accuracy. Al l participants in the no incentive condition were asked to be as 
accurate and realistic as possible when estimating the duration of each task. Each testing 
session lasted approximately 20 minutes. 
2,13 Results 
Basic descriptive statistics of estimated and actual duration per task performance 
order and incentive condition on the three-disk and four-disk tasks are presented in Tables 
2,4 and 2.5, respectively. Al l test statistics used in Experiment 3 are contained in Appendix 
3. 
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Task Incentive Condition 
Performance 
Order 
Accuracy Speed No Incentive 
M = 32.12 M = 19.31 M = 21.24 
Mdn= 15.00 Mdn= 13.50 Mdn = 10.00 
Time Estimate 
SD = 55.61 SD= 16.07 SD= 19.80 
Three-disk 
N = 17 N = 17 N = 17 
First 
M = 14.65 M = 10.75 M = 14.88 
Completion Mdn= 14.00 Mdn = 9.00 Mdn = 13.00 
Time SD = 5.42 SD = 4.09 SD = 7,46 
N = 17 N = 17 N = 17 
M = 16.06 M = 23.76 M - 2 6 . 3 1 
Mdn= 12.00 Mdn = 15.00 Mdn = 20.00 
Time Estimate 
SD= 11.74 SD = 22.55 SD = 26.56 
Three-disk 
N = 16 N = 16 N = 16 
Second 
M = 10.38 M = 9.35 M = 10.06 
Completion Mdn= 10.00 Mdn = 8.00 Mdn = 9.50 
Time SD = 3.44 SD = 3,66 SD = 2,98 
N = 16 N = 16 N = 16 
Table 2.4 
Time estimates and completion times on the three-disk task per performance order and 
incentive condition (in seconds) 
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Task Incentive Condition 
Performance 
Order 
Accuracy Speed No Incentive 
M = 85.00 M = 64.82 M = 109.25 
Time Estimate 
Mdn = 60.00 
SD = 62.58 
Mdn = 45.00 
SD = 43.98 
Mdn = 90.00 
SD = 80.54 
Four-disk First N = 16 N = 16 N = 16 
M = 99.69 M = 76.35 M = 70.25 
Completion Mdn = 103.50 Mdn = 57.00 Mdn = 53.00 
Time SD = 73.02 SD = 61.00 SD = 51.78 
N = 16 N = 16 N = 16 
M = 52.47 M = 49.94 M = 44.29 
Four-disk 
Second 
Time Estimate 
Mdn = 40.00 
SD = 35.02 
N = 17 
Mdn = 30.00 
SD = 41.92 
N = 17 
Mdn = 40.00 
SD = 26.27 
N = 17 
M = 91.12 M = 69.31 M = 86.59 
Completion Mdn = 63.00 Mdn = 43.50 Mdn = 98.00 
Time SD = 72.33 SD = 59.85 SD = 45.10 
N = 17 N = 17 N = 17 
Table 2.5 
Time estimates and completion times on the four-disk task per performance order and 
incentive condition (in seconds) 
As Table 2.4 shows, estimates exceeded completion times in all cells on the three-
disk task. This finding is consistent with those of Experiments 1 and 2, and provides 
further evidence of a general pessimistic time prediction bias on this task. In contrast, there 
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was evidence of temporal underestimation on the four-disk task. That is, in the majority of 
cells in Table 2.5, temporal estimates were lower than completion times on this more 
complex task. Bar graphs of predicted and actual completion times from the accuracy, 
speed and no incentive conditions are presented below in Figures 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12, 
respectively. 
• Predicted Time 
• Actual Time 
Figure 2.10 
Bar graph of predicted and actual completion times per task and task performance order 
(data from the accuracy incentive condition) 
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Figure 2.11 
Bar graph of predicted and actual completion times per task and task performance order 
(data from the speed incentive condition) 
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• Predicted Time 
• Actual Time 
Figure 2.12 
Bar graph of predicted and actual completion times per task and task performance order 
(data from the no incentive condition) 
In order to determine how many participants predicted task duration using whole 
minutes, frequency distributions of time estimates were calculated. Histograms of time 
estimates on the three-disk and four-disk tasks (regardless of performance order and 
incentive condition) are presented below in Figures 2.13 and 2.14, respectively. 
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Time Estimate (Seconds) 
Figure 2.13 
Histogram of time estimates on the three-disk task 
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Figure 2.14 
Histogram of time estimates on the four-disk task 
For the same reasons that were specified in Experiment 1, the estimated and actual 
completion time data were subjected to a logarithmic transformation before being 
statistically analysed. In order to address the issue of task complexity, the log-transfomicd 
data from the first trial were analysed. A 2 (time) x 2 (task) x 3 (incentive) mixed design 
ANOVA produced a main effect of task, F(l,93) = 163.94, MSE = .70, p < .001, with 
overall time being longer on the four-disk task. The main effect of incentive was not 
significant (F < 2, p > .10). Likewise, the interaction between the task and time factors was 
not significant (F < 2, p > .10). Thus, although estimates exceeded compIeUon Umes on the 
three-disk (Ms = 24.22 vs. 13.43 seconds, respectively) and four-disk tasks (Ms = 86.36 vs. 
82.10 seconds, respectively), the magnitude of prediction bias did not dilTcr significantly 
according to the complexity of the first trial. The ANOVA produced no other significant 
main effects or interactions (Fs < 2.5, ps > . 10). Since the incentive factor did not interact 
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with the other factors, there was no evidence that the monetary rewards influenced time 
prediction bias on the fir^t trial. 
The issue of prior task experience was addressed by analysing the log-transformed 
data from the second trial. A 2 (time) x 2 (task) x 3 (incentive) mixed design ANOVA 
produced a main effect of task, F(l,93) = 174.17, MSE = .53, p < .001, with overall time 
being longer on the four-disk task. The main effect of incentive was not significant (F < 1, 
p > .10). However, the interaction between the task and time factors was significant, 
F(l,93) = 54.41, MSE = .24, p < .001 (see Figure 2.15 below). 
This interaction revealed that estimates exceeded completion times on the three-disk 
task (Ms = 20.56 and 10.40 seconds, respectively), whereas completion times exceeded 
estimates on the four-disk task (Ms = 84.68 and 53.86 seconds, respectively). Planned 
comparisons (LSD t-tests, both two-tailed) revealed a significant difference between 
estimated and actual duration on each task (ps < .05). This finding suggests that there was 
a significant pessimistic time prediction bias on the three-disk task, and a significant 
optimistic time prediction bias on the four-disk task. The ANOVA produced no other 
significant main effects or interactions (Fs < 1.5, ps > . 10). Since the incentive factor did 
not interact with the other factors, there was no evidence that the monetary rewards 
influenced time prediction bias on the second trial. 
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n Predicted Time 
• Actual Time 
3-disk 4-disk 
Task 
Figure 2.15 
Bar graph depicting the interaction between the time and task factors (data from the second 
task) 
Since the monetary rewards did not affect time prediction bias on either trial, the log 
transformed task completion time data were analysed as an incentive manipulation check. 
I f the monetary reward had the desired effect, then the speed incentive condition should 
produce the fastest completion times. A 2 (task) x 3 (incentive) mixed design ANOVA 
produced a main effect of task, F(l,96) = 723.95, MSE = .22, p < .001, with overall time 
being longer on the four-disk task. The interaction was not significant (F < 1, p > . 10), 
suggesting that incentives did not differentially influence the duration of the three- and 
four-disk tasks. However, the main effect of incentive approached significance, F(l,96) = 
3.04, MSE = .42, p < .06. This revealed that overall time was longest in the accuracy 
condition (M = 53.92 seconds), followed by the no incentive condition (M = 45.61 
seconds), followed by the speed condition (M = 41.48 seconds). This finding is broadly 
consistent with the work of Buehler et al. (1997), which revealed that task completion 
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times were shortest among participants who were offered a financial incentive for the 
speed of task completion. 
2.14 Discussion 
There was no evidence that the monetary incentives affected the direction or 
magnitude of time estimation bias on the three-disk and four-disk tasks. In contrast to the 
findings of Buehler et al, (1997), it seems that participants did not engage in motivated 
reasoning (Kunda, 1990) when estimating the duration of these tasks. However, there was 
some (albeit marginally significant) evidence that the present incentives influenced task 
duration in the manner predicted. That is, relative to the accuracy incentive condition, 
overall mean task duration was lower in the speed incentive condition. This finding 
suggests that participants who were offered the incentive for swift task completion finished 
the tasks in less time than participants who were offered the incentive for prediction 
accuracy. However, as it was only overall task duration that differed between the incentive 
conditions, it is unwise to make too much of this finding. 
The magnitude of the incentives on offer could explain the disparity between the 
findings of Buehler et al. (1997) and those of the present study. That is, participants in 
Buehler et al.'s study could obtain $4 per task compared to 50 pence per task in this 
experiment. Thus, the larger incentives offered by Buehler et al, were presumably 
sufficient to motivate participants to use either a goal-directed or a deliberative reasoning 
strategy, which resulted in an optimistic or pessimistic fime prediction bias, respecfively. 
Conversely, the prospect of receiving only 50 pence was probably insufficient an incentive 
to induce the present participants to engage in motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990). Hence, 
a feasible explanation for the present findings is that the monetary rewards were of 
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insufficient magnitude to influence the direction in which participants' time estimates were 
biased. 
Consistent with the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, there was further evidence of 
temporal overestimation on the three-disk task. In all incentive and task performance order 
conditions, time predictions exceeded the actual duration of this simple task. Likewise, 
there was a hint of temporal overestimation when the four-disk task was performed first, 
but this pessimistic time prediction bias was not significant. In contrast, there was evidence 
of a significant optimistic time prediction bias on this more complex task when it was 
performed second. Thus, as was the case in Experiment 2, the only evidence of temporal 
underestimation was on the four-disk task when the less complex three-disk task was 
performed beforehand. 
Time estimation bias on the second trial was found to be influenced by the relative 
complexity of the just-completed task. That is, temporal underestimation was evident on 
the four-disk task, whereas a significant pessimistic time prediction bias only occurred 
when the three-disk task was performed second. Since these tasks share the same structure 
(Kotovsky et al., 1985), participants might have based their second time estimate on 
information about the nature of the previous task, which was insufficiently adjusted for the 
demands of the upcoming task. For example, participants may have calculated the amount 
of time needed to complete the three-disk task, but failed to scale up their estimate 
according to the greater number of disk moves involved in completing the four-disk task. 
Given the difference in complexity between the three-disk and four-disk tasks, the 
use of such a judgement strategy would be expected to result in temporal underestimation 
on the four-disk version. Likewise, time predictions would be longer on the three-disk 
version i f they were based on the greater number of disk moves involved in completing the 
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four-disk task. Thus, temporal overestimation would be greater on the three-disk task as a 
consequence of using such a judgement strategy. 
The frequency distributions of time estimates revealed that several participants 
judged the duration of the three-disk and four-disk tasks using whole minutes. For 
example, over half of all participants used temporal units of one to four minutes when 
judging the duration of the four-disk task, whereas 17 individuals used such units on the 
three-disk task. Given that each task took less than two minutes to complete, general 
temporal overestimation would be expected to occur as a consequence of using units of 
time such as two or three minutes when judging task duration. As previously mentioned, a 
more fine-grained discussion of this issue will be provided later in this thesis, 
2.15 General Discussion 
There was no evidence of temporal underestimation on the three-disk version of the 
Tower of Hanoi task. In fact, the present research highlights the directional nature of time 
prediction bias, as temporal estimates exceeded completion times on this task in every cell 
in every condition in Experiments 1, 2 and 3. Thus, participants erred on the side of 
caution when estimating the duration of this well structured laboratory task. This finding is 
of considerable importance since the temporal underestimation indicative of the planning 
fallacy has been observed in numerous studies (e.g., Byram, 1997; Josephs & Hahn, 1995; 
Koole & Van't Spijker, 2000; Newby-Clark et al., 2000) and on a variety of tasks. 
Moreover, this finding indicates that the planning fallacy is not as prevalent as previous 
research suggests (e.g., Buehler et al., 1994), and that there is at least one task on which it 
does not occur, and is in fact reversed. 
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Task complexity was suggested as a reason for the absence of an optimistic time 
prediction bias on the three-disk task. That is, the greater complexity of the laboratory 
tasks used in previous research (e.g., Byram, 1997) was responsible for the temporal 
underestimation that was observed in those studies. Given that the three-disk task can be 
completed in just a few seconds and involves making a minimum of only seven disk 
moves, it is a simple task. In order to ascertain whether an opfimistic time prediction bias 
occurred on a more complex task, the four-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi task was 
employed in Experiments 2 and 3. 
Whilst there was a hint of over-optimism on the four-disk task, the direction in which 
time predictions were biased was mediated by task performance order in both studies. That 
is, the only evidence of temporal underestimation was on this task when it was performed 
after the three-disk task. In contrast, there was some evidence of a pessimistic time 
prediction bias when the four-disk task was performed first in Experiments 2 and 3. Thus, 
general temporal underestimation was not evident on this more complex task. 
The absence of a general optimisfic time predicfion bias on the four-disk task could 
be explained by the fact that it still took less time to complete than the laboratory tasks 
used in previous research. For example, the four-disk task took less than two minutes to 
complete, whereas the tasks used previously have taken at least eight minutes to finish 
(Buehler et al., 1997). Given that longer duration tasks also tend to be more complex than 
shorter ones (Buckhalt & Oates, 2002), the present tasks were presumably simpler than the 
ones used previously. Thus, it could be that the four-disk task was still too simple to induce 
overconfidence in participants, a notion that is broadly consistent with the difficulty effect 
(Griffin & Tversky, 1992). In order to lest this suggestion, a more complex task was 
employed in the research presented in the next chapter of this thesis. 
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The present findings indicate that temporal misestimation is reduced when people 
have the opportunity to think about the task completion process beforehand. That is, the 
mental planning method resulted in greater time prediction accuracy on the three-disk 
(Experiments I and 2) and four-disk tasks (Experiment 2). It was suggested that the two-
minute pre-exposure period enabled participants to acquire task-related infomiation, which 
was used to good effect. Moreover, since both tasks took less than two minutes to 
complete, participants may well have mentally simulated the task completion process 
before estimating task duration. However, as these participants did not perform either task 
before making a single (Experiment 1) or first time estimate (Experiment 2), they had no 
experience of performing the task when making an initial prediction. Thus, they were 
unlikely to possess any kind of distributional information when estimating the duration of 
the first (Experiment 2) or only task (Experiment I ) . 
Since these participants were instructed to think about the task completion process 
during the pre-exposure period, they presumably based their time predictions on 
information about the current task. For example, time estimates on the three-disk task may 
have been based on the disk move pattern and the number of disk moves needed for task 
completion. However, on the basis of previous research (e.g., Buehler et al., 1994), time 
predictions should be more biased rather than more accurate as a consequence of relying 
on such singular information. Given the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, it could be that 
people are able to use singular information to good effect. That is, estimates o f task 
duration are more accurate when people have spent time thinking about the demands of an 
upcoming task beforehand. 
Consistent with previous research (Josephs & Hahn, 1995), prior experience of 
performing the same task also reduced time prediction bias (Experiment 1). That is, 
relative to the no experience condition, time prediction accuracy was greater among 
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participants who actively practised performing the three-disk task beforehand. A plausible 
explanation for this finding is that participants drew upon their prior experience o f 
performing the task when estimating its duration. Indeed, having completed the three-disk 
task at least once during the pre-exposure period, these participants possessed some kind of 
distributional information when estimating task duration. Moreover, as the target trial was 
perfomied immediately afler the pre-exposure period, participants may have recalled 
information about the just-completed task when making a time estimate. Support for this 
notion comes from Buehler et al. (1994), who found that time prediction bias was reduced 
when participants recognised the similarities between previous and current tasks. 
The temporal interval between previous and current tasks could explain the well 
established link between the planning fallacy and the neglect of distributional information. 
That is, the lengthy temporal interval between the repeated performance of many real 
world tasks (e.g., painting one's house) might impede the recall of information about 
personal performance on previous tasks, meaning that time estimates are based on 
information about the task at hand. As Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have suggested, the 
use of such singular information should result in temporal underestimation. Conversely, 
when the temporal interval between previous and current tasks is brief, information about 
previous task performance is likely to be recalled (Ross & Buehler, 2001), and could be 
used to make more accurate time estimates. Given the findings of Experiment 1, the 
effective use of information about previous task performance might be contingent upon 
task experience being acquired shortly before task duration is estimated. 
Prior performance of a more or less complex version of the Tower of Hanoi task was 
found to influence time prediction bias (Experiment 3), That is, temporal underestimation 
was only evident on the four-disk task when it was performed second, whereas the extent 
of overestimation was greater on the three-disk task when it was performed second. It was 
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suggested that this finding occurred because time predictions on the second trial were 
based on information about the nature of the just-completed task. 
I f this were the case, then an alternative interpretation of the planning fallacy 
suggests itself That is, an optimistic time prediction bias is a consequence of temporal 
esfimates being based on infomiation such as the duration of previous similar tasks, which 
are less complex than the current one. Thus, rather than neglecting distributional 
information, people may take account of their previous task performance, but fail to scale 
up their time estimate in accordance with the greater demands of the task at hand. Given 
the findings of Experiment 3, the order in which more or less complex versions of the same 
task were performed was manipulated in the research presented in the next chapter of this 
thesis. 
Contrary to the findings of Buehler et al. (1997), performance-contingent monetary 
incentives did not affect the direction in which time estimates were biased (Experiment 3). 
Hence, there was no evidence that participants engaged in motivated reasoning (Kunda, 
1990) when estimating the duration of the three-disk and four-disk tasks. The relative 
magnitude of the incentives seems a plausible explanation for the disparity between the 
present findings and those of Buehler et al. Specifically, the present monetary rewards may 
have been too meagre to motivate participants to adopt a goal-directed or a deliberative 
reasoning strategy. 
The success of the incentives used by Buehler et al. could also be due to the fact that 
participants were given outcome feedback prior to making a time estimate. That is, at the 
end of each practice trial, Buehler et al.'s participants received a slip of paper detailing the 
duration of the just-completed task. Thus, when estimating task duration, these participants 
possessed information that was relevant to the target trial. In order to obtain the monetary 
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reward, such information may have been incorporated into time estimates on the target 
trial. For example, the durafion of the second practice trial might have served as a 
benchmark for time predictions on the target trial in the speed incentive condition. 
Given that Buehler et al.'s speed incentive was contingent on finishing the target trial 
in less time than the previous trial, predicfions on the target trial may have been lower than 
the duration of the second practice trial. As all trials of the anagram task were of similar 
complexity and durafion (Buehler et al., 1997), temporal underestimation would be 
expected to occur on the target trial i f fime predictions were lower than the duration of the 
second practice trial. Whilst this suggesfion is somewhat speculafive, the provision of 
outcome feedback may well have confounded Buehler et al.'s findings. Given this potenfial 
confound, and the findings of Experiment 3, the issue of performance-confingent 
incentives was not addressed further in this research programme. 
2.16 Conclusions 
A number of potentially important findings have emerged fi-om the research 
presented in this chapter, hi contrast to the findings of previous research (e.g., Buehler et 
al., 1997; Byram, 1997; Newby-Clark et al., 2000), there was no evidence of temporal 
underesfimation on the three-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi task. In fact, in every cell 
in every condifion of these studies, temporal overestimafion was evident on this simple 
well structured task. There was also some evidence of temporal overestimation on the more 
complex four-disk task when it was performed first (Experiments 2 and 3). However, there 
was a hint of temporal underestimation when the four-disk task was preceded by the three-
disk task (Experiments 2 and 3). 
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The present studies also highlight the impact of prior task experience on time 
estimation bias. In Experiments I and 2, prior experience of the same task was found to 
improve prediction accuracy. This finding suggests that information about a current task 
can be considered and used to make more accurate time estimates. The effective use of 
task-related information was also emphasised in Experiment 3, where time prediction bias 
on the second task differed according to the relative complexity of the previous task. 
Specifically, the extent of overestimation on the three-disk task was greater when it was 
performed second rather than first, whereas temporal underestimation was only evident 
when the four-disk task was performed second. 
The research presented in the next chapter of this thesis consists of two experiments. 
The first study sought to confirm some of the major findings fi-om Experiments 1 to 3, 
whereas the second study examined the impact of task duration on time estimation bias. In 
order to further address the issue of task complexity, the five-disk version of the Tower of 
Hanoi task was employed alongside the three-disk task in Experiment 4. The impact of 
prior experience of performing the same task was also further examined in this study. The 
effect of task duration on time estimation bias was investigated in Experiment 5, where 
task complexity was held constant. 
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Chapter Three 
The Effects of Task Complexity and Duration on Time Estimation Bias 
3.1 Overview 
The research presented in this chapter comprises two experiments. Given the 
findings of Experiments 2 and 3, the issue of task complexity was further addressed in 
Experiment 4. This study sought to ascertain whether temporal underestimation was 
evident on the more complex five-disk version of the Tower o f Hanoi task. In order to 
confirm the findings of Experiment 3, the issue of prior experience of performing a more 
or less complex version of the same task was also addressed in this study. Experiment 4 
also examined whether prior performance of an identical task improved time estimation 
accuracy. 
The impact of task duration on time estimation bias was examined in Experiment 5, 
where task complexity was held constant. This study employed short and long duration 
versions of a simple repetitive disk movement task, which were of similar duration to the 
three-disk and five-disk versions of the Tower of Hanoi task, respectively. The issue of 
prior experience of performing a similar task was addressed in Experiment 5, where the 
order in which the two repetitive tasks were performed was manipulated. 
3.2 General Introduction to Experiments 4 and 5 
A general optimistic time prediction bias was not evident on the three-disk 
(Experiments I to 3) and four-disk versions of the Tower of Hanoi task (Experiments 2 and 
3). This finding contrasts with previous research (e.g., Francis-Smythe & Robertson, 
1999), where general temporal underestimation was observed on other laboratory tasks. 
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The relative simplicity of the three-disk and four-disk tasks was suggested as an 
explanation for the discrepancy between the findings of Experiments 1 to 3 and those of 
previous research. That is, general temporal underestimation might only occur on tasks that 
are more complex than those used in the present research. Indeed, temporal 
underestimation was evident on laboratory tasks such as constructing self-assembly 
ftimiture (Byram, 1997) and proof-reading a manuscript (Josephs & Hahn, 1995), both of 
which are more complex than the three-disk and four-disk versions of the Tower of Hanoi 
task. 
There is considerable evidence that task complexity mediates bias in non-temporal 
judgements of task performance (e.g., Juslin et al., 2000; Pulford & Colman, 1997; 
Winman, 1999). Consistent with the judgement calibration phenomenon known as the 
difficulty effect (Griffin & Tversky, 1992), such research suggests that over-optimism 
prevails on more complex tasks whereas pessimism prevails on simpler tasks. Given the 
extent of support for the difficulty effect (Suantak et al., 1996), it could be that the 
direction in which time estimates are biased also differs according to task complexity. In 
fact, there was a hint o f an optimistic time prediction bias on the more complex four-disk 
task, but only when it was performed after the three-disk task (Experiments 2 and 3). In 
order to determine whether a general optimistic time prediction bias was evident on a more 
complex task, the five-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi task was employed in 
Experiment 4. 
Whilst tasks such as constructing self-assembly ftimiture (Byram, 1997) are more 
complex than the three-disk and four-disk tasks, they are also of longer duration. For 
example, the proof-reading task employed by Josephs and Hahn (1995) took about 40 
minutes to complete, whereas the duration of the three-disk task was about 20 seconds 
(Experiments I to 3). Hence, it could be that the temporal underestimation indicative of the 
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planning fallacy is only evident on laboratory tasks that take more time to complete than 
the ones used in the present research. In order to determine whether time estimation bias 
differs according to task duration, cognitive complexity was held constant in Experiment 5. 
In this study, participants performed a longer and a shorter duration version of a simple 
repetitive disk movement task. 
Different types of prior task experience were found to influence time estimation bias 
in Experiments 1 to 3. Firstly, predictions were more accurate when participants performed 
the three-disk task (Experiment I ) or mentally planned how to complete the three-disk and 
four-disk tasks beforehand (Experiments 1 and 2). It was suggested that time prediction 
accuracy was greater because participants used the pre-exposure period to think about 
information such as the steps involved in task completion. That is, when making a time 
estimate, participants drew on task-related information, which they acquired during the 
pre-exposure period. 
Secondly, prior experience of performing a more or less complex similar task was 
found to mediate time prediction bias (Experiment 3). Specifically, on the second trial, the 
magnitude of temporal overestimation was greater on the three-disk task, whereas an 
optimistic time prediction bias was evident on the four-disk task. It was suggested that this 
finding occurred because participants used information about the previous task as a basis 
for their second time prediction, but failed to scale this estimate up or down according to 
the relative complexity of the current task. Such a judgement strategy would be expected to 
result in an optimistic time prediction bias when the previous task was less complex than 
the current one. Likewise, temporal overestimation should be greater when the second task 
was less complex than the first one. That is, time predictions would be longer i f they were 
based on information about a more complex task that had just been completed. 
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Given the finding of Experiment 3, the effect of prior task experience on time 
estimation bias was further explored in the present studies. In Experiments 4 and 5, task 
performance order was manipulated in order to further address the issue of prior 
experience of a performing a similar task. The issue of prior performance of the same task 
was further addressed in Experiment 4, where some participants performed the three-disk 
or five-disk tasks twice in succession. 
3.3 Experiment 4 
This study further investigated the impact of task complexity on time prediction bias. 
Given the findings of Experiments 1 to 3, it was suggested that a general optimistic time 
prediction bias might only be evident on more complex tasks than the three-disk and four-
disk versions of the Tower of Hanoi task. In order to test this suggestion, task complexity 
was increased in this study by using the five-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi task, 
which was employed alongside the three-disk version. Given that over-optimism prevails 
in non-temporal judgements of performance on complex tasks (e.g., Griffin & Tversky, 
1992), it could be that temporal underestimation will be evident on the five-disk task. 
However, as this task has not been used in previous research into time estimation, no 
prediction was made about the direction of judgement bias on it. Consistent with the 
findings of the previous experiments, general temporal overestimation was expected to 
occur on the three-disk task. 
The issue of prior task experience was also further addressed in this study. That is, 
whether prior performance of a similar or an identical task influenced time prediction bias 
on the next task. To this end, some participants performed the same task twice in 
succession, whereas others completed a more or less complex version of the Tower of 
Hanoi task initially. Given the finding of Experiment 3, it was hypothesised that time 
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estimation bias would differ according to the relative complexity of the previous task. 
Specifically, an optimistic time prediction bias was expected to occur when the five-disk 
task was preceded by the three-disk task, whereas temporal estimates should be more 
pessimistically biased when the three-disk task was performed after the five-disk task. 
Since prior performance of the same task has been found to reduce time estimation bias 
(Josephs & Hahn, 1995), it was anticipated that predictions would be more accurate when 
the same rather than a different version of the Tower of Hanoi task was perfomied initially. 
3.4 Method 
3.4.1 Participants 
Ninety-four (88 female and 6 male) students at the University of Plymouth 
participated voluntarily in partial ftilfilment of a psychology course requirement. No 
biographical information other than gender was recorded. 
3.4.2 Materials 
The materials were the same as those used in Experiment 3 except that the Tower of 
Hanoi apparatus contained five different-sized disks. The two largest disks were removed 
to form the three-disk task. 
3.4.3 Design and Procedure 
A 2 (time: estimated vs. actual) x 2 (task: first vs. second) x 4 (task experience: 
three-disk twice vs. five-disk twice vs. three- then five-disk vs. five- then three-disk) mixed 
factorial design was used. The time and task factors were repeated-measures. The order in 
which the tasks were performed was determined by random assignment to a level of the 
task experience factor. Task experience was a between-groups factor, with participants 
being randomly assigned to one of four conditions. 
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The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 3 except that participants 
were given 20 seconds (after reading the task instructions) to make a time prediction on 
each task. Each testing session lasted approximately 20 minutes. 
3.5 Results 
Table 3.1 below contains basic descriptive statistics of estimated and actual duration 
per task and task experience condition. Al l test statistics used in Experiment 4 are 
contained in Appendix 4. 
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Task Experience Condition 
Task Three-disk Five- Then Five-disk Three- Then 
Twice Three-disk Twice Five-disk 
M = 93.54 M = 243.96 M = 268.70 M = 71,96 
Time Mdn = 90.00 Mdn = 270.00 Mdn = 240.00 Mdn = 60.00 
Estimate SD = 49.88 SD= 169.01 SD= 160.41 SD = 46.65 
First 
N = 24 N = 23 N = 24 N = 23 
M = 32.71 M = 248.75 M = 247.22 M = 31.09 
Completion Mdn = 24.50 Mdn = 219.50 Mdn = 222.00 Mdn = 29.00 
Time SD = 23.11 SD = 35.I4 SD= 109.18 SD= 19.66 
N = 24 N = 23 N = 24 N = 23 
M = 30,63 M = 82.50 M = 204.57 M = 120.22 
Time Mdn = 25.00 Mdn = 60.00 Mdn = 180.00 Mdn = 90.00 
Estimate SD = 22.33 SD = 52.29 SD= 121.85 SD = 77.00 
Second 
N = 24 N = 23 N = 24 N = 23 
M = 19.17 M = 18.00 M = 203.87 M = 169.39 
Completion Mdn = 16.00 Mdn = 14.00 Mdn = 207.00 Mdn = 161.00 
Time SD= 13.93 SD= 10.03 SD= 117.57 SD= 85.17 
N = 24 N = 23 N = 24 N = 23 
Table 3.1 
Time estimates and completion times per task and task experience condition (in seconds) 
As Table 3.1 shows, estimates exceeded complefion times on the three-disk task 
regardless of prior experience. That is, temporal overestimation was evident in the three-
disk twice, the five- then three-disk and the three- then five-disk task conditions. This 
finding is consistent with Experiments I to 3, and indicates that general temporal 
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overcstimation occurred on this simple task. However. Table 3.1 also shows that temporal 
underestimation was evident when the f i \ e-disk task was performed before or after the 
three-disk version, whereas overcstimation occurred on the first and second trials in the 
five-disk task twice condition. Bar graphs of predicted and actual completion times on the 
first and second tasks arc presented below in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. 
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Figure 3.1 
Bar graph of predicted and actual completion times per task experience condition (data 
from the first task) 
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Figure 3.2 
Bar graph of predicted and actual completion times per task experience condition (data 
from the second task) 
In order to determine how many participants predicted task duration using whole 
minutes, frequency distributions of time estimates were calculated. Histograms of time 
estimates on the three-disk and five-disk tasks (regardless of task experience condition) are 
presented below in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. 
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Time Estimate (Seconds) 
Figure 3.3 
Histogram of time estimates on the three-disk task 
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Figure 3.4 
Histogram of time estimates on the five-disk task 
For the same reasons that were specified in Experiment 1, the estimated and actual 
completion time data were subjected to a logarithmic transformation before being 
statistically analysed. In order to address the issue of task complexity, the log-transformed 
data from the first trial were analysed. Since the task experience factor was only relevant to 
the second trial, the data fi-om the first trial were collapsed across the two conditions that 
performed either the three-disk or the five-disk task. A 2 (task: three-disk vs. five-disk) x 2 
(time: estimated vs. actual) mixed design ANOVA produced a main effect of time, F(3,90) 
= 27.89, MSE = .32, p < .001, with estimates exceeding completion times (Ms = 169.54 
and 139.94 seconds, respectively). This finding indicates that general temporal 
overestimation was evident on the first trial. There was also a main effect of task, F(3,90) = 
226.70, MSE = .53, p < .001, with overall time being shorter on the three-disk task. 
08 
The interaction was also significant, F(3,90) = 38.00, MSE = .32, p < .001 (see 
Figure 3.5 below). This revealed that the difference between estimates and completion 
times was greater on the three-disk task (Ms = 82.75 and 31.90 seconds, respectively) than 
on the five-disk task (Ms = 256.33 and 247.99 seconds, respectively). Planned 
comparisons (LSD t-tests, both two-tailed) revealed a significant difference between 
estimated and actual duration on the three-disk (p < .05), but not the five-disk task (p > 
.10). Thus, the extent of temporal overestimation was less on the five-disk task, suggesting 
that task complexity might be positively related to time prediction accuracy. 
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Figure 3.5 
Bar graph depicting the interaction between the task and time factors (data firom the first 
task partially collapsed across the task experience factor) 
In order to address the issue of prior task experience, the log-transfomicd data from 
the second trial were analysed. A 2 (time) x 4 (task experience) mixed design ANOVA 
produced a main effect of time, F(l,90) = 20.92, MSE = .29, p < .001, with estimates 
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exceeding completion times (Ms = 109.48 and 102.61 seconds, respectively). Thus, there 
was evidence of general temporal overestimation on the second trial. There was also a 
main effect of task experience, F(3,90) = 120.64, MSE = .41, p < .001, with overall time 
being longest in the five-disk task twice condition. Scheffe pairwise comparisons revealed 
significant differences between the means of all conditions (ps < .05) except those of the 
five-disk task twice and the three- then five-disk task conditions (p > .05). 
The interaction was also significant, F(3,90) = 25.20, MSE = .29, p < .001 (see 
Figure 3.2 above). This revealed that temporal overestimation was evident in both 
conditions on the three-disk task, whereas the direction of time prediction bias on the five-
disk task differed according to prior experience. That is, temporal underestimation was 
evident when the three-disk task was performed beforehand, whereas temporal 
overestimation occurred when the five-disk task was performed for a second time. Planned 
comparisons (LSD t-tests, all two-tailed) revealed that estimates and completion times 
differed significantly when the five-disk task was preceded by the three-disk task (p < .05), 
but not when it was performed for a second time (p > ,10). On the three-disk task, the 
difference between estimated and actual duration was greater when the five-disk task (p < 
.001) rather than the three-disk task was performed beforehand (p < .05). These findings 
indicate that, on the three-disk and five-disk tasks, time predictions were more accurate 
when the same rather than a different version of the Tower of Hanoi task had been 
performed beforehand. 
3.6 Discussion 
Consistent with the task experience hypothesis, time predictions on the second trial 
were found to be more accurate when the same rather than a different version of the Tower 
of Hanoi was performed beforehand. A plausible explanation for this finding is that 
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participants mentally represented the task components during the first trial, and drew upon 
pertinent information such as the disk moves needed for task completion when making a 
second time estimate. Such a judgement strategy would be expected to result in greater 
time prediction accuracy when an identical rather than a different task had just been 
completed. This finding suggests that the effect of prior task performance that was 
observed in Experiment 1 generalises beyond the three-disk task to the more complex five-
disk version of the Tower of Hanoi task. 
The present study suggests that prior experience of performing a more or less 
complex similar task influenced time prediction bias. That is, temporal overestimation was 
greater when the three-disk task was preceded by the five-disk task, whereas temporal 
underestimation was only evident when the five-disk task was performed after the three-
task. This finding is consistent with the notion that participants used a judgement strategy 
whereby information about the previous task formed the basis of a second time prediction, 
which was insufficiently adjusted according to the greater or lesser demands of the current 
task. 
Given the difference in complexity between the three-disk and five-disk tasks, time 
prediction bias would be a consequence of using such a judgement strategy. For example, 
over-optimism would occur i f time predictions were based on the disk moves needed to 
complete the three-disk task, but were insufficiently scaled up to take account of the 
greater number of disk moves involved in finishing the five-disk task. Since a similar 
finding was observed in Experiment 3, the issue of prior experience of performing a 
different version of the same task was further addressed in Experiment 5. 
There was evidence that, on the first trial, time estimates were less biased on the 
more complex five-disk task. This finding is broadly consistent with previous research 
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(e.g., Suantak et al., 1996), which suggests that bias in non-temporal judgements of 
performance differs according to task complexity. Since time predictions on the five-disk 
task were less pessimistically biased, participants presumably displayed greater confidence 
(as well as greater accuracy) when judging the duration of the more complex task. This 
finding not only suggests that task complexity might mediate time prediction accuracy, but 
also highlights the potential applicability of the difficulty effect (Griffin & Tversky, 1992) 
to the process of estimating task duration. 
As was the case in Experiments 1 to 3, temporal overestimation was evident on the 
three-disk task regardless of the order in which it was performed. However, a general 
optimistic time prediction bias did not occur on the five-disk task. In fact, temporal 
underestimation was only observed when this more complex task was preceded by the 
three-disk task, whereas temporal overestimation was evident when it was performed first. 
This finding suggests that increasing the cognitive complexity of the Tower of Hanoi task 
did not result in general temporal underestimation. 
Task duration could explain the discrepancy between the present findings and those 
of previous research where the planning fallacy was evident (e.g., Buehler et al., 1994). 
That is, although the average duration of the five-disk task was almost three times that of 
the four-disk task in Experiment 3 (Ms = 217.31 and 78.42 seconds, respectively), it still 
took less time to complete than the laboratory tasks used previously. Thus, general 
temporal underestimation might only occur on laboratory tasks that are of longer duration 
than the tasks used in Experiments 1 to 4. Indeed, it has been found that people tend to use 
temporal units such as 10 or 15 minutes when estimafing the duration of everyday 
activities (Fraisse, 1984). 
- 112-
Extrapolating from the work of Fraisse, it could be that the propensity to use such 
temporal units results in an overestimation of time on tasks that are of shorter duration than 
these units. Given the duration of the three-disk, four-disk and five-disk tasks, time 
predictions would be expected to be pessimistically biased as a consequence of using 
temporal units such as five or 10 minutes. Consistent with this suggestion, the frequency 
distribution of time estimates on the five-disk task revealed that several participants judged 
the duration of this task as being either five or 10 minutes. This finding provides support 
for the notion that the tendency to estimate the duration of everyday activities using such 
temporal units might generalise to this well structured laboratory task. 
Since more complex tasks tend to be of longer duration than simpler ones (Buckhalt 
& Gates, 2002), the absence of a general optimistic time prediction bias could also be due 
to the relative simplicity of the three-disk, four-disk and five-disk tasks. Specifically, 
because these tasks were relatively undemanding, participants may well have been able to 
devote sufficient cognitive resources to the process of predicting task duration. For 
example, participants might have worked out the disk pattern involved in completing the 
three-disk task beforehand, and used this information when estimating its duration. On the 
basis of previous research (e.g., Sniezek et al., 1990), predictions would not be expected to 
optimistically biased as a consequence of cognitively processing task-related information. 
A key aim of Experiment 5 was to ascertain whether task duration or cognitive complexity 
was responsible for the absence of general temporal underestimation in Experiments 1 to 4. 
3.7 Experiment 5 
This study sought to determine whether task duration or cognitive complexity was 
responsible for the lack of a general optimistic prediction bias in Experiments I to 4. In 
order to achieve this goal, task duration was manipulated whilst cognitive complexity was 
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held constant. A repetitive manual disk movement task was employed, which used the 
Tower of Hanoi task apparatus. Duration was manipulated by employing two versions of 
this task, which involved moving either three or five disks for a certain number of limes. 
Unlike the Tower of Hanoi task, there were few restrictions on disk movement in the 
repetitive task, which was thus cognitively undemanding and simple to perform. Moreover, 
because there were few restrictions on disk movement (e.g., larger disks could be placed 
on top o f smaller ones), there was no need for participants to create subgoals in order to 
complete this task. Hence, the three-disk and five-disk versions of the repetitive task did 
not vary in cognitive complexity, but differed principally in the amount of time needed for 
complefion. 
I f task complexity is an important determinant of time estimation bias, then 
participants might be over-optimistic about their ability to complete such a simple 
repetitive task. That is, few cognitive resources are likely to be devoted to predicting the 
duration of this rather mundane task, a judgement strategy that has been shown to result in 
an optimistic bias (e.g., Arkes et al., 1988). Alternatively, i f task duration is an important 
factor, then the same general temporal overestimation should be evident on the repetitive 
task as was observed on the tasks used in Experiments 1 to 4. Specifically, general 
temporal overestimation occurred because the present tasks were of shorter duration than 
the laboratory tasks used in previous research where the planning fallacy was evident (e.g., 
Byram, 1997). Task performance order was also manipulated in order to ascertain whether 
prediction bias on the second task differed according to the relative duration of the first 
task. 
The repetitive task involved moving the disks one at a time fi-om the left-hand peg to 
the centre peg to the right-hand peg and back again in reverse order. This process was 
repeated until all disks had been placed on the pegs for a certain number of times. The two 
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repetitive tasks were designed to be of similar duration to the three-disk and five-disk 
versions of the Tower of Hanoi task (when they were performed first) in Experiment 4 (Ms 
= 31,90 and 247.99 seconds, respectively). These mean completion times served as a 
benchmark for the number of limes that the disks had to be stacked on the pegs. Pilot 
testing revealed that, on the three-disk task, all disks could be placed on eight pegs in 32 
seconds. On the five-disk task, pilot testing revealed that all disks could be placed on 36 
pegs in 248 seconds. Completion of the three-disk and five-disk tasks thus involved 
stacking all of the disks on either eight or 36 pegs, respectively. 
3.8 Method 
3.8.1 Participants 
Fifty (44 female and 6 male) students at the University of Plymouth participated 
voluntarily in partial fijlfilment of a psychology course requirement. No biographical 
information other than gender was recorded. 
3.8.2 Materials 
These were identical to the materials used in Experiment 4. 
3.8.3 Design and Procedure 
A 2 (time: estimated vs. actual) x 2 (task: three-disk vs. five-disk) x 2 (task 
performance order: three-disk then five-disk vs. five-disk then three-disk) mixed factorial 
design was used. The time and task factors were repeated-measures. The order in which the 
tasks were performed was fully counterbalanced. The task performance order factor was 
manipulated beUveen groups, with participants being randomly assigned to one of two 
equal-sized conditions. 
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Except for the following differences, the procedure was identical to that of 
Experiment 4. The researcher recorded the number of pegs on which the disks were 
stacked and informed participants when each task had been completed. Al l participants 
were informed about the number of pegs upon which the disks had to be placed before 
estimating task duration. Each testing session lasted approximately 20 minutes. 
3.9 Results 
Table 3.2 below contains basic descriptive statistics of estimated and actual duration 
per task and task performance order condition. Al l test statistics used in Experiment 5 are 
contained in Appendix 5. 
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Task 
Task Performance Order Condition 
Three- Then Five-
disk 
Five- Then Three-
disk 
Three-disk 
Time Estimate 
M = 59.60 
Mdn = 60.00 
SD = 30.92 
N = 25 
M = 63.20 
Mdn = 60.00 
SD = 41.05 
N = 25 
Completion Time 
M = 30.48 
Mdn = 30.00 
SD = 4.62 
N = 25 
M = 26.08 
Mdn = 24.00 
SD = 6.72 
N = 25 
Five-disk 
Time Estimate 
M = 184.00 
Mdn = 180.00 
SD = 74.89 
N = 25 
M = 255.60 
Mdn = 240.00 
SD= 106.46 
N = 25 
Completion Time 
M = 210.68 
Mdn = 207.00 
SD = 38.89 
N = 25 
M = 228.36 
Mdn = 217.00 
SD = 47.44 
N = 25 
Table 3.2 
Time estimates and completion times per task and task performance order condition (in 
seconds) 
As Table 3.2 shows, temporal estimates exceeded completion times on the three-disk 
task regardless of the order in which it was performed. This finding suggests that 
participants made pessimistically biased predictions on the shorter duration repetitive task. 
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However, Table 3.2 shows that the direction of time prediction bias differed according to 
the order in which the five-disk task was performed. That is, temporal underestimation was 
evident when this task was performed second, whereas temporal overestimation occurred 
when it was performed first. A bar graph of predicted and actual completion times per task 
and task performance order condition is presented below in Figure 3.6. 
in 150 
0) 
E 120 
• Predicted Time 
• Actual Time 
Figure 3.6 
Bar graph of estimated and actual completion times per task and performance order 
condition 
In order to determine how many participants predicted task duration using whole 
minutes, frequency distributions of time estimates were calculated. Histograms of time 
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estimates on the three-disk and five-disk tasks (regardless of performance order) are 
presented below in Figures 3.7 and 3.8. respectively. 
« 18 
Time Estimate (Seconds) 
Figure 3.7 
Histogram of time estimates on the three-disk task 
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Figure 3.8 
Histogram of time estimates on the five-disk task 
For the same reasons that were specified in Experiment 1, the estimated and actual 
completion time data were subjected to a logarithmic transformation prior to being 
statistically analysed. In order to address the issue of task duration versus cognitive 
complexity, the log-transformed data from the first trial were analysed. A 2 (time) x 2 
(task) mixed design ANOVA produced a main effect of time, F(l,48) = 21.39, MSE = .11, 
p < .001, with estimates exceeding completion times (Ms = 157.60 and 129.42 seconds, 
respectively). This finding suggests that general temporal overestimation was evident on 
the first trial. There was also a main effect of task, F(l,48) = 501.72, MSE = .15, p < .001, 
with overall time being longer on the five-disk task. 
The interaction was also significant, F(l,48) = 14.03, MSE = .11, p < .001, and 
revealed that the extent of temporal overestimation was greater on the three-disk task (see 
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Figure 3.9 below). Planned comparisons (LSD t-tests. both two-tailed) revealed that 
estimates and completion times differed significantly on the three-disk (p < .05). but not 
the five-disk task (p > .10). This finding indicates that time predictions were less 
pessimistically biased (and thus more accurate) on the longer duration version of the 
repetitive disk movement task. 
• Predicted Time 
• Actual Time 
3-disk 5-disk 
Task 
Figure 3.9 
Bar graph depicting the interaction between the task and time factors (data from the first 
task) 
In order to examine the impact of task performance order on time estimation bias, the 
log-transformed data from the second trial were analysed. A 2 (time) x 2 (task) mixed 
design ANOVA produced a main effect of time, F(l,48) = 16.60, MSE = .12, p < .001, 
with estimates exceeding completion times (Ms = 123.60 and 118.38 seconds, 
respectively). This finding suggests that general temporal overestimation was evident on 
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the second trial. There was also a main effect of task, F(l,48) = 424.13, MSE = .16, p < 
.001, with overall time being longer on the five-disk task. 
The interaction was also significant, F(l,48) = 48.84, MSE = .12, p < .001. This 
revealed that estimates exceeded completion times on the three-disk task, whereas 
completion times exceeded estimates on the five-disk version (see Figure 3.10 below). 
Planned comparisons (LSD t-tests, both two-tailed) revealed a significant difference 
between estimated and actual duration on each task (ps < .05). 
This finding indicates that the direction in which time predictions on the second task 
were biased differed according to the relative duration of the first task. That is, an 
optimistic time prediction bias was evident on the longer task, whereas a pessimistic time 
prediction bias occurred on the shorter task. However, whilst the difference between 
predicted and actual duration was greater when the three-disk task was performed second 
(see Table 3.2), time estimates (log-transformed) did not differ significantly according to 
performance order on this task, t(48) = .24, p > .10, two-tailed. Thus, time predictions were 
not significantly longer when the shorter task was performed after the longer task rather 
than before it. 
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• Predicted Time 
• Actual Time 
3-dlsk 5-disk 
Task 
Figure 3.10 
Bar graph depicting the interaction between the task and time factors (data from the second 
task) 
3.10 Discussion 
There was no evidence of a general optimistic time prediction bias on either version 
of the repetitive disk movement task. Specifically, time predictions were pessimistically 
biased on the three-disk task regardless of performance order, and there was a hint of 
temporal overestimation on the five-disk task when it was performed first. In fact, temporal 
underestimation was only evident when the five-disk task was preceded by the three-disk 
task. Given that the three-disk and five-disk versions of the repetitive task did not differ in 
cognitive complexity, the absence of general temporal underestimation suggests that task 
duration is responsible for the findings of the present research. That is, the present lack of 
general temporal underestimation could be due to the shorter duration of the tasks used in 
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Experiments 1 to 5 relative to those tasks employed in previous research where the 
planning fallacy has been observed (e.g., Byram, 1997). 
Given this suggestion, the direction in which time predictions are biased might differ 
according to task duration. That is, temporal overestimation occurs on laboratory tasks that 
take less than one minute to complete (e.g., the three-disk repetitive task), whereas 
temporal underestimation may prevail on such tasks when they are of longer duration than 
those used in Experiments 1 to 5. Consistent with this notion, an optimistic time prediction 
bias has been observed on laboratory tasks that took between eight minutes (Buehler et al., 
1997) and just over one hour to complete (Byram, 1997). Thus, the planning fallacy might 
only be evident on laboratory tasks that are of longer duration than the present ones. In 
order to test the validity of this claim, laboratory tasks that were of longer duration than 
those used in Experiments 1 to 5 were employed in the remainder of this research 
programme. 
The impact of task duration on the accuracy of time predictions was emphasised in 
the present study. That is, on the first trial, the extent of temporal overestimation was 
greater on the three-disk task relative to the five-disk task. This finding indicates that, after 
only 20 seconds of pre-exposure, participants were more accurate (i.e., less pessimistic) 
when estimating the duration of the longer task. 
A possible explanation for this finding is that greater cognitive resources were 
devoted to the process of estimating the duration o f the five-disk task. Since participants 
were aware in advance that this task involved placing all disks on each peg 12 times (i.e., 
36 pegs in total), they presumably realised that it could not be completed in a matter o f 
seconds. With such information in mind, they may have used the pre-exposure period to 
consider the amount of work involved in the task completion process, and based their 
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second time estimate on such information. Conversely, as the three-disk task involved 
placing the disks on each peg only Uvo or three times (i.e., eight pegs in total), few 
cognitive resources may have been devoted to estimating the duration of this quick and 
simple task. On the basis of previous research (Koriat et al., 1980), judgements would be 
expected to be more accurate when greater cognitive resources are devoted to the process 
of predicting task performance. 
There was some evidence that time estimation bias on the second task differed 
according to the relative duration of the first task. Specifically, temporal underestimation 
was only evident on the five-disk task when it was performed second, whereas there was a 
hint of greater temporal overestimation on the three-disk task when it was performed 
second. This finding is broadly consistent with those of Experiments 3 and 4, and suggests 
that information about the first task might have formed the basis of time estimates on the 
second task. For example, when making a second time prediction, participants may have 
estimated the duration of the just-completed task, but failed to take sufficient account of 
the greater or lesser number of disks involved in completing the current task. Given the 
findings of Experiments 3 to 5, the impact of previous task duration on subsequent time 
estimates was fiarther examined in the remainder of this research programme. 
3.11 General Discussion 
There was ftirther evidence of temporal overestimation on the three-disk Tower of 
Hanoi task regardless of task performance order or prior task experience in Experiment 4. 
Likewise, Experiment 5 revealed that temporal overestimation was evident on the three-
disk version of the repetitive task regardless of the order in which it was performed. 
Moreover, there was a hint of general temporal overestimation on the five-disk Tower o f 
Hanoi task (Experiment 4) and the five-disk repetitive task (Experiment 5). These findings 
- 125-
suggest that the temporal underestimation indicative of the planning fallacy does not occur 
on well structured laboratory tasks, which range in duration fi-om about 30 seconds to four 
minutes. However, there was some evidence of an optimistic time prediction bias on both 
of the five-disk tasks, but only when they were performed second. That is, participants 
tended to underestimate their completion times only when they had completed the three-
disk version of the same task beforehand. 
The present studies revealed that, on the first trial, participants were more accurate at 
estimating the duration o f the longer tasks. For example, time predictions were less 
pessimisfically biased on the five-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi relative to the three-
disk task (Experiment 4). As temporal estimates were also more accurate on the four-disk 
version of the Tower of Hanoi (Experiments 2 and 3), the present studies provide further 
evidence of a positive relationship between task complexity and time prediction accuracy. 
There was also evidence that temporal estimates were less pessimistically biased on the 
five-disk version of the repetitive task (Experiment 5), suggesting that task duration might 
be positively related to time predicfion accuracy. Whilst these findings could be due to 
participants devoting greater cognitive resources to predicting the duration of the longer 
tasks, an alternative explanation is that people tend to esfimate time in whole minutes 
rather than seconds, or longer temporal units such as 10 or 15 minutes (Fraisse, 1984). 
Given the durafion of both types of three-disk and five-disk task used here (i.e., 
approximately 30 seconds and four minutes, respectively), the tendency to estimate time in 
whole minutes may have resulted in greater time prediction accuracy on the longer tasks. 
For example, participants might have given esfimates of four or five minutes on these 
tasks. Conversely, greater fime prediction bias may have been a consequence of estimafing 
the durafion of the shorter tasks using temporal units such as one or two minutes. Although 
participants were asked to estimate task duration in seconds, several of them gave time 
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predictions in whole or part minutes, which they then converted into seconds at the request 
of the researcher. 
Consistent with the notion that people tend not to judge task duration in seconds, the 
frequency distributions of time estimates revealed that the majority of the present 
participants predicted the duration of all tasks in units of whole minutes. For example, over 
half of the participants estimated the duration of the three-disk Tower o f Hanoi task 
(Experiment 4) and the shorter duration repetitive disk movement task (Experiments 5) 
using temporal units of whole minutes (see Figures 3.3 and 3.7, respectively). Similarly, on 
the five-disk Tower of Hanoi task (Experiment 4) and the longer duration repetitive disk 
movement task (Experiment 5), over ninety percent of participants estimated their 
completion times using whole minutes (see Figures 3.4 and 3.8, respectively). Hence, there 
was evidence that individuals estimated the duration of both types of three-disk and five-
disk task using temporal units of whole minutes rather than seconds. Indeed, on the five-
disk Tower of Hanoi task (Experiment 4), a sizeable minority of participants estimated task 
duration in temporal units of five and 10 minutes. Likewise, some participants predicted 
that the longer duration repetitive disk movement task would take them five minutes to 
complete (Experiment 5). Thus, it seems that people use such temporal units when judging 
the duration of certain laboratory tasks. 
Experiment 5 revealed that task duration could be responsible for the discrepancy 
between the findings of the present studies and those of previous research where the 
planning fallacy was evident (e.g., Josephs & Hahn, 1995). That is, a general optimistic 
time prediction bias might only prevail on longer duration tasks than those used in 
Experiments 1 to 5. Given that the shortest task used in previous research took about eight 
minutes to complete (Buehler et al., 1997), tasks may need to be of at least this duration 
before general temporal underestimation occurs. In order to test this suggestion, a 
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laboratory task that was of similar durafion to some of those used in previous studies (e.g., 
Francis-Smythe & Robertson, 1999) was employed in Experiments 6 and 7. 
The present lack of general temporal underestimation could also be due to the nature 
of the tasks used in Experiments 1 to 5. For example, whilst the Tower of Hanoi task has 
been the subject of research into task planning (e.g., Goel & Grafinan, 1995; Karat, 1982; 
Spitz et al., 1984), it is a rather novel task. Thus, it could be that participants erred on the 
side of caution when making a time estimate because they were unsure of the task 
completion process. Moreover, as the Tower of Hanoi task and the repetitive task are both 
novel, participants presumably had little or no experience of performing them before the 
experiment. 
In contrast, in previous research, participants may be been over-optimistic when 
predicting the duration of tasks such as writing an essay (e.g., Koole & Van't Spijker, 
2000) because they were familiar with the completion process. Hence, people might be 
over-optimistic when estimating the duration of a familiar task, but pessimisfic when 
judging the duration of a novel activity. Given this suggestion, it was decided to increase 
task familiarity in the research presented in the next chapter of this thesis. To this end, 
laboratory tasks that are more realistic than the Tower of Hanoi task and the repetitive disk 
movement task were employed in Experiments 6 and 7. 
The importance of prior task experience in mediating fime prediction bias was 
ftirther emphasised in the present studies. For example, time estimates were more accurate 
when the three-disk and five-disk versions of the Tower of Hanoi task were performed for 
a second time (Experiment 4). This finding is consistent with previous research (Josephs & 
Hahn, 1995), and suggests that information about personal performance on a previous task 
can be used to good effect when it is acquired shortly before estimating task duration. 
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Given the brief temporal interval between the first and second trials in the present 
studies, participants were likely to recall information about the just-completed task (e.g., 
the correct disk move pattern) when making a second time estimate. Likewise, participants 
may have thought about any errors that they committed on the first trial (e.g., moving a 
disk to the wrong peg), and incorporated such information into their second time 
prediction. In the light of the research reported by Taylor et al. (1998), thinking about 
factors that might delay task completion would be expected to reduce temporal 
misestimation. 
Prior experience of performing a similar task was also found to influence time 
prediction bias in the present studies. That is, an optimistic time prediction bias was only 
evident when either of the five-disk tasks were performed second (Experiments 4 and 5), 
whereas temporal overestimation was greater on the three-disk tasks when a more complex 
(Experiment 4) or a longer duration version of the same task was completed initially 
(Experiment 5). This finding is consistent with that of Experiment 3, and suggests that 
participants took account of their performance on the previous task when making a second 
time estimate. 
A possible explanation for these findings is that time predictions on the second task 
were based on information about the first task. Given that the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982b) have been shown to influence temporal 
judgements (Buehler et al., 1995), participants might have used these heuristics when 
making a second time estimate. For example, in Experiment 4, over-optimism may have 
been a consequence of time predictions being anchored on the shorter duration of the just-
completed three-disk task, with insufficient adjustment for the greater demands of the 
upcoming five-disk task. 
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In relation to the time estimation process, evidence of anchoring effects implies that 
people base their predictions about their performance on a current task on what happened 
on a previous task. However, in contrast to the standard anchoring paradigm (Chapman & 
Johnson, 2002), no numerical anchor values were presented to participants in the present 
studies. Thus, if anchoring and adjustment occurred in these experiments, numerical 
anchor values would have to be self-generated. Since participants generated a numerical 
value before each task (i.e., a time estimate), they might also have done so at the end of 
each trial. That is, they may have estimated how long the just-completed task took to 
complete, and used this infonnation as a basis for their second estimate. 
Alternatively, participants may have recalled their time prediction on the first task, 
and used this numerical value as an anchor for estimating the duration of the second task. 
Whilst these suggestions are rather speculative, there is evidence of anchoring and 
adjustment in the absence of externally-presented numerical values (Epiey & Gilovich, 
2002). Hence, it could be that participants misestimated the duration of the second task 
because they used these cognitive heuristics. 
3.12 Conclusions 
A number of potentially important findings have emerged from the research 
presented in this chapter. There was no evidence of a general optimistic time prediction 
bias on the five-disk Tower of Hanoi task (Experiment 4). Hence, increasing the 
complexity of this well structured task did not result in general temporal underestimation. 
In addition to providing further evidence that prior task experience mediates time 
estimation accuracy (Experiment 4), task duration was also identified as a potentially 
important determinant of prediction bias (Experiment 5). Specifically, general temporal 
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underestimation was not evident on three-disk and five-disk versions of a simple repetitive 
task, suggesting that the shorter duration of the present tasks could be responsible for the 
absence of a genera! optimistic time prediction bias in Experiments 1 to 5. This finding 
indicates that general temporal underestimation does not occur, and seems to be reversed, 
on well structured laboratory tasks that take up to four or five minutes to complete. 
The next chapter of this thesis comprises two studies. A key aim of Experiments 6 
and 7 was to ascertain whether genera! temporal underestimation occurred on a laboratory 
task that was of longer duration than those used in Experiments 1 to 5. In order to achieve 
this goal, a task that took approximately 11 minutes to complete was employed alongside 
tasks that were of similar duration to the ones used in the present studies. The issue of prior 
task experience was further addressed in Experiments 6 and 7 by manipulating task 
performance order. These studies also employed tasks that are less artificial than the Tower 
of Hanoi task and the repetitive disk movement task. That is, tasks that bear greater 
resemblance to various well structured activities that are performed in everyday life, such 
as constructing self-assembly furniture (Byram, 1997) or cooking a meal by following a 
recipe (Byrne, 1977). 
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Chapter Four 
Time Estimation Bias on Less Artificial Well Structured Laboratory Tasks 
4.1 Overview 
The research presented in this chapter consists of two experiments. A principal aim 
of Experiments 6 and 7 was to ascertain whether general temporal overestimation would 
occur on well structured laboratory tasks that are less artificial than the ones used in 
Experiments 1 to 5. That is, whether time predictions were pessimistically biased on more 
realistic tasks that were of similar duration to the three-disk and five-disk versions of the 
Tower of Hanoi task (and the repetitive disk movement task). The present studies also 
sought to determine whether general temporal underestimation would occur on a well 
structured task that was of longer duration than the ones used in Experiments 1 to 5. This 
task was also of similar duration to a number of the laboratory tasks used in previous 
research where an optimistic time prediction bias prevailed (e.g., Byram, 1997). 
The impact of task duration on time prediction bias was further examined in 
Experiment 6, which employed two different tasks. One of these tasks took longer to 
complete than the ones used in Experiments I to 5, whereas the other was of similar 
duration to the five-disk Tower of Hanoi task. In order to reflect the design of Experiments 
I to 5, where different versions of the Tower of Hanoi task and the repetitive disk 
movement task were used, task structure was held constant in Experiment 7. In this study, 
three different versions of the same task were employed. Two of these tasks were shorter 
duration sub-component versions of the long duration task from Experiment 6, and were 
employed alongside the long task itself The issue of prior task experience was further 
addressed by manipulating task performance order in both studies. 
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4.2 General Introduction to Experiments 6 and 7 
As has been shown, a general optimistic time prediction bias did not occur on three 
versions of the Tower of Hanoi task (Experiments 1 to 4) and two versions of a repetitive 
disk movement task (Experiment 5). In general, there was evidence of temporal 
overestimation on the tasks used in Experiments 1 to 5, This finding contrasts with 
previous research (e.g., Josephs & Hahn, 1995), which has produced evidence of 
optimistically biased time estimates on other laboratory and real world tasks. Given the 
findings of Experiment 5, task duration was suggested as an explanation for the lack of a 
general optimistic time prediction bias in the present research. That is, general temporal 
underestimation might only be evident on longer duration tasks than those used in 
Experiments 1 to 5. 
Consistent with this suggestion, the laboratory tasks used previously were of longer 
duration than those employed in Experiments 1 to 5, which took up to four or five minutes 
to complete. For example, Byram (1997) reports that the furniture assembly task took a 
little over one hour to complete, whereas it took about 10 minutes to finish the origami 
task. Likewise, the crossword puzzle used by Francis-Smythe and Robertson (1999) took 
about 10 minutes to complete, whereas the anagram task employed by Buehler et al. (1997) 
took about eight minutes to finish. 
Whilst task duration might explain the findings of Experiments 1 to 5, the nature of 
the tasks used in those studies could also account for the absence of a general optimistic 
time prediction bias. That is, participants erred on the side of caution because they were 
unfamiliar with the completion process of the Tower of Hanoi task and the repetitive disk 
movement task. Given this suggestion, it could be that people are only over-optimistic 
when estimating the duration of tasks that are less novel than those used in Experiments 1 
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to 5. Moreover, although the Tower of Hanoi task has been the subject of research into task 
planning (e.g., Davies, 2000b; Goel & Graftnan, 1995; Welsh et al., 1999), it bears little 
resemblance to various well structured activities that are performed in everyday life. 
In contrast, some of the laboratory tasks used in previous research (e.g., Francis-
Smythe & Robertson, 1999) were more akin to certain well structured everyday activities, 
suggesting that participants may have had some prior experience of completing the same or 
similar tasks. For example, participants in Byram's (1997) research might have been 
familiar with the process of assembling an item of flat-packed fiimiture. If this were the 
case, then temporal underestimation would be expected to occur if these individuals failed 
to take account of the fact that self-assembly ftjmiture components tend not to fit together 
as easily as the task instruction booklet suggests. 
Support for this notion comes firom Byram's research, which revealed that 
participants failed to consider factors that might delay task completion when estimating the 
duration of a fijmiture assembly task. Hence, when predicting the duration of laboratory 
tasks that are identical or similar to tasks encountered previously, it could be that 
individuals fail to consider distributional information, a strategy that has been shown to 
lead to temporal underestimation (Buehler et al., 1994). Conversely, participants in 
Experiments 1 to 5 were unlikely to possess distributional information about novel tasks 
such as the Tower of Hanoi because of a lack of prior task experience. Thus, they may 
have erred on the side of caution when esfimating task duration. 
Given these suggestions, a key aim of Experiments 6 and 7 was to explore the time 
estimation process using well structured laboratory tasks that are more realistic than the 
Tower of Hanoi task and the repetitive disk movement task. The issue of task duration was 
also ftirther addressed in the present studies, where a well structured laboratory task that 
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took about 11 minutes to complete was employed alongside ones that were of similar 
duration to some of those used in Experiments 1 to 5. 
The tasks used in Experiments 6 and 7 were toy construction kits manufactured by 
Playmobil' .^ Completing these tasks involved assembling miniature castles by slotting 
together moulded plastic components in accordance with pictorial information presented in 
a step-by-step instruction booklet. Since the Playmobil^ tasks had to be completed in a 
sequential manner, they were well structured like the tasks used in Experiments 1 to 5. 
However, relative to the Tower of Hanoi task and the repetitive disk movement task, the 
Playmobil^ tasks were more akin to some of the laboratory tasks used in previous research. 
For example, the furniture assembly task used by Byram (1997) also had to be completed 
sequentially, and involved fitting components together in accordance with information that 
was specified in an instruction booklet. Thus, many of the features of such real world tasks 
were also evident in the Playmobil^ construction kits, suggesting that they were less 
artificial than the tasks used in Experiments 1 to 5. 
4.3 Experiment 6 
This study examined whether time estimation bias differed according to the duration 
of well structured laboratory tasks, which were more realistic than the ones used in 
Experiments 1 to 5. Task duration was manipulated by employing two different 
Playmobil^ construction kit toys. One of these tasks was of similar duration to the five-disk 
Tower of Hanoi task, whereas the other was longer than the tasks used in the previous 
experiments. Pilot testing revealed that the long task took just over 11 minutes to complete, 
whereas the duration of the short task was a little over four and a quarter minutes (Ms = 
667.87 and 258.43 seconds, respectively). Each Playmobil® task involved constructing a 
different miniature castle by slotting together moulded plastic components in accordance 
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with instructions, which were presented in a step-by-step booklet. As would be expected, 
the number of plastic components and the number of steps necessary for task completion 
was greater on the long duration task. 
As the short Playmobil®task was of similar duration to the five-disk Tower of Hanoi 
task (Experiment 4), it was hypothesised that general temporal overestimation would occur 
on this task. However, as the long Playmobil®task was of similar duration to some of the 
laboratory tasks used in previous research where an optimistic time prediction bias 
prevailed (e.g., Francis-Smythe & Robertson, 1999), general temporal underestimation was 
expected to occur on this task. Task performance order was manipulated in order to 
ascertain whether time prediction bias on the second task was influenced by the relative 
duration of the first task. 
4.4 Method 
4.4.1 Participants 
Sixty-one (51 female and 10 male) students at the University of Plymouth 
participated voluntarily. Forty-nine participants took part in partial fulfilment of a 
psychology course requirement whilst the remainder were paid £2.50 each. No 
biographical information other than gender was recorded. 
4.4.2 Materials 
Two Playmobil® construction kits each accompanied by a step-by-step pictorial 
instruction booklet were used. The short duration task involved constructing a single-
towered castle, whereas the long duration task involved building a multi-turreted castle 
with a surrounding jetty, platform and battlements. A digital stopwatch was used to 
measure task duration. 
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4.4.3 Design and Procedure 
A 2 (time: estimated vs. actual) x 2 (task: short duration vs. long duration) x 2 (task 
performance order: short then long task vs. long then short task) mixed factorial design 
was used. The time and task factors were repeated-measures, with the order of task 
performance being fully counterbalanced. Task performance order was a between-groups 
factor, with participants being randomly assigned to one of two conditions. 
The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 1. After participants were briefed 
about the experimental rationale, the researcher presented the instruction booklet for the 
first task, displayed the plastic components on the table, and then explained what the task 
involved. There then followed a planning period that was different for each task. 
Pilot testing revealed that it took, on average, 40 seconds to read the instruction 
booklet for the short task and 80 seconds to read the booklet for the long task. Dependent 
on task performance order, participants were given these amounts of time to read the 
instruction booklet before estimating the duration of the current task. In order to ensure 
that all pages of the instruction booklet were previewed, participants were informed when 
10 seconds of each planning period remained. 
At the end of each planning period, participants were asked to close the instruction 
booklet temporarily and estimate task duration. Participants then re-opened the instruction 
booklet and began performing the task. The stopwatch was activated at this point and was 
stopped once each task had been completed. This procedure was repeated for the second 
task. Upon completion of the second task, participants were fully de-briefed about the 
experimental rationale. Each testing session lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
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4.5 Results 
Table 4.1 below contains basic descriptive statistics of estimated and actual duration 
per task and task performance order condition. All test statistics used in Experiment 6 are 
contained in Appendix 6. 
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Task 
Task Performance Order Condition 
Short Then Long Long Then Short 
M = 285.48 M = 348.00 
Time Estimate 
Mdn = 240.00 
SD= 191.96 
Mdn = 300.00 
SD= 124.72 
Short Duration 
N = 31 N = 30 
M = 233.94 M = 244.90 
Completion Time 
Mdn = 212.00 
SD = 87.12 
N = 31 
Mdn = 224.00 
SD = 73.34 
N = 30 
M = 492.58 M = 557.00 
Time Estimate 
Mdn = 450.00 
SD = 207.52 
Mdn = 600.00 
SD = 245.33 
Long Duration 
N = 31 N = 30 
M = 642.48 M = 696.07 
Completion Time 
Mdn = 617.00 
SD= 167.26 
N = 31 
Mdn = 656.00 
SD = 222.71 
N = 30 
Table 4.1 
Time estimates and completion times per task and task performance order condition (in 
seconds) 
As Table 4.1 shows, temporal estimates exceeded completion times on the short 
duration Playmobil® task regardless of the order in which it was performed. In contrast, 
completion times exceeded temporal estimates regardless of the order in which the long 
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duration Playmobil^ task was performed. A bar graph of predicted and actual completion 
times is presented in Figure 4.1 below. 
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Figure 4.1 
Predicted and actual completion times per task and task performance order condition 
In order to determine how many participants predicted task duration using whole 
minutes, frequency distributions of time estimates were calculated. Histograms of time 
estimates on the short and long duration Playmobil^ tasks (regardless of performance 
order) arc presented below in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. 
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Figure 4.2 
Histogram of time estimates on the short duration Playmobil^ task 
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Figure 4.3 
Histogram of time estimates on the long duration Playmobil* task 
For the same reasons that were specified in Experiment 1, the estimated and actual 
completion time data were subjected to a logarithmic transformation before being 
statistically analysed. The log-transformed data were subjected to a 2 (task) x 2 (time) x 2 
(task performance order) mixed design ANOVA. This analysis produced a main effect of 
task, F( 1,59) = 625.01, MSE = .06, p < .001, with overall time being longer on the long 
duration task. The main effect of task performance order approached significance, F(l,59) 
= 3.23, MSE = .38, p < .08, with overall time being longer in the long then short task 
condition. 
The interaction between task and time was significant, F(l,59) = 86.65, MSE = .04, p 
< .001 (sec Figure 4.4 below). This revealed that estimates exceeded completion times on 
the short task (Ms = 316.74 and 239.42 seconds, respectively), whereas completion times 
exceeded estimates on the long task (Ms = 669.28 and 524.79 seconds, respectively). This 
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finding suggests that, regardless of performance order, the direction in which time 
predictions were biased differed between the long and short duration tasks. That is, 
temporal overcstimation occurred on the short task, whereas temporal underestimation 
prevailed on the long task. Planned comparisons (LSD t-tests, both two-tailed) revealed a 
significant difference between estimated and actual duration on each task (ps < .05). 
• Predicted Time 
• Actual Time 
Short Long 
Task 
Figure 4.4 
Bar graph depicting the interaction between the task and time factors 
The interaction between time and task performance order approached significance, 
F( 1,59) = 2.95, MSE = . 12, p < . 10. The main effect of fime and the task by task 
performance order interaction were not significant (Fs < 2.5, ps > .10). However, there was 
a significant three-way interaction, F(l,59) = 4.58, MSE = .04, p < .05 (see Figure 4.1 
above). This revealed that the extent of time estimation bias was greater on each task when 
it was performed second rather than first. Planned comparisons (LSD t-tests, all two-tailed) 
revealed that estimated and actual duration ditYered significantly on the long task 
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regardless of performance order (ps < .05). In contrast, the difference between estimated 
and actual duration was significant when the short task was performed second (p < .05), 
but not first (p > .10). This finding suggests that the extent of temporal overestimation was 
greater when the short task was performed second rather than first. However, the 
magnitude of temporal underestimation on the long task did not differ significantly 
according to task performance order. 
4.6 Discussion 
The present study indicates that the direction in which time estimates were biased 
differed between the two Playmobil® tasks. As predicted, general temporal overestimation 
was evident on the short duration task, whereas general temporal underestimation occurred 
on the long duration task. The prevalence of temporal underestimation on the long task 
suggests that the lack of a general optimistic time prediction bias in Experiments 1 to 5 
may have been due to the durations of the different versions of the Tower of Hanoi task 
and the repetitive disk movement task. That is, a general optimistic time prediction bias 
might only occur on tasks that are of longer duration than those used in the previous 
experiments. Moreover, as the long Piaymobil®task was of similar duration to some of the 
laboratory tasks used in previous research (e.g., Buehler et al., 1997), such tasks may need 
to be of around 11 minutes' duration before a general optimistic time prediction bias is 
evident. Whilst it is not known whether the present findings are applicable to other tasks, 
this study emphasises the fact that task duration is a factor that mediates time estimation 
bias. 
The existence of general temporal overestimation on the short duration Playmobil® 
task is consistent with the findings of Experiments 4 and 5, where there was a hint of a 
general pessimistic time prediction bias on tasks that were of similar duration (i.e., the 
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five-disk Tower of Hanoi task and the five-disk repetitive task). This finding suggests that 
people do not underestimate the duration of well structured laboratory tasks that take 
between four and five minutes to complete. Moreover, the present study indicates that the 
absence of general temporal underestimation is not confined to artificial problem solving 
tasks, but also applies to a different type of well structured laboratory task, which is more 
akin to various real world activities. 
A possible explanation for the general temporal overestimation that prevailed on the 
short Playmobil® task is that people tend to use temporal units such as 10 or 15 minutes 
when judging task duration in everyday life (Fraisse, 1984). Thus, on tasks that take only a 
few minutes to complete, temporal overestimation may be a consequence o f the tendency 
to use longer units of time when judging task duration. Consistent with the notion that 
people use longer temporal units when estimating task duration, there was evidence that 
several participants predicting their completion time on the short and long duration 
Playmobil® tasks in units such as 10 or 15 minutes (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3, respectively). 
In fact, the fi-equency distributions of time estimates revealed that the vast majority of 
participants judged the duration of the short Playmobil® task in units of whole minutes, 
whereas this was the case for all participants on the long task (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3, 
respectively). This finding suggests that people prefer to use whole minutes rather than 
seconds when judging task duration. 
There was some evidence that temporal misestimation was influenced by the relative 
duration of the previous task, as the magnitude of time prediction bias was greater when 
the short task was performed second rather than first. That is, time predictions were more 
pessimistically biased on this task among participants who had just completed the long 
duration task. Conversely, there was a hint of temporal underestimation being greater when 
the long task was performed second rather than first. However, the extent to which time 
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predictions were optimistically biased did not differ significantly between the first and 
second trials on the long task. Taken together, these findings are broadly consistent with 
those of Experiments 3 to 5, and indicate that information about the first task may have 
formed the basis of time estimates on the second task. 
It could be that participants used the anchoring and adjustment heuristics (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982a) when estimating the duration of the second task. The number of large 
plastic components involved in completing the previous task may have served as an anchor 
for predictions, which were insufficiently adjusted according to the relative demands of the 
current task (e.g., the greater or lesser number of large plastic components). An anchoring 
and adjustment strategy should result in time predictions on the short task being more 
pessimistically biased i f they were anchored on such information about the just-completed 
long duration task. By the same token, temporal underestimation should be greater on the 
long duration task as a consequence of using such a judgement strategy. 
Whilst similar findings were observed when different versions of the same task were 
performed in succession (Experiments 3 to 5), two different Playmobil® tasks were 
employed here. Hence, in contrast to those previous experiments, no specific information 
about how to complete the second task was acquired whilst performing the first task in this 
study. Given that both of the present tasks involved fitting plastic components together in a 
pre-specified manner, participants may have acquired some kind of general information 
about the nature of the second trial during the first trial (e.g., the actions needed for task 
completion). However, participants did not perform any part o f the second task before 
estimating its duration. 
In contrast, as different versions of the Tower of Hanoi task share the same structure 
(Karat, 1982), participants in Experiments 3 and 4 would have acquired information about 
- 146-
the nature of the second task whilst performing the first task. For example, after the first 
trial, participants might have reahsed that completing the second task would also involve 
removing some disks from their final destination peg (Kotovsky et al., 1985). Likewise, 
participants in Experiment 5 would have obtained relevant information about how to 
complete the five-disk repetitive task whilst performing the three-disk task beforehand. 
The use of different versions of the same task meant that participants in Experiments 3 to 5 
possessed some prior experience of the second task when estimating its duration. 
In order to ensure that participants acquired prior experience of performing part or all 
of the second task, tasks that shared the same structure were employed Experiment 7. That 
is, two versions of the same Playmobil® task were performed consecutively. Although 
these tasks differed in duration, the shorter task was a sub-component version of the longer 
task. Hence, some kind of pertinent information such as the steps and components involved 
in completing the second task would be acquired whilst performing the first task. 
4.7 Experiment 7 
This study sought to ascertain whether prior experience of performing a longer or 
shorter duration version of the same Playmobil® task would influence time prediction bias 
on the next task. In order to achieve this goal, task duration was manipulated whilst task 
structure was held constant. The long duration Playmobil® task from Experiment 6 was 
used again in this study. This task was divided into medium and short duration sub-
component versions, which were employed alongside the long task itself Given the 
findings of Experiment 6, the present study also sought to determine whether temporal 
underestimation was still evident on the long Playmobil® task when it preceded, or was 
performed after, one of the two shorter duration sub-component tasks. 
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Since the short and medium tasks were sub-components of the long Playmobil® task, 
differences in duration and complexity should be more akin to those associated with 
different versions of the Tower of Hanoi task. For example, the three-disk Tower of Hanoi 
task is not only a sub-component version of the five-disk task (Kotovsky et al., 1985), but 
is also less complex and takes less time to complete. Indeed, the two sub-component 
versions of the long Playmobil® task were selected because they approximated the duration 
of the three-disk and five-disk tasks from Experiment 4. Pilot testing revealed that the 
medium version was of similar duration to the five-disk task (Ms = 242.56 and 247.99 
seconds, respectively), whereas the short version approximated the duration of the three-
disk task (Ms = 27.19 and 31.90 seconds, respectively). 
As the short and medium sub-component tasks were of similar duration to the three-
disk and five-disk versions of the Tower of Hanoi task, it was hypothesised that general 
temporal overestimation would occur on these tasks. However, as was the case in 
Experiment 6, it was hypothesised that general temporal underestimation would be evident 
on the long duration Playmobil® task. Given that prior experience of performing the same 
task has been found to reduce temporal misestimation (Josephs & Hahn, 1995), it was 
anticipated that time predictions on the long task would be more accurate when the 
medium rather than the short duration sub-component task was performed initially. That is, 
completing the medium duration version beforehand would provide participants with 
greater information about the long task (e.g., how the plastic components slotted together), 
which they would use to good effect. 
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4.8 Method 
4.8.1 Participants 
Eighty (64 female and 16 male) students at the University of Plymouth participated 
voluntarily. Forty-seven participants took part in partial fulfihnent of a psychology course 
requirement whilst the remainder were paid £3 each. No biographical information other 
than gender was recorded. 
4.8.2 Materials 
The long duration Playmobil® task fi'om Experiment 6 was used. The short duration 
sub-component version of this task entailed constructing one wall of the Playmobil® castle 
by following the instructions on page one of the booklet. The medium duration sub-
component version involved building the walls and floor of the castle, and part of the 
surrounding jetty. This task entailed following the instructions on pages one to four of the 
booklet. The long duration task involved building a multi-turreted castle with a 
surrounding jetty, platform and battlements. This task involved following the instructions 
on pages one to eight of the booklet. A word association checklist comprising 40 words 
(Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1990) was also used. Task duration was measured using a digital 
stopwatch. 
4.8.3 Design and Procedure 
A 2 (time: estimated vs. actual) x 2 (task: first vs. second) x 4 (task experience: short 
then long duration vs. long then short duration vs. medium then long duration vs. long then 
medium duration) mixed factorial design was used. Task experience was a between-groups 
factor, with participants being randomly assigned to one of four equal-sized conditions. 
The time and task factors were repeated-measures, with task performance order being fully 
counterbalanced. 
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The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 6. Once participants were informed 
of the nature of each task, there followed a plaiuiing period that was different for each task. 
Pilot testing revealed that, on average, 20 seconds were needed to read the instruction 
booklet for the short task, 40 seconds for the medium task, and 80 seconds for the long 
task. Dependent on task performance order, participants were given these amounts of time 
to read the instruction booklet before estimating task duration. In order to ensure that all 
relevant pages of the instruction booklet were previewed, all participants were informed 
when 10 seconds of each planning period remained. At the end of each planning period, all 
participants gave a time estimate. This procedure was applicable to the first and second 
trials. 
In order to give the researcher time to dismantle the apparatus of each task, 
participants performed a word association checklist (Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1990) at the 
end of the first trial. Once the apparatus of each task had been dismantled or after two 
minutes had elapsed (whichever was longer), participants were asked to stop performing 
the word association task. The word association checklist was then removed from the table 
and participants were presented with the plastic components and the instruction booklet for 
the second task. Each testing session lasted approximately 30 minutes. 
4.9 Results 
Basic descriptive statistics of estimated and actual duration per task and task 
experience condition are presented in Table 4.2 below. Al l test statistics used in 
Experiment 7 are contained in Appendix 7. 
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Task Experience Condition 
Task Short Then Long Then Medium Then Long Then 
Long Task Short Task Long Task Medium Task 
M = 38.75 M = 696.00 M = 354,00 M = 657.00 
Time Mdn = 30.00 Mdn = 720.00 Mdn = 300.00 Mdn = 600.00 
Estimate SD = 25.85 SD = 210.92 SD= 142.59 SD = 244.28 
First 
N = 20 N = 20 N = 20 N = 20 
M = 22.00 M = 629.00 M = 290.40 M = 598.30 
Completion Mdn = 20.00 Mdn = 618.00 Mdn = 267.50 Mdn = 610.00 
Time SD = 8.58 SD= 113.89 SD = 88.88 SD= 123.40 
N = 20 N = 20 N = 20 N = 20 
M = 435.00 M = 28.15 M = 550.50 M = 254.25 
Time Mdn = 405.00 Mdn = 22.50 Mdn = 540.00 Mdn = 240.00 
Estimate SD= 181.70 SD = 20.12 SD= 129.59 SD= 109.20 
Second 
N = 20 N = 20 N = 20 N = 20 
M = 556.25 M = 18.55 M = 497.85 M = 178.95 
Completion Mdn = 545.00 Mdn = 18.00 Mdn = 498.00 Mdn= 176.00 
Time SD= 147.18 SD = 3.76 SD= 124.14 SD = 35.68 
N = 20 N = 20 N = 20 N = 20 
Table 4.2 
Time estimates and completion times per task and task experience condition (in seconds) 
As Table 4.2 shows, temporal estimates exceeded completion times in all task 
experience conditions on the first task, and in three out of the four conditions on the second 
task. This finding suggests that general temporal overestimation was evident in this study. 
That is, a pessimistic time prediction bias occurred on the short and medium duration tasks 
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when they were performed first or second, whereas an optimistic time prediction bias was 
only evident on the long task when it was preceded by the short duration sub-component 
version. Thus, in contrast to the findings of Experiment 6, general temporal 
underestimation was not evident on the long duration Playmobil* task. Bar graphs of 
predicted and actual completion times on the short, medium and long duration tasks are 
presented below in Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, respectively. 
• Predicted Time 
• Actual Time 
Short Task First Short Task 
Second 
Figure 4.5 
Bar graph of predicted and actual completion times on the short duration task per task 
performance order 
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• Predicted Time 
• Actual Time 
Medium Task 
First 
Medium Task 
Second 
Figure 4.6 
Bar graph of predicted and actual completion times on the medium duration task per task 
performance order 
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• Predicted Time 
• Actual Time 
Figure 4.7 
Bar graph of predicted and actual completion times on the long duration task per task 
experience condition 
In order to determine how many participants predicted task duration using whole 
minutes, frequency distributions of time estimates were calculated. Histograms of time 
estimates on the short, medium and long duration Playmobil^ tasks (regardless of 
performance order and task experience condition) are presented below in Figures 4.8, 4.9 
and 4.10, respectively. 
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Figure 4.8 
Histogram of time estimates on the short duradon Playmobil® task 
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Figure 4.9 
Histogram of time estimates on the medium duration Playmobil® task 
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Figure 4.10 
Histogram of time estimates on the long duration Playmobil* task 
For the same reasons that were specified in Experiment 1, the estimated and actual 
completion time data were subjected to a logarithmic transformation before being 
statistically analysed. In order to address the issue of prior task experience, the log-
transformed data from the second trial were analysed. A 2 (time) x 4 (task experience) 
mixed design ANOVA produced a main effect of task experience, F(3,76) = 637.66, MSE 
= .14, p < .001, with overall time being longest in the medium then long task condition. 
Scheffe pairwise comparisons revealed significant mean differences between all conditions 
(ps < .05) except the medium then long and the short then long task conditions (p > .10). 
The main effect of time was not significant (F < 3, p > .10). 
There was a significant interaction, F(3,76) = 6.12, MSE = .11, p < .01 (see Figure 
4.11 below). This revealed evidence of temporal overestimation on the medium and short 
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tasks, whereas the direction in which time predictions were biased on the long task differed 
according to the relative duration of the previous task. That is, temporal underestimation 
was evident when the short task was performed beforehand, whereas overestimation 
occurred when the medium task was completed initially. Planned comparisons (LSD t-
tests, all two-tailed) revealed that estimated and actual duration differed significantly on 
the medium task (p < .05), but not on the short task (p > .10). On the long duration task, the 
difference between estimated and actual completion time was significant when it was 
preceded by the short task (p < .05), but not by the medium task (p > . 10). This finding 
suggests that performing the medium rather than the short duration sub-component task 
beforehand resulted in greater time prediction accuracy on the long duration task. 
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Figure 4.11 
Bar graph depicting the interaction between the time and task experience factors (data from 
the second task) 
The issue of prior task experience was further addressed by analysing the log-
transformed time prediction data from the short and medium duration tasks. I f predictions 
were influenced by the relative duration of the previous task, then they should be longer 
when the tasks were performed second rather than first. That is, when the short and 
medium sub-component tasks were preceded by the long duration task. Whilst time 
predictions were longer on each task when they were performed second (see Table 4.2), 
independent-groups t-tests (both two-tailed) revealed that the ditTerence between the two 
trials was significant on the medium task, t(38) = 2.61, p < .05, but not on the short task. 
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t(38) = 1.67, p > .10. Thus, the longer duration of the just-completed task may have 
influenced time predictions on the medium sub-component task only. 
In order to determine whether time prediction accuracy differed beUveen the short, 
medium and long duration tasks, the log-transformed data from the first trial were 
analysed. The data from the long duration task were not collapsed across the task 
experience factor, as it was decided to keep sample sizes equal, that is, not to have 40 out 
of 80 participants in one of three treatment conditions, A 2 (time: estimated vs. actual) x 4 
(task condition: short vs. medium vs. long then short vs. long then medium) mixed design 
ANOVA produced a main effect of time, F(l,76) = 13.79, MSE = .09, p < .001, with 
temporal estimates exceeding completion times (Ms = 436.44 and 385,06 seconds, 
respectively). This finding suggests that general temporal overestimation was evident on 
the first trial. 
The ANOVA also produced a main effect of task condition, F(3,76) = 464.12, MSE 
= .20, p < .001, with overall time being longest in the long then short task condition. 
Scheff<6 pairwise comparisons revealed significant differences between the means of all 
conditions (ps < .05) except those of the long then medium and the long then short task 
conditions (p > .10). The interaction was not significant (F < 2, p > .10). The lack of a 
significant interaction suggests that the extent to which time predictions were 
pessimistically biased did not differ between the short, medium and long duration tasks 
when they were performed first. Moreover, the magnitude of temporal overestimation did 
not differ between the long then medium task and the long then short task conditions on the 
first trial. 
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4.10 Discussion 
Contrary to the findings of Experiment 6, there was no evidence of general temporal 
underestimation on the long duration Playmobil® task in this study. In fact, general 
temporal overestimation was observed when this task was performed first. Likewise, there 
was a hint of temporal overestimation when it was preceded by the medium duration sub-
component version. The discrepancy between the findings of Experiments 6 and 7 is not 
easily explicable, as the procedure associated with this task was identical in both studies. 
That is, all of the plastic components were displayed on the table in fi-ont of participants, 
who were given the same amount of time to preview the task and its instructions, and 
received the same warning when the pre-exposure period was coming to an end. Given 
these similarities, participants in both studies would presumably have possessed the same 
amount of information the nature of the long task when estimating its duration. Thus, it is 
not clear why general temporal underestimation was evident on the long task in 
Experiment 6, whereas general temporal overestimation occurred in the present study. 
The present study also produced some evidence of temporal overestimation on the 
short and medium duration sub-component versions of the long Playmobil® task regardless 
of the order in which they were performed. This finding suggests that general temporal 
overestimation is not confined to artificial problem solving tasks such as the Tower of 
Hanoi, but might also generalise to more realistic well structured laboratory tasks with a 
duration of up to four or five minutes. However, there was some evidence of temporal 
underestimation, but only on the long duration Playmobil® task when it was preceded by 
the short sub-component task. Thus, participants tended to underestimate their complefion 
times only when they had completed one part (i.e., one page in the instruction booklet) of 
the long duration task beforehand. 
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The presence of temporal underestimation on the long task when it was performed 
after the short task suggests that time predictions may have been influenced by the duration 
of the short task relative to that of the long task. For example, the duration of the short task 
may have served as a basis for time predictions on the long task. However, there was no 
evidence of such a judgement strategy being used on the long task when it was preceded by 
the shorter duration medium sub-component task. Specifically, there was a hint of temporal 
overestimation on the long task when the medium sub-component version had just been 
performed. Taken together, these findings suggest that the direction in which time 
predictions on the long task were biased (i.e., over or underestimation) differed according 
to the relative duration of the previous task 
A possible explanation for these findings is that, due to differences in the amount of 
prior task experience, participants used different kinds of task-related information when 
estimating the durafion of the long task. As participants who performed the short task 
initially constructed only one wall of the Playmobil® castle, they possessed little 
information about how to complete the long task when estimating its duration. Given this 
lack of prior task experience, these participants may have used a heuristic information 
processing strategy when making a second time estimate. For example, time predictions 
might have been anchored on the perceived duration of the previous task, but insufficiently 
adjusted according to the longer duration of the upcoming task. The use of such an 
anchoring and adjustment judgement strategy should lead to temporal underestimation 
when the previous task was of shorter duration than the current task. Thus, participants in 
the short then long task condition may have used these cognitive heuristics when making a 
second time estimate. 
In contrast, assembling half of the long task beforehand (i.e., the medium duration 
sub-component task) meant that participants in this condition possessed considerable 
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information about the nature of the long task when estimating its duration. Given the extent 
of their prior task experience, these individuals might have engaged in a more thorough 
information processing strategy when making a second time estimate. For example, they 
may have calculated the number of large plastic components required to complete the first 
task, and appropriately scaled up this figure as a ftinction of the greater number of major 
components involved in finishing the second task. Using such a judgement strategy could 
result in temporal overestimation i f it involved thinking about factors that delayed the 
completion of the previous task (e.g., fitting some plastic components together incorrectly). 
Thus, these participants may have erred on the side of caution because they took account of 
their previous task performance. In fact, time predictions were more accurate when the 
long task was preceded by the medium rather than the short task, suggesting that these 
individuals used such distributional information to good effect. 
There was evidence that time predictions on the medium task may have been 
influenced by the relative duration of the just-completed task. That is, relative to the first 
trial, time predictions were longer when this task was performed second (i.e., after the long 
duration task). A possible explanation for this finding is that participants calculated the 
number of major plastic components involved in completing the previous task (e.g., the 
components needed to build the walls of the castle), but overestimated the number of large 
plastic components needed to finish the current task. Time predictions should be longer as 
a consequence of using this kind of judgement strategy when the current task comprises 
fewer such components than the previous one. In contrast, there was no evidence of such a 
judgement strategy being used on the short duration sub-component task, as time 
predictions were slightly longer when it was performed first rather than second. However, 
as the length of time predictions on the short duration task did not differ significantly 
according to task performance order, it is unwise to make too much of this finding. 
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There was evidence that participants used whole minutes rather than seconds when 
estimating their completion times on the short, medium and long duration Playmobil® 
tasks. For example, the frequency distributions of time estimates revealed that nearly all of 
the participants used whole minutes when judging the duration of the medium and long 
Playmobil® tasks (see Figures 4.9 and 4.10, respectively). Moreover, almost half of these 
individuals used temporal units such as 10 and 15 minutes when estimating the duration of 
these two tasks. Whilst no participants used these temporal units when judging the duration 
of the short sub-component task, a sizeable minority estimated their completion times 
using whole minutes rather than seconds (see Figure 4.8). These findings provide support 
for the notion that people tend not to judge task duration using seconds, but prefer instead 
to use whole minutes or longer temporal units when estimating their task completion times. 
4.11 General Discussion 
The present studies have produced evidence of general temporal overestimation on 
three Playmobil® tasks that were of similar duration to the tasks used in Experiments I to 
5. Specifically, there was some evidence that time predictions were pessimistically biased 
on the short Playmobil® task (Experiment 6) and the two shorter duration sub-component 
versions of the long task (Experiment 7). This finding indicates that people tend to err on 
the side o f caution when estimating the duration of well structured laboratory tasks that are 
less artificial than the Tower of Hanoi and the repetitive disk movement task. Moreover, 
this finding suggests that the temporal underestimation indicative of the planning fallacy 
does not occur on two very different types of laboratory task that take up to five minutes to 
complete. 
In Experiment 6, a general optimistic time prediction bias was evident on the 
Playmobii® task that took about 11 minutes to complete, providing support for the notion 
- 164-
that temporal underestimation prevails on longer tasks than those used in Experiments I to 
5. An optimistic time prediction bias was also evident on this task in Experiment 7, but 
only when it was preceded by the short duration sub-component version, which took about 
30 seconds to complete. Conversely, a general pessimistic time prediction bias was evident 
on the long duration task when it was performed first, and there was a hint of temporal 
overestimation when this task was preceded by the medium duration sub-component task 
(Experiment 7). Since there was no evidence of a general optimistic time prediction bias on 
the long duration task in Experiment 7, the present studies provide conflicting evidence 
concerning the direction in which temporal estimates were biased on this task. 
Given that the long duration Playmobil® task had not been employed in research 
before Experiment 6, it was not known whether participants would under or overestimate 
its duration. In fact, it was anticipated that an optimistic time prediction bias would occur 
on this task because it was of similar duration to some of the tasks used in previous 
research where temporal underestimation prevailed (e.g., Francis-Smythe & Robertson, 
1999). However, as temporal underestimation has also been observed on laboratory tasks 
with a duration of over one hour (Byram, 1997), it could be that the long Playmobil® task 
was too short for a general optimistic time prediction bias to occur. 
Consistent with this suggestion, people's propensity for estimating time using longer 
units such as 15 or 20 minutes (Fraisse, 1984) could result in temporal predictions being 
pessimistically biased on tasks that are of shorter duration than such intervals. Thus, the 
general temporal overestimation that occurred in Experiment 7 might reflect the direction 
in which time predictions are biased on the long duration Playmobil® task. Given the rather 
conflicting findings of the present studies, the long duration Playmobil® task was 
employed in Experiments 8 and 9 in order to determine the direction of time prediction 
bias on it. 
- 165-
The benefits of prior task experience were emphasised in Experiment 7, where time 
predictions were more accurate among participants who had perfonmed half of the long 
duration Playmobil® task beforehand. That is, the extent of temporal misestimation on the 
long task was significantly less when the medium rather than the short duration sub-
component task was performed beforehand, A plausible explanation for this finding is that 
performing the medium task provided participants with considerable task-related 
information, which they used to good effect. Moreover, it could be that these participants 
considered factors that delayed the completion of the first task (e.g., incorrectly assembling 
some plastic components), and incorporated such infomiation into their second time 
estimate. Given the findings of Buehler et al. (1994), taking account of information about 
personal performance on a previous similar task would be expected to result in more 
accurate time estimates. 
The impact of prior experience of performing a longer or shorter duration task on 
time prediction bias was also demonstrated in the present studies. That is, fime predicdon 
bias on the second task was found to differ according to the relative duration of the first 
task. For example, on the second trial, there was a hint of greater temporal underestimation 
on the long duration Playmobil® task, whereas the magnitude of temporal overestimation 
on the short task was greater relative to the first trial (Experiment 6). Similarly, temporal 
underestimation occurred when the long task was preceded by the short task, whereas there 
was evidence of temporal overestimation on the medium and short tasks when they were 
performed after the long task (Experiment 7). These findings are broadly consistent with 
those of Experiments 3 to 5, and indicate that participants may have used information 
about the nature of the first task when estimating the duration of the second task. 
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Whilst information concerning the previous task might have formed the basis of time 
estimates on the current task, the nature of this task-related information is not known. 
Given that the tasks used in Experiments 3 to 7 differed in duration, it could be that the 
perceived duration of the previous task served as a basis for time predictions on the current 
task. That is, participants estimated how long they had taken to complete the first task, and 
used this information as a basis for predicting the duration of the second task. This kind of 
judgement strategy would be expected to result in temporal underestimation when the 
current task was of longer duration than the previous one. Conversely, temporal 
overestimation should be greater when the longer duration of a just-completed task formed 
the basis of time predictions on a subsequent shorter task. 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982a) might also 
be used in this kind of judgement strategy, with temporal misestimation occurring when 
successive tasks differ in duration. That is, time predictions are anchored on the perceived 
duration of the previous task, but are insufficiently scaled up or down according to the 
longer or shorter duration of the upcoming task. For example, in Experiment 7, temporal 
underestimation may have been a consequence of time predictions being anchored on the 
perceived duration of the just-completed short sub-component task, with insufficient 
adjustment for the longer duration of the long Playmobil® task. 
Although the tasks used in Experiments 3 to 7 differed in duration, they were also 
similar. Thus, participants would have acquired some kind of information about the general 
nature of the second task whilst performing the first task. Moreover, as different versions 
of the same task were employed in all but one of these studies (i.e., Experiment 6), most 
participants had some experience of performing all or part of the second task when 
estimating its duration. For example, in Experiment 7, performing the short sub-component 
task initially meant that participants had already built part of the long duration Playmobil® 
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task before making a second time prediction. Likewise, as the Playmobil® tasks used in 
Experiment 6 both involved fitting together plastic components in a pre-specified manner, 
participants would have acquired some kind of general information about the nature of the 
second task whilst performing the first one (e.g., the actions needed for task completion). 
Given the similarity between the first and second trials in Experiments 3 to 7, 
information other than the perceived duration of the previous task may have formed the 
basis of time predictions on the second task. That is, time predictions might have been 
based on information about the nature of the previous task such as the number of plastic 
Playmobil® components or the number of Tower of Hanoi disks. A possible judgement 
strategy for using such information might entail a calculation of the number of large plastic 
components involved in completing the previous Playmobil® task, and an estimation of the 
number of such components needed to finish the to-be-completed task. 
Whilst this kind of judgement strategy would presumably require greater cognitive 
resources than one involving the perceived duration of the previous task, it could also lead 
to temporal misestimation. For example, the optimistic time prediction bias in Experiment 
7 may have been due to participants underestimating the number of large plastic 
components involved finishing the upcoming long duration Playmobil® task, and basing 
their second temporal estimate on this information. Similarly, the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristics might be used in this kind of judgement strategy, with temporal 
misestimation occurring because of a failure to take sufficient account of the greater or 
lesser amount of work involved in completing the current task (e.g., the number of large 
Playmobil® task components). 
The use of different judgement strategies and different kinds of task-related 
information could thus explain the effects of prior task performance that were observed in 
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Experiments 3 to 7. In order to determine the type of task-related information that formed 
the basis of subsequent time estimates, the relevance of prior experience was manipulated 
in the studies presented in the next chapter of this thesis. To this end, Experiments 8 and 9 
employed tasks that were either related or unrelated to each other, which participants 
performed consecutively. 
4.12 Conclusions 
Experiments 6 and 7 have produced a number of potentially important findings. 
There was some evidence that participants made pessimistically biased time predictions on 
well struct\ired laboratory tasks that are similar to some of the tasks used in previous 
research (e.g., Byram, 1997), but are less artificial than the ones employed in Experiments 
I to 5. Given the duration of most of the tasks used in Experiments 6 and 7, it is clear that 
general temporal underestimation does not occur on a different type of well structured 
laboratory task that takes up to four or five minutes to complete. This finding suggests that 
the absence of a general opfimistic time prediction bias in Experiments 1 to 5 may have 
been due to the shorter duration of the Tower of Hanoi task and the repetitive disk 
movement task rather than the nature of these tasks (e.g., their artificiality). 
The present studies have produced evidence of an opfimistic time prediction bias on 
a well structured laboratory task that took about 11 minutes to complete. That is, temporal 
underestimation occurred on the long duration Playmobil® task regardless of performance 
order in Experiment 6, and was also evident on this task when it was preceded by the short 
duration sub-component task in Experiment 7. The latter finding is broadly consistent with 
previous studies (e.g., Experiment 5), and suggests that temporal underestimation could be 
due to fime predicfions on longer tasks being based on information about previous tasks, 
which are of shorter duration. Indeed, in Experiments 6 and 7, there was some evidence 
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that time prediction bias on the current task differed according to the relative duration of 
the previous task. This finding suggests people do take account of information about a just-
completed task when subsequently estimating the duration of a similar task (Experiment 6) 
or a different version of the same task (Experiment 7). 
The next chapter of this thesis comprises the final two experiments of this research 
programme. These studies sought to determine the type of information about a previous 
task that formed the basis of time predictions on a current task. In order to achieve this 
goal, related or unrelated tasks were performed in succession in Experiments 8 and 9. The 
issue o f the relevance of prior experience was addressed in Experiment 8, where a similar 
or a different shorter duration task was performed before the long Playmobil® task. The 
relevance of prior task experience was also the focus of Experiment 9, where the long 
Playmobil® task was either perfonmed for a second time or was preceded by an unrelated 
task, which was of similar, shorter or longer duration. 
- 170 
Chapter Five 
The Impact of Prior Task Performance on Time Estimation Bias 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter comprises the final two experiments of the present research progranmie. 
Given the findings of Experiments 3 to 7, the issue of prior experience of performing a 
similar or different task was further addressed in Experiments 8 and 9. Specifically, these 
studies sought to determine the type of information about a just-completed task that formed 
the basis of time estimates on the long duration Playmobil® task from Experiments 6 and 7. 
In order to achieve this goal, tasks that were either related or unrelated to the long duration 
Playmobil® task were performed beforehand in both of the present studies. Completing a 
related task initially should provide participants with infomation that was relevant to the 
long duration Playmobil® task, whereas no such information was acquired whilst 
performing an unrelated task beforehand. 
Experiment 8 sought to ascertain whether time prediction bias on the long 
Playmobil® task differed according to the type of shorter duration task that had just been 
completed. The relevance of task experience was manipulated by having participants 
perform either the short duration sub-component Playmobil® task (Experiment 7) or the 
three-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi task beforehand. The issue of the relevance of 
prior task experience was also addressed in Experiment 9. In this study, participants either 
completed one of three versions of the Tower of Hanoi task before the long duration 
Playmobil® task or performed this task twice in succession. 
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5.2 General Introduction to Experiments 8 and 9 
Prior experience of performing a task of different duration was shown to influence 
time prediction bias in Experiments 3 to 7. That is, in all but one of these studies (i.e., 
Experiment 6), the only evidence of the temporal underestimation indicative of the 
planning fallacy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) was on longer duration tasks when they 
were preceded by shorter tasks. For example, in Experiment 3, an optimistic time 
prediction bias only occurred when the four-disk Tower of Hanoi task was preceded by the 
three-disk task. Likewise, temporal underestimation was only evident when the long 
duration Playmobil® task was performed after the short sub-component task in Experiment 
7. 
There was also some evidence that prior experience of performing longer duration 
tasks led to an increase in temporal overestimation on shorter tasks. For example, in 
Experiment 4, relative to when the three-disk Tower of Hanoi task was performed for a 
second time, the extent of overestimation on this task was greater when the five-disk task 
was completed beforehand. This finding indicates that participants might have used 
information about the previous task when making a second time prediction. 
Given that similar findings were observed when different versions of the same task 
(e.g.. Experiment 4) or similar tasks (Experiment 6) were performed consecutively, it could 
be that time estimates were based on general rather than specific information about the 
nature of the previous task. That is, instead of thinking about precise information such as 
how certain plastic Playmobil® components fitted together, participants may have 
considered general information such as the number of steps involved in completing the 
previous task. 
172 
Support for this notion comes fi-om Experiment 6, where the magnitude of time 
estimation bias was greater when the long and short duration Playmobil® tasks were 
performed second rather than first. As these tasks were different, no infomiation about how 
to complete the second task would have been acquired whilst performing the first one. 
Hence, the extent of temporal misestimation should have been similar on both trials i f 
participants did not use some kind of information about the nature of the previous task. 
Since each task involved constructing a miniature castle, participants may well have based 
their second time prediction on some kind of general information about the nature of the 
previous task (e.g., the number of large plastic Playmobil® components). 
The perceived duration of the previous task was suggested as another possible source 
of task-related information. That is, participants may have estimated how long it had taken 
them to complete the first task, and used this information as a basis for making a second 
time prediction. Such a judgement strategy should lead to temporal misestimation i f 
individuals failed to increase or decrease their second time prediction sufificienUy 
according to the longer or shorter duration of the upcoming task. Similarly, failing to take 
sufficient account of the greater or lesser number of large plastic components needed to 
assemble the upcoming Playmobil® task should also result in temporal misestimation i f 
time predictions were based on the number of large plastic components involved in 
completing the previous task. Thus, relying on either type of task-related information when 
making a second time prediction should lead to temporal misestimation i f individuals used 
an anchoring and adjustment judgement strategy. 
It has been shown that externally-presented numerical values are not a prerequisite of 
anchoring and adjustment (Epiey & Gilovich, 2002), suggesting that these cognitive 
heuristics are used when numerical values are self-generated. In the present research, self-
generated numerical anchor values may have taken the form of estimates of the number of 
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components (e.g., the number of Tower of Hanoi disks) or the duration of the previous 
task. Thus, potential sources of the anchoring component of an anchoring and adjustment 
temporal judgement strategy were evident in the present research. 
A possible source of the adjustment component of this kind of judgement strategy 
could be the failure to appreciate the increase in task complexity with each additional 
Tower of Hanoi disk. For example, participants in Experiment 4 may have based their 
second time prediction on the number of disk moves involved in completing the three-disk 
task, but increased this estimate as a function of the extra disks associated with the 
upcoming five-disk task instead of the greater number of disk moves required to finish this 
task. Such insufficient adjustment from self-generated numerical anchor values would be 
expected to result in predictions being optimistically biased when the current task is more 
complex than the previous one (Suantak et a l , 1996). 
Whilst some kind of information about the first task may well have served as a basis 
for estimating the duration of the second task in Experiments 3 to 7, it is not clear what 
form this information takes. In order to determine the type of task-related information upon 
which subsequent time estimates are based, the issue of the relevance of prior task 
experience was addressed in the present studies. To this end, tasks that differed in duration 
but were either related or unrelated to each other were performed consecutively in 
Experiments 8 and 9. 
Completing a related task initially would provide participants with information about 
the nature of the upcoming task, whereas no such relevant prior experience would be 
acquired whilst performing an unrelated task. Thus, i f information about the nature of the 
previous task formed the basis of time predictions, then judgement accuracy should be 
greater when a related task had just been completed. In contrast, i f time predictions were 
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based on the perceived duration of the previous task, then the extent of temporal 
miscstimation should not differ according to the relevance of prior task experience. A key 
aim of Experiment 8 was to ascertain whether prior performance of a related or an 
unrelated shorter duration task influenced time prediction bias on the long duration 
Playmobil''task. 
5.3 Experiment 8 
This study sought to determine the type of information about a just-completed 
shorter duration task that formed the basis of time estimates on the long Playmobil* task. 
That is, whether participants used information about the nature (e.g., the number of task 
components) or the perceived duration of the previous task when making a second time 
prediction. In order to achieve this goal, the relevance of prior experience was manipulated 
by employing two shorter duration tasks, one of which was related to the long Playmobil^ 
task. The related task was the short duration sub-component task from Experiment 7, 
whereas the unrelated task was the three-disk Tower of Hanoi task. Pilot testing revealed 
that the three-disk task and the short Playmobil'' task were of similar duration (Ms = 28.59 
and 25.37 seconds, respectively). 
Performing the short sub-component task initially would provide participants with 
information about the nature of the long duration Playmobil^ task, whereas no relevant 
prior experience would be acquired whilst completing the three-disk task. Hence, i f 
temporal estimates were based on information about the nature of the previous task, then 
time predictions on the long duration task should be more accurate when the related task 
was performed beforehand. Conversely, i f temporal estimates were based on the perceived 
duration of the previous task, then the extent of time prediction bias on the long duration 
task should not differ according to the relevance of prior task experience. 
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Given the findings of Experiment 7, it was anticipated that temporal underestimation 
would occur on the long Playmobil® task when it was preceded by the short duration sub-
component task. However, no prediction was made about the direction (i.e., under or 
overestimation) or extent o f time prediction bias on the long duration task when the three-
disk Tower of Hanoi task was performed initially. As temporal overestimation was evident 
previously on the three-disk (e.g., Experiment I ) and short duration Playmobil® tasks 
(Experiment 7), it was expected that time predictions would be pessimistically biased on 
these tasks here. 
5.4 Method 
5.4.1 Participants 
Fifty-six (42 female and 14 male) students at the University of Plymouth participated 
voluntarily. Forty-three participants took part in partial fiilfilment of a psychology course 
requirement whilst the remainder were paid £2.50 each. No biographical information other 
than gender was recorded. 
5.4.2 Materials 
The long duration Playmobil® task from Experiments 6 and 7, and a wooden Tower 
of Hanoi apparatus containing three different-sized disks were used. A digital stopwatch 
was used to record task duration. 
5.4.3 Design and Procedure 
A 2 (task: short duration vs. long Playmobil®) x 2 (time: estimated vs. actual) x 2 
(prior task experience: three-disk Tower of Hanoi task first vs. short Playmobil® task first) 
mixed factorial design was used. Prior task experience was a between-groups factor, with 
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participants being randomly assigned to one of two equal-sized conditions. The time and 
task factors were repeated-measures, with task performance order being fully 
counterbalanced. 
The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 7. Pilot testing revealed that 20 
seconds were needed to preview the three-disk Tower of Hanoi apparatus and its 
instruction sheet. Participants in the three-disk task condition were thus given 20 seconds 
to view this task before estimating its duration. Participants in the short duration 
Playmobil® task condition were also given 20 seconds to view the components and 
instruction booklet of this task before estimating its duration. As was the case in 
Experiments 6 and 7, participants viewed the plastic components and the instruction 
booklet of the long Playmobil® task for 80 seconds before estimating its duration. Al l 
participants were informed when 10 seconds of each pre-exposure period remained. Each 
testing session lasted approximately 20 minutes. 
5.5 Results 
Table 5.1 below contains basic descriptive statistics of estimated and actual duration 
per task and prior task experience condition. Al l test statistics used in Experiment 8 are 
contained in Appendix 8. 
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Prior Task Experience Condition 
Task 
Three-disk Tower 
of Hanoi Task 
Short Duration 
Playmobil® 
Task 
M = 412.50 M = 432.86 
Long Duration 
Playmobil® 
Time Estimate 
Mdn = 360.00 
SD= 137.99 
N = 28 
Mdn = 420.00 
SD= 177.66 
N = 28 
(Second Task) 
Completion Time 
M = 614.04 
Mdn = 599.50 
SD= 125.32 
N = 28 
M = 599.07 
Mdn = 597.00 
SD= 140.91 
N = 28 
M = 124.29 M = 40.14 
Time Estimate 
Mdn = 120.00 
SD= 120.00 
Mdn = 30.00 
SD = 32.94 
Short Duration N = 28 N = 28 
(First Task) 
Completion Time 
M = 27.25 
Mdn = 20.00 
SD= 16.29 
N = 28 
M = 22.61 
Mdn = 22.00 
SD = 6.61 
N = 28 
Table 5.1 
Time estimates and completion times per task and prior task experience condition (in 
seconds) 
As Table 5.1 shows, temporal estimates exceeded completion times on both of the 
short duration tasks, suggesting that a general pessimistic time prediction bias was evident 
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on these tasks. Conversely, a general optimistic time prediction bias was evident on the 
long duration Playmobil* task, with completion times exceeding estimates regardless of 
prior task experience. Bar graphs of predicted and actual duration on the long and short 
duration tasks are presented below in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. 
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Figure 5.1 
Predicted and actual completion times per prior task experience condition (data from the 
long duration Playmobil^ task) 
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3-disk Tower of Short Playmobil 
Hanoi 
Figure 5.2 
Predicted and actual completion times on each of the short duration tasks 
In order to determine how many participants predicted task duration using whole 
minutes, frequency distributions of time estimates were calculated. Histograms of time 
estimates on the three-disk Tower of Hanoi, the short Playmobil* task and the long 
duration Playmobil® task (regardless of prior experience condition) are presented below in 
Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. 
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Histogram of time estimates on the three-disk Tower of Hanoi task 
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Histogram of time estimates on the short duration Playmobil^ task 
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Histogram of time estimates on the long duration Playmobil* task 
For the same reasons that were specified in Experiment 1, the estimated and actual 
completion time data were subjected to a logarithmic transformation before being 
statistically analysed. The issue of prior task experience was addressed by analysing the 
log-transformed data from the long duration Playmobil'^ task. A 2 (time) x 2 (prior 
experience) mixed design ANOVA produced a main effect of time, F(l,54) = 61.81, MSE 
= .07, p < .001, with completion times exceeding estimates (Ms = 606.56 and 422.68 
seconds, respectively). This finding suggests that a general optimistic time prediction bias 
was evident on this task. However, the main effect of prior experience and the interaction 
were not significant (Fs < 1, ps > .10). The lack of a significant interaction indicates that 
the extent of temporal underestimation on the long task did not differ according to the type 
of short duration task that was performed beforehand. 
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In order to ascertain whether time prediction bias differed between the two short 
duration tasks, the log-transformed data from the first trial were analysed. A 2 (time: 
estimated vs. actual duration) x 2 (task: three-disk Tower of Hanoi vs. short duration 
Playmobil®) mixed design ANOVA produced a main effect of task, F(l,54) = 15.56, MSE 
= .65, p < .001, with overall time being longer on the three-disk task. There was also a 
significant main effect of time, F(l,54) = 45.73, MSE = .40, p < .001, with temporal 
estimates exceeding completion times (Ms = 82.22 and 24.93 seconds, respectively). This 
finding suggests that general temporal overestimation was evident on the three-disk task 
and the short duration Playmobil® task. 
The interaction was also significant, F(l,54) = 19.61, MSE = .40, p < .001, and 
revealed that the difference between estimated and actual duration was greater on the 
three-disk task (see Figure 5.2 above). Follow-up analyses (LSD t-tests, both two-tailed) 
revealed that estimates and completion times differed significantly on the three-disk task (p 
< .05), but not on the short duration Playmobil® task (p > .10). These findings indicate that 
time predictions were less pessimistically biased on the short duration Playmobil® task. 
5.6 Discussion 
There was evidence of temporal underestimation on the long duration Playmobil® 
task when the three-disk Tower of Hanoi task was performed beforehand. Similarly, as 
predicted, temporal underestimation was evident on the long Playmobil® task when it was 
preceded by the short duration sub-component task. However, the extent of this optimistic 
time prediction bias did not differ according to the relevance of prior task experience. That 
is, relative to those individuals who performed the unrelated problem solving task 
beforehand, time predictions were no less optimistically biased among participants who 
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had just constructed part of the Playmobil® castle. Thus, participants with prior experience 
of performing part of the long duration task were no more accurate at estimating their 
completion time on the second trial. 
This finding suggests that information about the nature of the previous task was not 
used as a basis for estimating the duration of the long Playmobil® task. Instead, the 
perceived duration of the previous task seems to have been the type of information upon 
which time estimates on the long duration Playmobil® task were based. Specifically, as the 
extent of judgement bias was similar when the related or the unrelated task was performed 
beforehand, temporal underestimation on the long Playmobil® task may have been a 
consequence of time predictions being based on the shorter duration of the previous task. 
The presence of an optimistic time prediction bias on the long duration Playmobil® 
task is consistent with the notion that participants used the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982a) when making a second temporal estimate. Given 
that time prediction bias did not differ according to the relevance of prior task experience, 
participants may have used an anchoring and adjustment judgement strategy involving the 
perceived duration of the previous task when making a second temporal estimate. That is, 
temporal underestimation was a consequence of time predictions being anchored on the 
perceived duration of the just-completed task, with insufficient upward adjustment for the 
greater demands of the current task. 
An example of the insufficient adjustment component of such a judgement strategy is 
the erroneous assumption that each stage of the long duration task (i.e., each of the first 
eight pages of the Playmobil® instruction booklet) entailed an equal amount of work. 
Making this assumption should result in time predictions being insufficiently scaled up 
fi-om the anchor value (i.e., the shorter duration of the previous task) because the last three 
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stages of the task involve assembling many small plastic components, which takes more 
lime than is the case with the earlier stages (e.g., when building the castle walls). Hence, 
temporal underestimation would be expected to occur on the long duration Playmobil® 
task i f participants made such an assumption. 
The anchoring component of such a judgement strategy may have taken the form of 
an estimate of the duration of the previous task or the recall of the time prediction given on 
the first trial. Whilst both of these sources of information qualify as potential numerical 
anchor values, anecdotal evidence suggests that many participants were aware that they 
had overestimated the duration of the first task. That is, at the end of the first trial, several 
individuals commented that the just-completed task had taken them less time than they 
predicted. Such awareness of temporal misestimation indicates that participants might have 
estimated the duration of the first task retrospectively. Thus, time predictions on the second 
task were presumably anchored on the perceived duration of the previous task rather than 
on the recall of the temporal estimate given before the first trial. 
Given that the short duration Playmobil® task involved building only one wall of the 
castle (i.e., one wall of the long task), a lack of prior task experience might explain why 
time prediction accuracy was not greater when this related task was performed beforehand 
(compared to when the unrelated three-disk task was completed initially). As participants 
acquired little information about how to complete the long duration task whilst performing 
the short sub-component task (e.g., how certain plastic components slotted together), they 
may have used an anchoring and adjustment judgement strategy involving the perceived 
duration of the just-completed task. Likewise, in the absence of any prior experience, 
participants who had just completed the three-disk task might also use such a heuristic 
information processing strategy when estimating the duration of the long Playmobil® task. 
Consistent with these suggestions, it has been shown that people who have little or no prior 
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task experience rely on the anchoring and adjustment heuristics when judging personal task 
performance (e.g., Mussweiler & Strack, 2000; Wilson et al., 1996). 
As anticipated, temporal predictions exceeded completion times on the three-disk 
Tower of Hanoi task and the short duration Playmobil® task. However, the extent of this 
temporal overestimation differed between these tasks, with time predictions being 
significantly more accurate on the short duration Playmobil® task. A plausible explanation 
for this finding is that, when making an initial time estimate, participants in the short 
duration Playmobil® task condition possessed greater task-related information, which they 
used to good effect. That is, as the steps involved in performing this task were specified in 
the instruction booklet, participants were presumably aware of the completion process, and 
may have based their time estimate on task-related information (e.g., how the plastic task 
components slotted together). 
In contrast, as the three-disk Tower of Hanoi task instruction sheet contained only a 
pictorial representation o f the end state o f the task, participants may not have been aware 
of the steps involved in task completion (e.g., the disk move pattern) when estimating its 
duration. Hence, due to a lack of task-related information, participanU could have given an 
*off-the-cufP guess (Byram, 1997) concerning the duration of this task. Given that greater 
prior task experience has been shown to reduce temporal misestimation (Josephs & Hahn, 
1995), it is unsurprising that time predictions were more accurate among participants who 
viewed the Playmobil® instruction booklet beforehand. 
The present study suggests that the perceived duration of the just-completed task 
formed the basis of time estimates on the long duration Playmobil® task. However, it is not 
known whether time predictions on this task will be based on such information when an 
unrelated task that is of longer duration is performed initially. It could be that previous task 
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duration only forms the basis of time predictions on current tasks that are of longer 
duration than previous ones. Since longer duration tasks tend to be more complex than 
shorter ones (Buckhalt & Gates, 2002), performing them is likely to require greater 
cognitive resources. 
In the light of the findings o f Zakay (1989), completing more complex (and longer 
duration) tasks may well leave few cognitive resources available to monitor temporal 
information. Thus, i f individuals have little knowledge of the duration of a previous longer 
task, they might use information about the nature of the current task (e.g., the number of 
major components) when estimating its duration. In view of these suggestions, a key aim 
of Experiment 9 was to determine whether time predictions on the long duration 
Playmobil® task were based on the perceived duration of an unrelated longer task, which 
had just been completed. 
Given the nature of the short duration Playmobil® task, it was suggested that previous 
task duration might only form the basis of time predictions when people possess little or no 
experience of an upcoming task. That is, due to a lack of prior task experience, time 
predictions might be anchored on the perceived duration of the previous task, but 
insufficiently adjusted according to the demands of the current task. 
As prior task experience has been shown to improve time prediction accuracy (e.g.. 
Experiment 1), having it may well enable people to use information about the nature of a 
previous task when estimating the duration of a current task. Indeed, there was no evidence 
of anchoring and adjustment when half of the long Playmobil® task was performed 
beforehand (Experiment 7), suggesting that predictions on the long task were not based on 
the shorter durafion of the just-completed medium sub-component task. In order to 
ascertain whether previous task duration forms the basis of time predicfions when people 
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possess considerable prior task experience, some participants perfonmed the long duration 
Playmobil® task twice in succession in Experiment 9. 
Consistent with the previous experiments, the tendency to estimate task duration 
using whole minutes rather than seconds was apparent in the present study. For example, 
nearly all of the participants used whole minutes when judging the duration of the three-
disk Tower of Hanoi task, whereas half of those individuals used whole minutes when 
estimating their completion time on the short Playmobil® task (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4, 
respectively). There was also evidence that the majority of participants used temporal units 
ranging from five to 15 minutes when judging their completion time on the long duration 
Playmobil® task (see Figure 5.5). Taken together, these findings indicate that in general 
participants did not estimate task duration in seconds, but preferred instead to use whole 
minutes or longer temporal units. 
5.7 Experiment 9 
The aims of this study were twofold: to further address the issue of the relevance of 
prior task experience; and to ascertain whether time prediction bias on the long duration 
Playmobil® task differed according to the relative duration of a just-completed unrelated 
task. The findings of Experiment 8 suggest that time predictions on the long duration 
Playmobil® task were based on the perceived duration of a previous shorter task. However, 
it is not known whether this kind of task-related information wil l be used when an 
unrelated task of longer duration is performed initially. Likewise, it is unclear whether 
such information will serve as a basis for subsequent time estimates when participants 
possess greater prior task experience than was the case in the previous study. It could be 
that people who have completed the same task beforehand are able to use information 
about the nature of the previous task when estimating the duration of the upcoming task. 
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In order to fiirther address the issue of the relevance of prior task experience, a task 
that was either related or unrelated to the long duration Playmobil® task was performed 
beforehand in this study. The issue of relative task duration was addressed by employing 
tasks that were either shorter, longer or of similar duration to the long Playmobil® task. In 
fact, participants completed one of four tasks beforehand, three of which were unrelated 
(i.e., different) to the long duration Playmobil® task. Performing any one of these tasks 
initially would provide no information about the nature of the long duration Playmobil® 
task, whereas relevant prior experience would be acquired whilst completing the related 
task. 
The unrelated tasks were the three-disk, six-disk and seven-disk versions of the 
Tower of Hanoi task. Pilot testing revealed that the six-disk task was of similar duration to 
the long duration Playmobil® task fi-om Experiment 8 (Ms = 584.91 and 606.55 seconds, 
respectively), whereas the seven-disk task took longer to complete (M = 1013.23 seconds). 
As was the case in Experiment 8, the three-disk task was selected as the shorter duration 
unrelated task. The related task was the long duration Playmobil® task itself, which some 
participants thus performed twice in succession. 
Since none of the Tower of Hanoi tasks provided any information about the nature of 
the long duration Playmobil® task, it was anticipated that time predictions on the second 
task would be based on the perceived duration of the unrelated first task. Given the 
findings of Experiment 8, it was hypothesised that performing the three-disk task initially 
would result in temporal underestimation on the long duration Playmobil® task. 
Conversely, temporal overestimation was expected to occur on the long duration 
Playmobil® task when it was preceded by the seven-disk task. That is, time predictions 
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would be pessimistically biased because they were based on the longer duration of the just-
completed unrelated task. 
As the long duration Playmobil® task and the six-disk task were o f similar duration, 
no prediction was made about the direction of time estimation bias on the second trial 
when these tasks were performed consecutively. Likewise, no prediction was made about 
the direction of time estimation bias when the long duration Playmobil® task was 
performed for a second time. However, as prior experience of performing the same task 
has been found to reduce time prediction bias (e.g.. Experiment 4), temporal estimates 
were expected to be more accurate when the long duration Playmobil® task was performed 
for a second time rather than when one of the unrelated tasks had just been completed. 
Hence, it was anticipated that, when making a second time prediction, participants who had 
just completed the same task would use information about the nature of this task to good 
effect. 
5.8 Method 
5.8.1 Participants 
Ninety (77 female and 13 male) students at the University of Plymouth participated 
voluntarily. Fifty participants took part in partial fulfilment of a psychology course 
requirement whilst the remainder were paid £4 each. No biographical information other 
than gender was recorded. 
5.8.2 Materials 
A word association checklist (Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1990) comprising 40 words 
was used. The other materials were identical to those used in Experiment 8 except that the 
Tower of Hanoi apparatus contained seven different-sized disks. The largest disk was 
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removed to form the six-disk task, whereas the four largest disks were removed to form the 
three-disk task. 
5.8.3 Design and Procedure 
A 2 (task: first vs. second) x 2 (time: estimated vs. actual) x 4 (prior task experience: 
three-disk vs. six-disk vs. seven-disk vs. long duration Playmobil® task) mixed factorial 
design was used. The time and task factors were repeated-measures, whereas prior task 
experience was manipulated between groups. Al l participants performed two tasks as 
determined by random assignment to one of the four prior task experience conditions. 
The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 8. Before estimating the duration of 
each trial, participants who performed the Playmobil® task twice were given 80 seconds to 
view the plastic task components and the instruction booklet. Participants who performed 
the six-disk Tower of Hanoi task were also given 80 seconds to view the task apparatus 
and the instruction sheet before making a time estimate. A 100-second planning period was 
operative on the seven-disk task. As was the case in Experiment 8, participants were given 
20 seconds to preview the three-disk task and its instruction sheet. All participants were 
informed when 10 seconds of each pre-exposure period remained. In order to give the 
researcher time to dismantle the apparatus of the long duration Playmobil® task, 
participants who performed this task twice were required to complete a word association 
checklist (Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1990) for a period of two minutes at the end of the first 
trial. Each testing session lasted between 30 and 50 minutes. 
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5.9 Results 
Table 5.2 below contains basic descriptive statistics of estimated and actual duration 
per task and prior task experience condition. Al l test statistics used in Experiment 9 are 
contained in Appendix 9. 
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Prior Task Experience Condition 
Task 
Three-disk 
Tower of 
Six-disk 
Tower of 
Seven-disk 
Tower of 
Long Duration 
Playmobil 
Hanoi Task Hanoi Task Hanoi Task Task 
M = 508.70 M = 575.22 M = 683.18 M = 462.73 
Time Mdn = 480.00 Mdn = 600.00 Mdn = 720.00 Mdn = 450.00 
Estimate SD = 200.53 SD= 119.54 SD = 300.28 SD= 132.42 
Second Task N = 23 N = 23 N = 22 N = 22 
(Playmobil®) M = 696.87 M = 646.83 M = 632.50 M = 461.14 
Completion Mdn = 677.00 Mdn = 642.00 Mdn = 568.50 Mdn = 436.00 
Time SD= 187.21 SD= 126.74 SD= 199.33 SD= 131.19 
N = 23 N = 23 N = 22 N = 22 
M = 112.38 M = 456.52 M = 598.64 M = 715.91 
Time Mdn = 120.00 Mdn = 420.00 Mdn = 600.00 Mdn = 720.00 
Estimate SD = 78.94 SD = 224.31 SD = 298.35 SD = 219.93 
First Task 
N = 23 N = 23 N = 22 N = 22 
M = 35.83 M = 510.35 M = 940.00 M = 667.27 
Completion Mdn = 36.00 Mdn = 501.00 Mdn = 953.00 Mdn = 680.00 
Time SD = 22.18 SD= 144.60 SD = 221.62 SD= 173.47 
N = 23 N = 23 N = 22 N = 22 
Table 5.2 
Time estimates and completion times per task and prior task experience condition (in 
seconds) 
Table 5.2 shows that, on the second trial, temporal estimates exceeded completion 
times in the seven-disk task and the Playmobil® task twice conditions, whereas completion 
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times exceeded temporal estimates in the three-disk and six-disic task conditions. On the 
first trial. Table 5.2 shows that temporal overestimation was evident on the three-disk task 
and the long duration Playmobil" task, whereas temporal underestimation occurred on the 
six-disk and seven-disk tasks. Bar graphs of predicted and actual completion times on the 
second and first tasks arc presented below in Figures 5.6 and 5.7, respectively. 
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Figure 5.6 
Bar graph of predicted and actual completion times per prior task experience condition 
(data from the second task) 
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• Predicted Time 
• Actual Time 
Figure 5.7 
Bar graph of predicted and actual completion times per prior task experience condition 
(data from the first task) 
In order to determine how many participants predicted task duration using whole 
minutes, frequency distributions of time estimates were calculated. Histograms of time 
estimates on the three-disk, six-disk, seven-disk and long duration Playmobil*" tasks 
(regardless of prior experience condition) are presented below in Figures 5.8, 5.9, 5.10 and 
5.11, respectively. 
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Figure 5.8 
Histogram of time estimates on the three-disk Tower of Hanoi task 
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Figure 5.9 
Histogram of time estimates on the six-disk Tower of Hanoi task 
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Figure 5.10 
Histogram of time estimates on the seven-disk Tower of Hanoi task 
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Figure 5.11 
Histogram of time estimates on the long duration Playmobil*^ task 
For the same reasons that were specified in Experiment 1, the estimated and actual 
completion time data were subjected to a logarithmic transformation before being 
statistically analysed. In order to address the issues of prior task experience and relative 
task duration, the log-transformed data from the second trial were analysed. A 2 (time) x 4 
(prior task experience) mixed design ANOVA produced a main effect of time, F( 1,86) = 
9.92, MSE = .06, p < .01, with completion times exceeding estimates (Ms = 609.34 and 
557.46 seconds, respectively). Hence, on the second trial, general temporal 
underestimation was evident on the long duration Playmobil*^ task. There was a significant 
main effect of prior task experience, F(3,86) = 6.49, MSE = .15, p < .01, which revealed 
that overall lime was shortest in the Playmobil*^ task twice condition. Schcffe pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the mean of the Playmobil^ task twice condition differed 
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significantly fi^om the means of the other conditions (ps < .05). No other condition mean 
differences were significant (ps > .10). 
The interaction was also significant, F(3,86) = 5.41, MSE = .06, p < .01 (see Figure 
5.6 above). This indicated that temporal underestimation occurred in the three-disk and six-
disk task conditions, whereas temporal overestimation was evident in the seven-disk task 
and the Playmobil®task twice conditions. Planned comparisons (LSD t-tests, all two-
tailed) revealed that estimates and completion times differed significantly in the three-disk 
and six-disk task conditions (ps < .05), but not in the seven-disk task and the Playmobil® 
task twice conditions (ps > . 10). 
In order to ascertain whether time prediction accuracy differed between the four 
tasks, the log-transformed data fi-om the first trial were analysed. A 2 (time) x 4 (task) 
mixed design ANOVA produced a main effect of task, F(3, 86) = 164.60, MSE = .44, p < 
.001, which revealed that overall time was shortest on the three-disk task. Scheff6 pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the mean of the three-disk task differed significantly fi^om the 
means of the other tasks (ps < .05). Al l other condition mean differences were significant 
(ps < .05) except those of the Playmobil® task and the six-disk task (p > .05) and the 
Playmobil® task and the seven-disk task (p > .10). The main effect of time was not 
significant (F < 3, p > .10). 
There was also a significant interaction, F(3, 86) = 40.54, MSE = .13, p < .001 (see 
Figure 5.7 above). This revealed that temporal underestimation was evident on the six-disk 
and seven-disk tasks, whereas temporal overestimation occurred on the three-disk task and 
the long duration Playmobil® task. Follow-up analyses (LSD t-tests, all two-tailed) 
revealed that estimates and completion times differed significantly on the three-disk and 
seven-disk tasks (ps < .05), but not on the six-disk task and the long duration Playmobil® 
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task (ps > .10). This finding indicates that the extent of temporal overestimation was only 
significant on the three-disk task, whereas the magnitude of temporal underestimation was 
only significant on the seven-disk task. 
5.10 Discussion 
There was evidence of temporal underestimation on the long duration Playmobil® 
task when it was preceded by one of two unrelated tasks that were of shorter duration. 
Specifically, participants who had just performed the three-disk or six-disk versions of the 
Tower of Hanoi task tended to make optimistically biased time predictions on the long 
duration Playmobil®task. Whilst pilot testing revealed that the six-disk and Playmobil® 
tasks were of similar duration, the latter task (when it was performed first in the 
experiment) took over two minutes longer to complete than the former task (see Table 5.2), 
The presence of an optimistic time prediction bias on the long duration Playmobil® 
task suggests that participants who performed either the three-disk task or the six-disk task 
initially based their second time estimate on the perceived duration of the just-completed 
shorter task. Moreover, it could be that these participants used the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982a) when judging the duration of the long 
Playmobil® task. That is, time predictions may have been anchored on the perceived 
duration of the previous task, but insufficiently scaled up according to the greater demands 
of the long duration Playmobil® task (e.g., the greater number of task components). The 
use of these cognitive heuristics provides a plausible explanation for the presence of 
temporal underestimation on the Playmobil® task when it was preceded by either of these 
shorter duration tasks. 
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In the seven-disk task and the Playmobil® task twice conditions, there a hint of time 
predictions being pessimistically biased on the second trial. Since the first trial took more 
time to complete than the second trial in these conditions, there was some evidence of 
temporal overestimation on a shorter task when it was performed after a longer duration 
one. However, as the extent of temporal overestimation was not significant in these 
conditions, time predictions were more accurate when a longer rather than a shorter task 
had just been completed. That is, relative to those individuals who performed either the 
three-disk task or the six-disk task initially, the magnitude of temporal misestimation was 
less among participants who had just completed the seven-disk task or the long duration 
Playmobil® task. 
A plausible explanation for this finding is that participants in the seven-disk task and 
the Playmobil® task twice conditions used information other than the perceived duration of 
the just-completed task when making a second time estimate. Whilst information about the 
nature of the first task (e.g., how the plastic components fitted together) should be expected 
to form the basis of temporal estimates when the long duration Playmobil® task was 
performed for a second time, no such information was acquired whilst completing the 
seven-disk task beforehand. Thus, it is unclear what kind of information served as a basis 
for time estimates on the long Playmobil® task when this longer duration unrelated task had 
just been performed. One possibility is that these individuals based their second time 
estimate on information about the nature of the long duration Playmobil® task, which they 
acquired whilst previewing the instruction booklet and the plastic task components. For 
example, they may have calculated the number of large plastic components involved in 
task completion and estimated how much time it would take to assemble these 
components. 
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Whilst this explanation could apply to all participants, those individuals who had just 
performed the seven-disk task might have used such information because they possessed 
little knowledge of the duration of the previous task. That is, they were unable to devote 
sufficient cognitive resources to monitoring the duration of the seven-disk task because of 
its complexity. As the completion of the seven-disk task involves making at least 127 disk 
moves, it is a complex task that is likely to require considerable cognitive resources. On 
the basis of Zakay's (1989) research, few cognitive resources should be available to 
process temporal infomiation on such a task because non-temporal information (i.e., how 
to complete the task) becomes the focus of attention. Hence, given Zakay's findings, it 
could well be that participants were unaware of the duration of the seven-disk task, and 
may have based their second time estimate on information about the nature of the long 
duration Playmobil® task. 
The importance of prior task experience in reducing time prediction bias was further 
highlighted in this study. That is, time predictions on the second task were most accurate 
among participants who had just performed the Playmobil® task. In fact, on average, these 
individuals overestimated the duration of the second task by less than two seconds (see 
Table 5.2), suggesting that their extensive prior experience was used to good effect. A 
plausible explanation for this finding is that these participants took account of their 
previous task performance when making a second time estimate. As both tasks were 
identical, they were presumably aware of factors that delayed the completion of the first 
task (e.g., fitting plastic components together incorrectly), and may have based their 
second time estimate on such task-related information. 
Alternatively, participants who performed the long duration Playmobil® task twice 
might have based their second time prediction on information about the nature of the 
previous task. For example, they may have estimated the number of large plastic 
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components and made a second time prediction on the basis of this information. Given that 
time estimation bias has been found to be reduced when people recognise the similarities 
between previous and current tasks (Buehler et al., 1994), the use of both of these 
judgement strategies should result in greater time prediction accuracy when the long 
duration Playmobil® task was performed for a second time. 
There was further evidence of the tendency to estimate task duration using whole 
minutes rather than seconds in the present study. The fi-equency distributions of time 
estimates on all four tasks revealed that the vast majority of the participants used whole 
minutes when judging their completion times (see Figures 5.8 to 5.11). There was also 
evidence that most participants used temporal units ranging from five to 15 minutes when 
judging the duration of the six-disk, seven-disk and long duration Playmobil® tasks. 
Consistent with previous studies (e.g.. Experiment 8), these findings indicate that in 
general participants preferred to use whole minutes or longer temporal units when judging 
the duration of the present tasks. 
5.11 General Discussion 
The present studies sought to determine the type of task-related information upon 
which time estimates on the second of two consecutive tasks are based. In Experiment 8, 
the extent of temporal underestimation on die long duration Playmobil® task did not differ 
according to the relevance of prior task experience. That is, time predictions were no less 
optimistically biased when a related rather than an unrelated task of about 30 seconds' 
duration had just been completed. This finding suggests that the perceived duration of the 
just-completed task was the type of information upon which time predictions on the long 
duration Playmobil® task were based. Consistent with this suggestion. Experiment 9 
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produced further evidence of temporal underestimation on this task when it was preceded 
by either one of two tasks, which were of shorter duration and unrelated to it. 
Although there was a hint of temporal overestimation on the long duration 
Playmobil®task when it was performed after an unrelated task that was of longer duration, 
the extent of this pessimistic time prediction bias was not significant in the seven-disk task 
condition in Experiment 9. Likewise, the magnitude of temporal overestimation on the 
long duration Playmobil®task was not significant when it was performed for a second time 
in succession in that study. These findings suggest that participants who performed an 
identical or an unrelated longer task initially may not have based their second time estimate 
on the perceived duration of the just-completed task. 
The complexity o f the seven-disk task might explain why the perceived duration of 
this task did not form the basis of time estimates on the long duration PIaymobil®task. 
That is, participants who performed the seven-disk task initially possessed little knowledge 
of its duration because they had to devote considerable cognitive resources to processing 
non-temporal information in order to complete this task. Instead of using previous task 
duration, these individuals may have based their second time estimate on information 
about the nature of the long duration PlaymobiI®task, which they acquired during the pre-
exposure period. Conversely, it was suggested that performing the long duration 
Playmobil®task beforehand enabled participants to base their second time estimate on 
information about the nature of the previous task (e.g., the number of large plastic task 
components). Since time predictions were most accurate when this task was performed for 
a second time, these participants presumably used their extensive prior task experience to 
good effect. 
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In contrast to research supporting the planning fallacy (e.g., Buehler et al., 1994), the 
present studies suggest that taking account of distributional information such as personal 
performance on previous tasks can result in temporal underestimation. That is, when a 
related or an unrelated shorter duration task had just been completed, time predictions were 
optimistically biased. This finding indicates that, under such conditions, people use the 
perceived duration of the previous task as a mechanism for temporal estimation. Moreover, 
it suggests that erroneous distributional information such as how much time a previous 
unrelated task took to complete is used when estimating task duration. Given the findings 
of Experiments 3 to 9, it could be that the temporal underestimation indicative of the 
planning fallacy is a consequence of time predictions being based on the shorter duration 
of a just-completed task. 
Whilst it is not known whether these findings will apply to other tasks, temporal 
underestimation may well be a consequence of people's use of the anchoring and 
adjustment judgemental heuristics. Specifically, time predictions might be anchored on the 
perceived duration of a previous shorter task, but insufficiently scaled up or adjusted 
according to the greater demands of an upcoming task. Conversely, temporal 
overestimation could be due to time predictions being anchored on the perceived duration 
of a just-completed longer task, with insufficient downward adjustment for the lesser 
demands of a current task. However, given the lack of a significant pessimistic time 
prediction bias when the long duration Playmobil® task was preceded by the seven-disk 
task or the same task (Experiment 9), anchoring and adjustment in the context of time 
estimation could be uni-directional. That is, these cognitive heuristics might only used 
when people estimate the duration of a task that takes more time to complete than a 
previous one. 
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It could be that people who have prior experience of perfonming a longer or more 
complex task engage in more thorough information processing when making a subsequent 
time estimate. For example, instead o f relying on previous task duration, individuals might 
think about the steps involved in completing the current task and base their time prediction 
on this information. On the basis of previous research (e.g., Sniezek et al., 1990), 
judgements of task performance would be expected to be more accurate as a consequence 
of using such task-related information. Likewise, having prior task experience should 
enable people to use more in-depth judgement strategies instead of relying on cognitive 
heuristics (e.g.. Smith & Kida, 1991; Wilson et al., 1996) when estimating task duration. 
There was fiirther evidence of the benefits of prior task experience in Experiment 9, 
where time predictions were very accurate when the Playmobil® task was performed for a 
second time. This finding suggests that people do take account of their performance on 
previous tasks, and use correct distributional information to good effect. That is, people 
make good use of information about personal performance on a previous task when this 
task is directly relevant to the upcoming task. 
The present research indicates that, in order to improve time prediction accuracy, all 
(e.g., Experiment 4) or a substantial part of a current task must have been performed 
beforehand (Experiment 7). However, when people lack extensive prior task experience, it 
could well be that they rely on erroneous distributional information (e.g., the perceived 
duration of a previous unrelated task) when estimating their completion time on a task that 
is longer or more complex than a previous one. The use of such incorrect information 
should lead to temporal underestimation i f people rely on the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristics when judging task duration (Buehler et al., 1995). 
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A similar kind of judgement strategy has in fact been found to be used by people 
who possess little prior task experience. Josephs and Hahn (1995) report that participants 
used an anchoring judgement strategy when estimating the duration of tasks such as proof-
reading a manuscript. Specifically, time predictions were based on superficial task 
characteristics such as the number of pages, at the expense of information that would affect 
task duration such as the amount of text on each page. Josephs and Hahn found that this 
low cognitive effort judgement strategy resulted in temporal underestimation, and suggest 
that it was used because participants were unsure of the amount of work involved in 
completing the upcoming task. Hence, due to a lack of prior task experience, temporal 
underestimation was a consequence of these individuals engaging in heuristic information 
processing. 
The amount of prior task experience could explain why time predictions were very 
accurate when the long duration Playmobil®task was completed for a second time 
(Experiment 9), whereas the extent of temporal underestimation on this task was not 
reduced when a shorter duration sub-component version of it was performed beforehand 
(Experiment 8). That is, greater information about the nature of the second task was 
acquired whilst performing the long (Experiment 9) rather than the short duration 
Playmobil®task initially (Experiment 8). Having just performed an identical task (i.e., the 
long duration task), participants in Experiment 9 presumably took account of information 
about the task completion process, which they used as a basis for their second time 
estimate. 
In contrast, having built only one wall of the Playmobil® castle beforehand (i.e., the 
short duration sub-component task), participants in Experiment 8 possessed much less 
task-related information when estimating the duration of the long Playmobil® task. Hence, 
due to limited knowledge of the upcoming task, these individuals probably relied on the 
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perceived duration of the previous task when making a second time estimate. Consistent 
with the work of Josephs and Hahn (1995), time estimates would be expected to be less 
biased when people have greater prior experience of performing a task. Thus, it is 
unsurprising that time predictions were more accurate when all rather than part of the long 
duration Playmobil®task had just been completed. 
The present studies provide further evidence of the impact of the duration of a 
current task on the direction in which time predictions on it are biased. Specifically, there 
was evidence of temporal underestimation on the seven-disk Tower of Hanoi task 
(Experiment 9). Moreover, temporal underestimation occurred on the long duration 
PIaymobil®task, but only when it was preceded by a related (Experiment 8) or an unrelated 
task that was of shorter duration (Experiments 8 and 9). Conversely, temporal 
overestimation was evident on the three-disk Tower of Hanoi task (Experiments 8 and 9) 
and there was a hint of a pessimistic time prediction bias on the short duration Playmobil® 
task (Experiment 8). 
These findings indicate that people tend to make pessimistically biased time 
predictions on laboratory tasks that take less than one minute to complete. Conversely, the 
general temporal underestimation indicative of the planning fallacy may only be evident on 
laboratory tasks that take in excess of nine minutes to complete. That is, time predictions 
are optimistically biased on tasks that are of longer duration than the six-disk version of the 
Tower of Hanoi task, which took about eight and a half minutes to finish (see Table 5.2). It 
could be that a pessimistic time prediction bias occurs on shorter tasks because of the 
tendency to estimate task duration using whole minutes or temporal units such as 10 or 15 
minutes (Fraisse, 1984). 
210 
The frequency distributions of time estimates provide support for the notion that task 
duration tends to be judged using whole minutes or temporal units such as 10 or 15 
minutes. For example, in Experiment 8, all participants predicted the duration of the long 
Playmobil®task in whole minutes, and several of them used temporal unitsof 10 and 15 
minutes (see Figure 5,5), Similarly, over half of the participants estimated their completion 
time on the three-disk Tower of Hanoi task and the short duration Playmobil® task in whole 
minutes rather than seconds in Experiment 8 (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4, respectively). 
A similar pattern of time estimation was observed in Experiment 9, where the 
majority of participants in the three-disk task condition judged the duration of the three-
disk task in whole minutes (see Figure 5.8). Likewise, all individuals used whole minutes 
when predicting the duration of the six-disk, seven-disk and long duration Playmobil® tasks 
in that study, and several of them used temporal units such as 10 and 15 minutes on these 
longer duration tasks (see Figures 5.9, 5,10 and 5.11, respectively). Taken together, the 
findings of the present studies indicate that whole minutes or temporal units such as 10 or 
15 minutes tend to be used when estimating the time needed to complete tasks that range in 
duration from about 30 seconds to 16 minutes. 
5.12 Conclusions 
The research presented in this chapter provides ftirther clarification of the role of 
prior task experience in the time estimation process. It has been shown that the extent of 
temporal underestimation on the long duration Playmobil® task does not differ when a 
related or an unrelated task, which was of much shorter duration was performed 
beforehand (Experiment 8). Similarly, prior experience o f performing either one o f two 
unrelated shorter tasks (i.e., the three-disk and six-disk versions of the Tower of Hanoi 
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task) also led to temporal underestimation on the long duration Playmobil®task 
(Experiment 9). 
These findings indicate that the perceived duration of a just-completed shorter task 
may have been the type of information upon which time estimates on the long duration 
Playmobil®task were based. It was suggested that an anchoring and adjustment judgement 
strategy might have been responsible for temporal underestimation on this task. 
Specifically, the perceived duration of the just-completed shorter task served as an anchor 
for time predictions, which were insufficiently adjusted according to the greater demands 
of the long duration Playmobil®task. 
In contrast, there was little evidence o f this kind o f heuristic information processing 
when a longer duration task was performed before the long Playmobil®task (Experiment 
9). Whilst there was a hint of temporal overestimation when the same or an unrelated task 
that was of longer duration was completed initially, the magnitude of this pessimistic time 
prediction bias was not significant. Thus, relative to participants who performed a shorter 
task beforehand, individuals who had just completed a longer task were more accurate at 
estimating the duration of the long duration Playmobil®task (Experiment 9). It was 
suggested that, when both tasks are identical, information about the nature of the first task 
served as a basis for time estimates on the second task. However, when an unrelated 
complex task had just been completed, it was proposed that time estimates may have been 
based on information about the nature of the upcoming task (i.e., the long duration 
Playmobil®task). 
The present findings indicate that people can and do take account of their 
performance on previous tasks when estimating the duration of a current task. However, 
this research suggests that the use of such distributional information (Kahneman & 
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Tversky, 1979) does not necessarily improve time prediction accuracy, but can lead to 
temporal underestimation when it is erroneous. That is, when irrelevant information such 
as the perceived duration of a previous unrelated task forms the basis of time predictions 
on a longer task. 
On the other hand, the present studies suggest that such distributional information 
can improve time prediction accuracy, but only when people have substantial experience of 
performing the same task before estimating its duration. Hence, in addition to highlighting 
the type of information that is used when estimating the duration of subsequent 
consecutive tasks, the present research indicates that the use of distributional information 
(i.e., personal performance on previous tasks) does not always lead to more accurate time 
predictions. 
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Chapter Six 
General Discussion 
6.1 Overview 
The research presented in this thesis investigated a number of factors that might 
influence the accuracy of people's estimates of their task completion times. The nine 
experiments have produced several potentially important findings, and have highlighted 
two distinct factors that influence the direction (i.e., under or overestimation) and/or extent 
of time prediction bias. One factor relates to the task itself, namely, its duration, whereas 
the other factor concerns the person making the time estimate, that is, their prior 
experience of the to-be-completed task, or of other related or unrelated tasks. 
In the final chapter of this thesis, the findings of the present studies will be discussed 
and potential theoretical and practical implications highlighted. The other aims of this 
chapter are to evaluate the strengths and limitations of the nine studies and make 
recommendations for ftiture research. The chapter begins with a section that summarises 
the findings o f the nine experiments. In the next section, potential explanations for the 
present findings are proposed. Some strengths and limitafions of this research are discussed 
in the next section, which is followed by a section containing recommendations for fijture 
research. In the final two sections of the chapter, practical and theoretical implications of 
the present findings are emphasised. 
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6.2 Summary of the Findings 
The present research provides a remarkably consistent picture concerning the process 
of estimating the duration of the three-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi task. In all six of 
the studies where this task was employed, there was no evidence of an optimistic time 
prediction bias on it. hideed, the temporal underestimation indicative of the planning 
fallacy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) was not only absent but was reversed on this task. 
That is, in Experiments 1 to 4, and 8 and 9 (and in every cell in every condition in these 
studies), there was evidence of temporal overestimation on this simple well structured task. 
This simple finding is of considerable importance since the planning fallacy has 
previously been found in virtually all published studies (e.g., Buehler et a l , 1994; Newby-
Clark et al., 2000), and with a variety of tasks including origami (Byram, 1997) and 
college coursework assignments (e.g., Koole & Van't Spijker, 2000). Moreover, this 
finding indicates that the planning fallacy is not as prevalent a cognitive judgement 
phenomenon as previously suspected, and that there is at least one task on which it 
definitely does not occur. 
Given the simplicity of the three-disk task, the issue of task difficulty was addressed 
in Experiments 2 to 4, where the cognitive complexity of the Tower of Hanoi task was 
increased. In these studies, the four-disk (Experiments 2 and 3) and five-disk tasks 
(Experiment 4) were employed alongside the three-disk task. There was evidence that, 
relative to the three-disk task, time predictions were less pessimistically biased on the four-
disk and five-disk tasks when they were performed first in Experiments 2 and 4, 
respectively. Specifically, the difference between estimated and actual duration was 
significant on the three-disk task, but not on the two more complex versions of the Tower 
of Hanoi. 
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In Experiments 2 to 4, there was some evidence of an optimistic time prediction bias 
on the four-disk and five-disk tasks, but only when they were preceded by the three-disk 
task. The simplicity of the three-disk, four-disk and five-disk tasks relative to the 
laboratory tasks used in previous research (e.g., Byram, 1997) was proposed as an 
explanation for the absence of a general optimistic time prediction bias in Experiments I to 
4. However, as the laboratory tasks used in previous research also took more time to 
complete, task duration could provide an alternative explanation for the findings of 
Experiments 1 to 4. That is, the shorter duration of the three-disk, four-disk and five-disk 
tasks could be responsible for the general temporal overestimation that was observed on 
these tasks. 
The principal aim of Experiment 5 was to ascertain whether task duration or 
cognitive complexity was responsible for the findings of the previous four studies. In order 
to achieve this goal, task duration was manipulated whilst cognitive complexity was held 
constant. Experiment 5 revealed that general temporal overestimation was evident on two 
versions of a simple repetitive disk movement task, which were of similar duration to the 
three-disk and five-disk versions of the Tower of Hanoi task. This finding was consistent 
with the notion that the shorter duration of the present tasks was responsible for the 
absence of a general optimistic time prediction bias in Experiments 1 to 5. Hence, the 
temporal underestimation that was observed in previous research (e.g., Francis-Smythe & 
Robertson, 1999) could be due to the longer duration of the laboratory tasks used in those 
studies. 
Further support for this notion was evident in Experiment 6, where the direction in 
which time predictions were biased differed according to the duration of laboratory tasks 
that are less artificial than the Tower of Hanoi. That is, temporal underestimation was 
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evident on a Playmobil® construction task that was of similar duration to some of the 
laboratory tasks used previously (e.g., BuehJer et al., 1997), whereas temporal 
overestimation prevailed on another Playmobil® construction task that was of similar 
duration to the five-disk version of the Tower o f Hanoi task. 
The impact of the duration of a current task on the direction of time prediction bias 
was also highlighted in Experiment 9. Here, an optimistic time prediction bias was evident 
on a different type of laboratory task that was of similar duration to some of the ones used 
previous research (e.g., see Byram, 1997). Specifically, there was evidence of temporal 
underestimation on the seven-disk task version of the Tower of Hanoi, a task that took 
approximately 16 minutes to complete. Likewise, there was a hint of an optimistic time 
prediction bias on the six-disk version of the Tower of Hanoi, a task that took between 
eight and nine minutes to complete. Given these findings, it could be that laboratory tasks 
need to be of at least the duration of the six-disk task in order for the general temporal 
underestimation indicative of the plarming fallacy to occur. Whilst it is not known whether 
an optimistic time prediction bias will prevail on other tasks of this duration, the present 
research suggests that task duration is a factor that influences the direction in which 
temporal judgements are biased (i.e., under or overestimation). 
In contrast to previous studies (e.g., Koole & Van't Spijker, 2000; Newby-Clark et 
al., 2000), the present research emphasises the directional nature of time estimation bias. 
Temporal overestimation was observed on tasks such as the three-disk Tower of Hanoi, 
whereas underestimation prevailed on tasks such as the seven-disk Tower o f Hanoi. Hence, 
in relation to well structured laboratory tasks at least, there is evidence that the direction in 
which time estimates are biased differs according to task duration. That is, temporal 
overestimation was evident on the tasks that took less than one minute to complete, 
whereas temporal underestimation occurred on the tasks that were in excess of eight 
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minutes' duration. Given this finding, the longer duration of the laboratory tasks used in 
previous research (e.g., Byram, 1997) may well have been responsible for the general 
temporal underestimation that was observed in those studies. 
The present research demonstrates that prior task experience is an important 
determinant of time prediction bias. In fact, three distinct types of prior task experience 
have been found to influence temporal misestimation. Firstly, there was evidence of the 
benefits of mental planning on time prediction accuracy on the three-disk and four-disk 
versions of the Tower of Hanoi task. That is, in Experiments 1 and 2, previewing the three-
disk task and its instructions for two minutes resulted in a significant reduction in temporal 
overestimation. Likewise, this method of pre-exposure led to a significant reduction in time 
prediction bias on the four-disk task in Experiment 2. Here, the extent of temporal 
underestimation in the mental planning condition was less than the magnitude of temporal 
overestimation in the no experience condition. These findings indicate that fime predictions 
were more accurate among individuals who previewed the three-disk or four-disk tasks 
beforehand. 
It was suggested that these findings occurred because participants formed some kind 
of mental representation of the task completion process during the two-minute pre-
exposure period. For example, they might have worked out the correct disk move pattern, 
and calculated the amount of time that would be needed to move the disks accordingly. 
Given the findings o f Davies (2000a), it could be that mental preplanning is precluded only 
on the five-disk task and more complex versions of the Tower of Hanoi. If this were the 
case, then having the opportunity to preview the three-disk and four-disk tasks may well 
have provided participants with pertinent information upon which to make more accurate 
time estimates. 
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Active task practice was the second type of prior experience to be highlighted in the 
present research. This method of pre-exposure was studied initially in Experiment 1, which 
produced some evidence of temporal overestimation being reduced among participants 
who performed the three-disk task at least once beforehand. Similarly, fime prediction 
accuracy was found to be greater on the three-disk and five-disk tasks (Experiment 4) and 
the long duration Playmobil® task (Experiment 9) when they were performed for a second 
time in succession. These findings indicate that having prior experience of performing an 
upcoming task enabled participants to make a more accurate single (Experiment 1) or 
second time prediction (Experiments 4 and 9). Moreover, these findings suggest that 
people can and do take account of their performance on previous tasks, and use such 
distributional information to good effect. 
Prior performance of a longer or a shorter duration task was the third type of task 
experience that was found to influence time prediction bias. Specifically, there was 
evidence that time prediction bias on the second task differed according to the relative 
duration of the first task in Experiments 3 to 9, In general, temporal underestimation 
occurred on longer duration tasks when they were preceded by shorter ones, whereas there 
was some evidence of temporal overestimation being greater when shorter duration tasks 
were performed after longer ones. 
Since different versions of the same task were performed in the majority of the 
present studies, it could be that time predictions on the current task were based on 
information about the nature of the just-completed task. For example, the disk moves 
needed to complete the three-disk task may have served as a basis for time predictions on 
the four-disk task (Experiment 3). However, the effects o f prior task performance were 
also observed when no specific information about the nature of the second task was 
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acquired whilst performing the first task. That is, when the first and second experimental 
trials were not different versions of the same task (Experiment 6). 
Temporal overestimation was greater when the short duration Playmobil® task was 
preceded by the long Playmobil® task, whereas there was a hint of temporal 
underestimation being greater when the long duration Playmobil® task was performed 
second rather than first in Experiment 6. Given that two different tasks were performed 
consecutively in this study, it could be that time predictions on the second task were based 
on information such as the perceived duration of the first task. Specifically, participants 
may have estimated the duration of the just-completed task, and used this figure as a basis 
for making a time estimate on the current task. 
In order to determine whether previous task duration or information about the nature 
of the just-completed task formed the basis of time predictions on the current task, the 
relevance of prior task experience was manipulated in Experiments 8 and 9. To this end, 
tasks that were either related or unrelated to each other were performed in succession. I f 
time estimates were based on information about the nature of the previous task, then 
predictions should be more accurate when a related task had just been completed. 
Conversely, i f time estimates were based on previous task duration then temporal 
prediction bias should not differ according to the relevance of prior task experience. 
Experiment 8 provided support for the latter hypothesis, as the extent of temporal 
underestimation on the long duration Playmobil® task did not differ when a related or an 
unrelated shorter task had just been performed. Likewise, Experiment 9 revealed that time 
predictions on the long duration Playmobil® task may have been based on the perceived 
duration of one of two shorter unrelated tasks, which had just been completed. 
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In contrast, there was no evidence that time prediction bias differed significantly 
according to the relative duration of a previous task when one of two shorter tasks was 
performed after a longer task (Experiment 9). Specifically, the extent of temporal 
overestimation on the long duration Playmobil® task was not significant when the seven-
disk Tower of Hanoi task or the long duration Playmobil® task itself had just been 
completed. Given this finding, it was suggested that individuals who performed these tasks 
initially may not have based their second time estimate on the perceived duration of the 
previous task. Instead, information about the nature of the previous task may have served 
as a basis for temporal predictions on the long duration Playmobil® task when it was 
performed for a second time. Conversely, it was suggested that individuals possessed little 
knowledge of the duration of the seven-disk task because of its complexity, and so used 
information concerning the nature of the long duration Piaymobil® task when estimating its 
duration. 
The findings of Experiment 9 indicate that when a related task of longer duration was 
performed beforehand, time predictions on the second trial (i.e., the long duration 
Playmobil® task) may have been based on information about the nature of the previous 
task. Conversely, when a longer duration imrelated task (i.e., the seven-disk Tower of 
Hanoi) was completed before the long duration Playmobil® task, it was suggested that time 
predictions on the second trial might have been based on information about the nature of 
the upcoming task, which was acquired during the pre-exposure period (Experiment 9). 
There was also evidence that time predictions on the long duration Playmobil® task 
might have been based on the perceived duration of a just-completed shorter task, which 
was either unrelated or related to it (Experiments 8 and 9). Given that temporal 
underestimation occurred when only one part of the long duration Playmobil® task (i.e., the 
short duration sub-component task) had just been completed in Experiments 7 and 8, it 
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could be that people need to possess considerable prior task experience i f information 
about the nature of a previous shorter duration task is to be used to improve time prediction 
accuracy. 
Consistent with this suggestion, there was evidence of infonmation about the nature 
of the previous task being used to good effect when half of the long duration Playmobil® 
task was performed initially (Experiment 7). That is, time predictions on the long duration 
task were more accurate when the medium rather than the short sub-component task had 
just been completed. Indeed, a pessimistic rather than an optimistic time prediction bias 
occurred when the long task was preceded by the medium task in this study, suggesting 
that the shorter duration of the first task did not form the basis of temporal estimates on the 
second task. Given the present findings, it could be that previous task duration only forms 
the basis of time esfimates when people possess litUe or no prior task experience. That is, 
when an unrelated or a related task of much shorter duration than the upcoming task has 
just been performed. 
6.3 Explaining the Findings 
The role of distributional information in determining the planning fallacy (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979) implies that information about previous task performance tends to be 
neglected when estimating task duration. However, the present research highlights 
conditions under which such information is not only considered, but is also used to good 
effect. That is, in Experiments 1, 4 and 9, time prediction accuracy was greater among 
participants who had some prior experience of performing the same task. 
This finding is consistent with the work of Buehler et al, (1994), which revealed that 
temporal underestimation was reduced (and time prediction accuracy improved) when 
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individuals recognised the similarities between previous tasks and the one that they were 
about to perform. Buehler et al.'s experimental manipulation presumably gave participants 
the opportunity to recall distributional information, which they used effectively. Since 
prior task experience was acquired immediately in the present research, participants 
probably recognised the similarities between the previous and upcoming tasks, and may 
well have drawn upon their prior experience when making a single (Experiment 1) or a 
second time prediction (Experiments 4 and 9). 
The immediacy with which prior task experience was acquired in the present 
research might thus explain why distributional information was presumably considered and 
used to good effect. That is, as the temporal interval between the acquisition of task 
experience and time estimation was only a matter of minutes, participants may well have 
recalled information about the just-completed task when making a prediction. For example, 
when estimating the duration of the three-disk task in Experiment 1, some participants had 
just completed the task at least once during the two-minute pre-exposure period. Hence, 
greater time prediction accuracy may have been a consequence of these participants 
recalling pertinent information such as the correct disk movement pattern, which they used 
as a basis for their temporal estimate. 
In contrast, in many real world situations, the temporal interval between repeated 
performance o f similar or identical tasks tends to be much longer than was the case in the 
present studies. For example, marking students' examination scripts is a task that is usually 
performed at the end of each academic year, meaning that there is a period of around nine 
months until this activity is undertaken again. This kind of lengthy temporal interval would 
be likely to impede the recall of distributional information such as the duration of previous 
examination script marking tasks. Thus, in such instances, the person can only really 
estimate their completion time using information about the current task such as the number 
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of examination scripts to be marked. On the basis of previous research (e.g., Buehler et al., 
1994), time predictions would be expected to be over-optimistic in such instances because 
of the person's reliance on singular information (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
The temporal interval between previous and current tasks could thus explain the well 
established link between the planning fallacy and the failure to use distributional 
information. Similarly, the temporal interval between time estimation and task 
performance might explain the absence o f a general optimistic time prediction bias in the 
present research. That is, the imminence of task performance may have forced participants 
to engage in defensive pessimism (Norem & Cantor, 1986b), which resulted in them erring 
on the side of caution when making a time estimate. 
Indeed, it has been shown that non-temporal judgements are less optimistically 
biased when task performance is imminent rather than temporally distant (e.g., Sheppard et 
al., 1996; Lemer & Tetlock, 1999), Likewise, research into temporal construal theory (e.g., 
Liberman & Trope, 1998) has found that people consider different types of task-related 
information when judging their performance on tasks that are temporally distant or 
imminent. For example, factors that might delay task completion are overlooked when 
making judgements about future activities, whereas such information becomes the focus of 
attention when judging performance on tasks that are imminent (Trope & Liberman, 2000). 
On the basis of such research, it could be that time estimates were pessimistically 
biased in the present studies because they were based on information such as potential 
impediments to optimal task completion. Moreover, given the presence of the researcher in 
the laboratory, participants were presumably aware that their task performance would be 
objectively evaluated. Thus, participants may have been over-cautious when estimating 
task duration in order to appear competent and maintain self-esteem (Gilovich et al., 1993), 
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However, as an optimistic time prediction bias has been observed when task performance 
occurred immediately after time estimation (e.g., Byram, 1997), it could be that a brief 
temporal interval does not lead to pessimistically biased temporal estimates on tasks that 
are of longer duration than the ones used here. That is, the tasks used in such previous 
research took more time to complete than those used in the present studies. 
In research where a lengthy temporal interval was operative (e.g., Buehler et al., 
1994), an optimistic time prediction bias would be expected to prevail because participants' 
task performance was not assessed until some time after task duration was predicted. 
Indeed, as completion times were self-reported in some studies (e.g., Newby-Clark et al., 
2000), task performance was not objectively evaluated, and so participants had no obvious 
need to maintain self-esteem. Given the findings of previous research (e.g., Savitsky et a)., 
1998), optimistically biased predictions should occur in such circumstances because 
attention is focused on information concerning successftil task completion (i.e., singular 
information). In view of these suggestions, the temporal interval between time estimate and 
task performance might well influence the direction in which predictions of task duration 
are biased (i.e., under or overestimation). 
The use of the anchoring and adjustment judgemental heuristics (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982a) could explain the effects of prior performance of a shorter version of 
the same task or a shorter similar task, which were observed in the present research. 
Support for this suggestion came from Experiments 8 and 9, which revealed that time 
predictions on longer tasks may have been based on the perceived duration of a just-
completed shorter task. Thus, temporal underestimation might have been a consequence of 
using an anchoring and adjustment judgement strategy whereby the shorter duration of the 
previous task served as an anchor for time predictions, which were insufficiently adjusted 
according to the greater demands of the upcoming task. 
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Given the prevalence and robustness of the anchoring and adjustment heuristics 
(George et al., 2000), it is likely that temporal as well as non-temporal judgements would 
be affected by these cognitive heuristics. As the planning fallacy has been attributed to 
heuristic information processing (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), temporal underestimation 
could be a consequence of using cognitive heuristics. In fact, Buehler et al. (1995) report a 
study in which previously-presented numerical values served as anchors for time 
predictions on a college coursework assignment. 
Whilst the methodology reported by Buehler et al. is consistent with the standard 
anchoring paradigm (Chapman & Johnson, 2002), the present research suggests that 
anchoring and adjustment can occur in the absence of numerical values that are presented 
by the experimenter. That is, as no outcome feedback was made available to participants in 
the present studies, they presumably generated their own estimate of the duration o f the 
just-completed task. Indeed, at the end of the first trial in all of the studies, a number of 
participants mentioned that they had misestimated the duration of the just-completed task. 
Although this evidence is purely anecdotal, it seems to suggest that participants may have 
made implicit retrospective estimates of task duration. 
Self-generated anchor values have been found to lead to bias in non-temporal 
judgements of task performance (Epiey & Gilovich, 2002; Kruger, 1999; Mussweiler & 
Strack, 1999), suggesting that externally-presented numerical values are not a prerequisite 
for anchoring effects to occur. Such research provides support for the notion that, when a 
shorter duration task had just been performed, time predictions on a longer task were 
anchored on the perceived duration of the previous task in Experiments 3 to 9. That is, 
participants in these studies estimated the duration of the just-completed task, and used this 
figure as a basis for their next time prediction, which was insufficiently scaled up 
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according to the greater demands of the upcoming task. Engaging in this kind of heuristic 
information processing would be expected to result in temporal underestimation on a 
longer duration task when a shorter one had just been performed. 
There was limited evidence of this type strategy being used when a longer duration 
task had just been completed (Experiments 3 to 9), prompting the suggestion that 
anchoring and adjustment in the context of time estimation could be uni-directional. That 
is, an anchoring and adjustment judgement strategy might only be used when a shorter 
duration task has just been performed. In fact, temporal underestimation rather than 
temporal overestimation was evident in previous research where anchoring effects 
occurred (Buehler et al., 1995). Given that anchoring and adjustment was not evident when 
all (e.g., Experiment 9) or half of the same task had just been completed (Experiment 7), it 
could be that having substantial prior task experience enables people to engage in more 
thorough information processing when judging task duration. 
Additionally, there was evidence that possessing such extensive task-related 
knowledge resulted in greater time prediction accuracy, suggesting that distributional 
information was used to good effect. Conversely, when a shorter duration task had just 
been performed and prior task experience was minimal (e.g., Experiment 8) or absent (e.g., 
Experiment 9), there was evidence that time predictions were anchored on erroneous 
distributional information such as the perceived duration of a previous unrelated task. On 
the basis of previous research (e.g., Wilson et al., 1996), judgements of task performance 
would be expected to be influenced by the anchoring and adjustment heuristics in the 
absence of prior task experience. 
The directional nature of time estimation bias was highlighted in the present 
research. That is, the direction in which time predictions were biased was found to differ 
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according to the duration of the upcoming task. There was evidence of general temporal 
overestimation on tasks with a duration of less than one minute, whereas general temporal 
underestimation prevailed on tasks that took between about eight and 16 minutes to 
complete. The latter finding indicates that, in relation to well structured laboratory tasks at 
least, the planning fallacy tends only to be evident when task duration is greater than eight 
minutes. Indeed, the laboratory tasks used in previous research where an optimistic time 
prediction bias prevailed were of at least eight minutes' duration (Buehler et al., 1997), 
suggesting that such tasks may need to take this amount of time to complete before the 
planning fallacy occurs. 
A possible explanation for temporal overestimation on the short duration tasks used 
in the present studies is that participants may have estimated their completion times using 
whole minutes or longer temporal units such as 10 minutes. By the same token, on the long 
tasks, an optimistic time prediction bias could have been due to participants using temporal 
units such as five minutes. For example, on the seven-disk Tower of Hanoi task 
(Experiment 9), temporal underestimation may have been a consequence of participants 
giving a prediction of five minutes when the task itself took about 16 minutes to complete. 
Consistent with this suggestion, the fi-equency distribution of time estimates on the seven-
disk task revealed that almost half of the participants in the seven-disk task condition 
judged the duration of the first trial as being either five or 10 minutes. 
Given that the estimation of everyday activities is often made using temporal units 
such as five and 10 minutes (Fraisse, 1984), the finding fi-om Experiment 9 indicates that 
several participants used such units when judging the duration of a laboratory task that 
took about 16 minutes to complete. In a similar vein, there was evidence that a number of 
individuals estimated task duration using whole minutes rather than seconds in 
Experiments 1 to 9. This tendency was observed on tasks ranging in duration fi-om less 
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than 30 seconds (e.g., the three-disk Tower of Hanoi task) to about 16 minutes (i.e., the 
seven-disk Tower of Hanoi task). Hence, in all of the present studies, there was evidence of 
participants estimating task duration in whole minutes rather than seconds. 
Although task duration has received little empirical treatment previously, it has been 
suggested that a closely related factor (i.e., task complexity) might influence the length of 
temporal estimates (Zakay, 1989). Since more complex tasks are generally of longer 
duration than simpler ones (Buckhalt & Gates, 2002), with the exception of the repetitive 
disk movement task (Experiment 5), the longer tasks used here were presumably more 
difficult than the shorter ones. Given that time estimates have been found to be shorter 
when task performance requires greater attentional resources (Zakay, 1989), the over-
optimism that tended to occur on the longer duration tasks could be due to cognitive 
processing limitations. For example, participants in Experiment 9 may have 
underestimated the duration of the seven-disk Tower of Hanoi task because they could not 
mentally represent the 127 disk moves needed for optimal task completion during the pre-
exposure period 
It has been proposed that judgement overconfidence is a consequence of insufficient 
cognitive processing of task-related information (Sniezek et al., 1990). Hence, temporal 
underestimation could be due to people's inability to cognitively process information 
concerning the completion of an upcoming task. In fact, greater cognitive processing of 
task-related information has been found to reduce over-optimism in non-temporal 
judgements of task performance (e.g., Hoch, 1985; Koriat et al., 1980). On the basis of 
such research, it could be that time estimation accuracy improves as a consequence of 
engaging in more in-depth cognitive processing. Given the role of heuristic information 
processing in determining the planning fallacy (i.e., the neglect of distributional 
information), a sound theoretical basis exists for further investigation of this issue. 
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The absence of a general optimistic time prediction bias in the present research could 
be due to the fact that the present tasks were well structured. That is, since the Tower of 
Hanoi task, the repetitive disk movement task, and the Playmobil® tasks all comprised 
sequential components, participants might have been able to envisage the task completion 
process at the outset. Indeed, Lesgold (1988) found that it was possible to mentally 
represent the steps involved in the completion of well structured problem solving tasks. 
Hence, as the present tasks were well structured, participants may well have based their 
time predictions on information about the nature of the to-be-completed task. For example, 
in Experiments 1 to 5, participants might have esfimated the amount of time needed to 
place one disk on a peg, and based their task duration predictions on such information. 
Similarly, as the steps involved in completing the Playmobil® tasks were clearly specified 
in the instruction booklets, it is likely that individuals would have recognised the task 
components when estimating the duration of these tasks. 
In contrast, as less well structured tasks such as anagrams have been employed in 
some previous research (e.g., Buehler et al., 1997), it could be that participants in those 
studies based their time estimates on some kind of non-task information. For example, as 
tasks such as completing a college thesis (Buehler et al,, 1994) were of considerable 
personal importance, participants might have given over-optimistic time predicfions in 
order to bolster self-esteem (Norem & Cantor, 1986a). Likewise, as tasks with a deadline 
were employed in some studies (e.g., Pychyl et al., 2000), over-optimism may have been 
due to participants trying to enhance feelings of self-efficacy (Taylor & Brown, 1988) 
regarding their ability to complete such tasks on time. Since the temporal underestimation 
indicafive of the planning fallacy has been observed on many real world tasks (Buehler et 
al., 1994), it may prove fi^itfiil for ftiture research to determine whether time prediction 
bias differs according to the type of task that is about to be performed. 
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6.4 Strengths and Limitations of the Present Research 
A major strength of the present research is the experimental control of prior task 
experience. Given the key role of distributional information in determining the planning 
fallacy, it is surprising that many of the tasks employed in previous research were ones that 
people had little prior experience of performing. For example, it is unlikely that Buehler et 
al.'s (1994) participants would have possessed prior experience of completing a final year 
college dissertation. Likewise, as income tax forms tend to be completed annually, 
participants in Buehler et al.'s (1997) research may not have been able to recall 
information about their previous task performance because it was not readily available to 
them and thus could not be brought to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
In the present studies however, prior task experience was acquired within a few 
minutes o f performing a target trial. Moreover, by using different versions o f the same 
task, it was possible to vary the amount of prior task experience that participants possessed. 
Taking such steps not only ensured that participants had some prior experience of an 
upcoming task when estimating its duration, but also meant that the amount and type of 
such distributional information was experimentally manipulated. 
Another major strength o f this research is that objective measures of task duration 
were obtained in all studies. In order to examine the accuracy of participants' time 
estimates, it was decided not to employ self-report measures of task duration, which have 
been used in much previous research (e.g., Koole & Van't Spijker, 2000; Newby-Clark et 
al., 2000). The principal reason for not using self-report measures was that participants 
might misremember their completion time or provide inaccurate information regarding the 
duration of the just-completed task. Indeed, it has been shown that retrospective self-
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reported judgements of task performance are often characterised by the inaccurate recall of 
information (Ross, 1989), suggesting that self-reported estimates of task duration might 
also be erroneous. As there was no verification of task duration in previous studies were 
self-report measures were used, the possibility of participants giving incorrect information 
cannot be ruled out. Given this possibility, objective measures of task duration should be 
obtained when conducting research into time estimation. 
The nature of the tasks used here is a potential limitation of the present research. 
Whilst the Tower of Hanoi is undoubtedly an artificial task, it may well also be a novel 
one. Specifically, it seems likely that participants had little or no pre-experimental 
experience of performing this task. Conversely, the Playmobil® tasks comprised many of 
the characteristics of certain everyday activities, suggesting that participants might have 
possessed some prior experience of performing similar kinds of task. However, as the 
Playmobil® tasks were unlikely to have been performed on a regular basis, any prior task 
experience that participants had may have been obtained quite some time before the 
experiment. Thus, in addition to the Tower of Hanoi task, individuals might not have 
possessed any readily available distributional information (FCahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
concerning the Playmobil® tasks prior to their participation in the present research. 
A further potential limitation of the present research is that laboratory tasks were 
used in the nine studies. That is, many factors that can influence task performance and time 
estimation in everyday life do not occur in a laboratory environment. Support for this 
suggestion comes fi-om Buehler et al. (1997), who found that the extent of temporal 
underestimation was less on laboratory tasks compared to everyday activities. Specifically, 
these authors found that, relative to the real worid tasks used in previous research (Buehler 
et al., 1994), the magnitude of temporal underestimation was less on an anagram task that 
they employed. 
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Buehler et al. (1997) explain this finding by suggesting that various factors that can 
impede or delay the completion of real world tasks are absent from laboratory settings. For 
example, the task of collating weekly sales figures could be interrupted by telephone 
enquiries from clients, which may well cause the person to complete this activity later than 
anticipated. Conversely, such distractions rarely occur in the laboratory and the person is 
thus better able to complete the task within the estimated time (Buehler et al., 1997). In a 
similar vein, the present tasks were discrete, that is, participants did not perform other 
activities simultaneously. Hence, in contrast to most real world situations where the 
planning and completion of multiple activities is prevalent (Smith, 1996), participants 
estimated the duration of a single task, which they then performed in isolation, 
6.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
Given that time predictions have been shown to be more accurate when people have 
prior experience of a task (Josephs & Hahn, 1995; see also Experiments 1,4 and 9), the 
issue of expertise should be addressed in future research. Since experts are involved in 
performing many organisational tasks such as project management (Markham, 1997), the 
study of expertise has potential practical implications for everyday time estimation. For 
example, a greater understanding of the conditions under which civil engineers take 
account of their performance on previous similar tasks may be useful in developing 
strategies for reducing costs and overheads on large scale construction projects. Whilst 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that experts tend to be over-optimistic when 
estimating task duration, research in this domain has yet to investigate expert-novice 
differences. However, expertise has been found to improve task performance in areas as 
diverse as sporting prowess (McPherson, 2000; Ste-Marie, 1999) and business acumen 
(Baron, 1998). 
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In the domain of specialist problem solving, the impact of expertise on task 
performance was investigated by Chi et al, (1982). These authors found that experts used 
their more extensive domain-specific knowledge to complete tasks more effectively (e.g., 
to produce faster completion times). Specifically, Chi et al. found that experts (i.e., physics 
professors) solved mechanical physics problems using abstract principles of physics 
derived fi-om implicit knowledge, whereas novices (i.e., physics undergraduate students) 
used explicit information, which was presented in the problem statement. Chi et al, suggest 
that experts and novices use different information processing strategies, which are derived 
fi-om the amount of knowledge accumulated in memory. 
The effects of expertise on the accuracy of judgements of task performance were 
studied by Smith and ICida(!99I). These authors found that, compared to novices (i.e., 
students), experts (i.e., auditors) relied less on cognitive heuristics such as 
representativeness when judging their performance on job-related tasks. Smith and Kida 
suggest that novices' judgements are more susceptible to cognitive heuristics because they 
often perform experimental tasks o f which they have no experience. Given that the 
planning fallacy has been attributed to heuristic information processing, Smith and Kida's 
research provides an empirical basis for studying the role of expertise in relation to 
judgements of task duration. Moreover, given the present findings, expertise may well 
prove to be a fiojitfiil topic for ftiture research in this domain. 
Task deadlines is another issue that could be addressed in fijture research. Whilst 
many real worid tasks are accompanied by deadlines (e.g., college assignments), this issue 
has received little empirical treatment in relation to time estimation. One exception is the 
work of Buehler et al. (1994), which revealed that the extent of temporal underestimation 
was less among participants who were set a deadline for task completion. In a similar vein, 
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the type of task deadline was investigated by Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002), who found 
that procrastination was eliminated when deadlines were self-set rather than externally-
imposed. That is, student participants who set their own deadline for completing a college 
coursework assignment tended to finish the task within the amount of time that they 
predicted. 
As many activities have self-set (e.g., dieting) or externally-imposed deadlines (e.g., 
college coursework assignments), research into this issue has potential implications for 
time estimation in everyday life. For example, the elimination of procrastination observed 
by Ariely and Wertenbroch could translate into a reduction in time prediction bias. Thus, 
temporal misestimation could feasibly be overcome by ensuring that individuals set their 
own deadlines for task completion. Given that financial penalties are associated with the 
late completion of a growing number of organisational projects (Grundy & Brown, 2002), 
fiiture research could investigate whether disincentives for failing to meet a task deadline 
mediate the accuracy of people's time predictions. 
Another potentially fiaiitfiil area for ftiture research is the type of task upon which 
time estimates are based. Whilst previous research has employed various tasks ranging 
from essays (e.g., Josephs & Hahn, 1995) to self-assembly furniture (Byram, 1997), it is 
unclear whether time estimation accuracy differs according to the type of the task that is 
about to be performed. However, time predictions were found to be more accurate on the 
short duration Playmobil® task relative to the three-disk Tower of Hanoi task (Experiment 
8), prompting the suggestion that greater task-related information was available to 
participants on the former task. Given this suggestion, the kind of information upon which 
temporal estimates are based might differ between tasks as diverse as essay writing and 
assembling flat-packed furniture. For example, the step-by-step instructions that 
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accompany self-assembly furniture products provide people with task-related information 
(Byram, 1997), which may well form the basis of their time estimates. 
In contrast, on less well structured activities like essays, information about the nature 
of the task completion process (e.g., the number of major task components) may not be 
available to people when estimating task duration. Thus, temporal estimates might be 
based on information that is extrinsic to the task at hand, such as the number of other 
college coursework assignments that must be completed within a certain period of time. In 
order to address the issue of task type, future research could employ a single task that can 
be completed either with or without the aid of a set of sequential instructions. 
As tasks of varying levels of difficulty are performed in everyday life, the issue of 
task complexity might also prove to be a fiiiitful area for fiiture research. Although there 
was some evidence of time predictions being less biased on more complex versions of the 
Tower of Hanoi task (e.g., Experiment 3), it is not known whether such findings are 
applicable to real world tasks. Given that the impact of task complexity on bias in non-
temporal judgements of task performance is well supported empirically (e.g., Fischhoff & 
MacGregor, 1982; Pulford & Colman, 1997), it could be that this factor also influences the 
accuracy of temporal estimates. Indeed, the existence of the difficulty effect (Griffin & 
Tversky, 1992) provides a sound theoretical basis for studying the role of task complexity 
in relation to temporal judgements. By employing real world tasks that differ in cognitive 
complexity, future research should be well placed to provide information concerning the 
applicability of the difficulty effect to estimates of task duration. 
Given the paucity of previous research into factors that influence time estimation 
bias, it is unsurprising that several recommendations for future work should follow from 
the present studies. Topics such as task complexity, task deadlines and expertise all have 
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potentially important implications for time estimation in everyday life. Moreover, given 
the prevalence of the planning fallacy (Buehler et al., 2002), and the costs associated with 
temporal underestimation on many real worid projects (Grundy & Brown, 2002), there are 
sound practical and theoretical reasons for conducting further research in this domain. 
In order to gain further insight into the kind of task-related information that forms the 
basis of time estimates on the current task, verbal protocols should be obtained in future 
research. Using verbal protocol analyses should also make it possible to determine the 
components of an anchoring and adjustment time estimation strategy. For example, having 
participants verbalise their thoughts would help determine the type of task-related 
information that is responsible for insufficient upward adjustment of time estimates on 
longer duration and more complex tasks. 
6.6 Practical Implications of the Present Research 
Whilst the present research suggests that prior task experience leads to greater time 
prediction accuracy (Experiments 1, 4 and 9), it is not known whether this finding is 
applicable to more everyday kinds of task than the ones used here. I f this finding were to 
generalise to tasks such as college coursework assignments, then the benefits of prior 
experience on time prediction accuracy could be highlighted in study skills courses taught 
within educational institutions. For example, encouraging students to draw upon their 
previous task experience when preparing for examinations and planning the completion of 
assignments might result in better academic performance. Given the changing face of 
higher education (e.g., the introduction of tuition fees), teaching such task planning skills 
might also result in a reduction in student attrition rates, thus benefiting universities as well 
as students. Hence, further research into the effects of prior task experience can potentially 
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aid the development of strategies for improving the accuracy of time predictions in 
everyday life. 
I f the findings of Experiments 3 to 9 are applicable to more everyday kinds of task, 
then people's use of the anchoring and adjustment judgemental heuristics could explain 
why the planning fallacy is evident on many large scale projects. That is, people who 
perform large scale projects will typically have prior experience of undertaking similar but 
less complex tasks. Moreover, as large scale organisational tasks such as major 
construction projects tend to be undertaken only infi^equently (Grundy & Brown, 2002), 
judgements of their duration can only really be based on the shorter duration of previous 
less complex tasks. I f anchoring on the shorter duration of previous less complex tasks 
occurs, then such time estimates would be expected to be optimistically biased. 
Extrapolating fi-om the present research, organisations might benefit fi-om training 
employees to recognise (and avoid using) the cognitive heuristics that contaminate 
judgement and decision making processes. For example, emphasising the prevalence of the 
anchoring and adjustment heuristics might lead to less biased time predictions and the 
attenuation or elimination of the planning fallacy. Whilst the somewhat artificial nature of 
the present tasks renders this suggestion rather speculative, the fact that many everyday 
tasks are also well structured provides support for the potentially important practical 
implications of the present research. Moreover, given that serious consequences are often 
associated with temporal underestimation (e.g., project overrun costs), raising awareness of 
the adverse effects of using cognitive heuristics may well be beneficial in terms of 
improved judgement accuracy. 
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6.7 Theoretical Implications of the Present Research 
Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) theory of the planning fallacy states that temporal 
underestimation is a consequence of attention being focused on singular information at the 
expense of distributional information, which is neglected. In order to identify why the 
planning fallacy occurs, subsequent research has employed various potential debiasing 
techniques including the mode in which time estimates are made (Griffin & Buehler, 1999) 
and the generation of less optimistic mental scenarios of the task completion process 
(Newby-Clark et al., 2000). However, aside from the use of information about personal 
performance on previous tasks (e.g., Buehler et al., 1994), these debiasing techniques have 
not resulted in greater time prediction accuracy (Buehler et al., 2002). 
The present research provides further evidence that the use of information about 
previous personal task performance is a successfijl technique for debiasing estimates of 
task duration. Specifically, time predictions were found to be more accurate when 
participants completed the same task beforehand, suggesting that such distributional 
information was used to good effect. However, the present findings indicate that, under 
certain conditions, people consider erroneous information (e.g., the perceived duration of a 
previous unrelated task), which they use when estimating task duration. 
Unsurprisingly, the use of such incorrect information does not improve time 
prediction accuracy, but leads to temporal underestimation when a current task is of longer 
duration than a previous one. Thus, in contrast to Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) theory 
of the planning fallacy, the present research implies that the neglect of distributional 
information is not a prerequisite for temporal underestimation. Instead, an optimistic time 
prediction bias might be a consequence of engaging in an anchoring and adjustment 
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judgement strategy whereby attention is focused on the perceived duration of a just-
completed shorter task. 
Given the present findings, a possible alternative interpretation of the planning 
fallacy suggests itself That is, an optimistic time prediction bias occurs because people use 
the anchoring and adjustment judgemental heuristics when estimating the duration of a 
longer duration or more complex task. Hence, rather than ignoring distributional 
information, individuals take account of their previous performance on shorter duration or 
simpler tasks, but engage in heuristic information processing when making time 
predictions. 
Whilst it is for future research to determine whether the present findings apply to 
other types of task, temporal underestimation is evident when time predictions are based on 
information concerning personal performance on a previous task. In the light of the present 
research, some modification of Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) theory of the planning 
fallacy may be necessary. Specifically, it is the amount of prior task experience that people 
possess rather than their use of distributional information per se, which determines the 
extent to which their predictions of task duration are biased. 
By experimentally controlling prior task experience, the present research has 
provided a more thorough treatment of the issue of distributional information than has been 
the case in previous studies (e.g., Buehler et al., 1994; Byram, 1997). In addition to 
emphasising the benefits of prior experience of the same task, the consequences of using 
different types of task-related information have been demonstrated. For example, basing 
time predictions on irrelevant information about just-completed shorter duration tasks has 
been shown to lead to temporal underestimation on longer tasks. Conversely, when a 
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substantial part of a current task has just been performed, distributional information can be 
used to improve time prediction accuracy. 
Since the neglect of base rate data is a key determinant of over-optimistic judgements 
of task performance (Lichtenstein et al., 1982), an in-depth analysis of the issue of 
distributional information is likely to enhance our understanding of the planning fallacy. 
However, given the prevalence of temporal underestimation both inside and outside of the 
laboratory, it is surprising that the components of the planning fallacy are somewhat i l l -
specified. That is, the nature of singular and distributional information is poorly 
understood. Although there has been considerable empirical evidence of the planning 
fallacy (e.g., Newby-Clark et al., 2000), the present research indicates that temporal 
underestimation is not just a matter of neglecting distributional information, but may also 
be a consequence of using the wrong kind of information about personal performance on 
previous tasks. 
In the light of the present research, it could be that no single explanation of the 
planning fallacy exists, and that contextual factors such as the amount and type of prior 
task experience are responsible for the occurrence of optimistically biased time predictions. 
Whilst it is for future research to determine the exact components of this cognitive 
judgement phenomenon, the present studies have gone some way to identifying the 
conditions under which people use information about their previous task performance to 
good effect (i.e., to improve time prediction accuracy). 
As it has been shown that temporal misestimation is reduced when people have prior 
experience of performing a longer duration but unrelated task (i.e., the seven-disk Tower of 
Hanoi task), the role of singular information in determining the planning fallacy may need 
to be reconsidered in the light of the present research. I f the findings of Experiment 9 
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generalise to tasks where temporal underestimation prevails, then a further amendment to 
Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) theory of the planning fallacy suggests itself. 
Specifically, using singular information does not necessarily lead to an optimistic time 
prediction bias, but can improve judgement accuracy when information about the task at 
hand is acquired immediately before a temporal estimate is given and task performance 
occurs. 
Alternatively, singular information might only be used to good effect when people 
possess little or no knowledge of the duration of the previous task, that is, when a more 
complex task has just been performed. In such instances, people may think about the 
amount of work involved in completing the current task, and base their time estimates on 
such singular information. On the basis of previous research (e.g., Sniezek et a l , 1990), 
such cognitive processing of task-related information would be expected to result in more 
accurate predictions of task performance. Whatever the potential modifications to 
Kahneman and Tversky's theory of the planning fallacy, it is clear that this cognitive 
judgement phenomenon is not merely a consequence of attention being focused on case-
specific information at the expense of distributional information, which is neglected. 
6.8 Conclusion 
The present research programme has perhaps raised many more questions than it has 
answered: Will the same findings occur with other tasks? Does the temporal interval 
between the performance of previous and current tasks mediate time prediction bias? Is the 
planning fallacy a consequence of using an anchoring and adjustment temporal judgement 
strategy? 
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Whilst it is for fijture research to answer these questions, the present studies provide 
compelling evidence that the planning fallacy is not as pervasive a cognitive judgement 
phenomenon as previously thought. Hence, the sources of its absence and indeed reversal 
on laboratory (and perhaps, real world) tasks are in need of further study. Moreover, the 
potentially important role of task duration rather than cognitive complexity in explaining 
the general overestimation of time on very short duration tasks is a topic worthy of further 
investigation. 
This research programme has also demonstrated the importance of prior task 
experience in mediating time estimation bias, thus emphasising the need to understand the 
way in which such distributional information can be used to improve temporal prediction 
accuracy. Given the costs of misestimating the duration of many major projects and the 
potential gains of accurately estimating task completion times, there is an obvious need to 
more fully understand these effects. 
Although the present studies have gone some way to enhancing our understanding o f 
factors that can influence time prediction accuracy, the fact that this thesis was completed 
almost two months later than was initially anticipated provides an apposite example of 
temporal underestimation on complex and long duration tasks. Given the present findings, 
a plausible explanation for this over-optimism is that, having only undertaken similar but 
less complex tasks previously (e.g., writing journal articles), the author had little prior 
knowledge of the amount of work involved in writing a doctoral thesis, and thus possessed 
insufficient information about the nature of this task when estimating its duration. 
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Appendix 1: Test Statistics From Experiment 1 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Time 9.360 1 9.360 38.367 .000 
Time* Task 
Experience 
2.631 2 1.316 5.392 .007 
Error (Time) 13.906 57 .244 
Task 
Experience 
13.355 2 6.667 13.106 .000 
Error (Task 
Experience) 
29.041 57 .509 
Levene Tests 
F df 1 d f 2 Sig. 
Log Time 
Prediction 
1.417 2 57 .251 
Log 
Completion 
Time 
4.067 2 57 .022 
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Appendix 1 (Continued): 
Scheffe Tests 
Task Experience Conditions Mean Difference Sig. 
No Experience 
Mental Plaiming .802 .000 
Active Practice .537 .006 
Mental Planning 
No Experience -.802 .000 
Active Practice -.265 .260 
Active Practice 
No Experience -.537 .006 
Mental Planning .265 .260 
LSD t-tests (Following Time*Experience Interaction) 
Predicted vs. 
Actual Time 
(Log Data) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
No 
Experience 
Condition 
.275 .611 1.109 19 .302 
Mental 
Planning 
Condition 
.967 .857 5.049 19 .000 
Active 
Practice 
Condition 
.434 .597 3.252 19 .004 
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Appendix 2: Test Statistics From Experiment 2 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the Data From the First Task 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Time 1.584 1 1.584 5.265 .025 
Time*Experience 2.225 1 2.225 7.395 .008 
Time*Task 1.662 1 1.662 5.525 .022 
Time*Task*Experience 1.271 1 1.271 4.223 .041 
Error (Time) 18.652 62 .301 
Experience 6.770 1 6.770 10.477 .002 
Task 62.229 1 62.229 96.308 .000 
Task* Experience .060 1 .060 .093 .762 
Error 
(Task* Experience) 
40.061 62 .646 
Levene Tests 
F df 1 d f 2 Sig. 
Log Time 
Prediction 
.228 3 62 .876 
Log 
Completion 
Time 
.943 3 62 .425 
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Appendix 2 (Continued): 
LSD t-tests (Following Task*Time Interaction) 
Predicted vs. 
Actual Time 
(Log Data) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
3-disk Task 4.402 .682 3.704 32 .001 
4-disk Task .007 .936 .936 32 .968 
LSD t-tests (Following Task*Time*ExDerience Interaction) 
Predicted vs. 
Actual Time 
(Log Data) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation t 
df Sig. 
3-disk Task 
(Mental 
Planning 
Condition) 
.2158 .689 1.739 16 .103 
4-disk Task 
(Mental 
Planning) 
-.2642 .913 -1.554 16 .157 
3-disk Task 
(No 
Experience 
Condition) 
.6372 .671 3.408 15 .004 
4-disk Task 
(No 
Experience 
Condition) 
.4362 .808 2.324 15 .031 
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Appendix 2 (ContinuedV 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the Data From the Second Task 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Time 4.015 1 4.015 12.631 .001 
Time* Experience .199 1 .199 .627 .431 
Time*Task 8.079 1 8.079 25.414 .000 
Time*Task*Experience .401 1 .401 1.261 .266 
Error (Time) 19.710 62 .318 
Experience 5.431 1 5.431 15.316 .000 
Task 34.031 1 34.031 95.972 .000 
Task* Experience 1.114 1 1.114 3.141 .081 
Error 
(Task* Experience) 
21.985 62 .355 
Levene Tests 
F df 1 d f 2 Sig. 
Log Time 
Prediction 
.970 3 62 .413 
Log 
Completion 
Time 
7.237 3 62 .000 
248 
Appendix 2 (Continued): 
LSD t-tests (Following Task*Time Interaction) 
Predicted vs. 
Actual Time 
(Log Data) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
3-disk Task .850 .748 6.529 32 .000 
4-disk Task -.145 .843 -.989 32 .330 
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Appendix 3: Test Statistics From Experiment 3 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the Data From the First Task 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Time .687 1 .687 2.111 .150 
Time*lncentive .011 1 .011 .149 .861 
Time*Task .584 1 .584 1.795 .184 
Time*Task* Incentive 1.073 2 .573 1.649 .198 
Error (Time) 30.272 93 .326 
Incentive 2.322 2 1.161 1.649 .198 
Task 115.447 1 115.447 163.943 .000 
Task* Incentive .045 2 .023 .032 .968 
Error (Task*Incentiye) 65.489 93 .704 
Levene Tests 
F df 1 d f 2 Sig. 
Log Time 
Prediction 
.713 5 93 .615 
Log 
Completion 
Time 
5.305 5 93 .000 
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Appendix 3 (Continued): 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the Data From the Second Task 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Time .031 1 .031 .129 .720 
Time*Incentive .573 2 .286 1.186 .310 
Time*Task 13.136 1 13.136 54.408 .000 
Time*Task* Incentive .636 2 .318 1.317 .273 
Error (Time) 22.454 93 .241 
Incentive .457 2 .228 .429 .653 
Task 92.782 1 92.782 174.165 .000 
Task* Incentive 1.426 2 .713 1.338 .267 
Error (Task*Incentive) 49.543 93 .533 
Levene Tests 
F df 1 d f 2 Sig. 
Log of Time 
Prediction 
.667 5 93 .642 
Log of 
Completion 
Time 
6.964 5 93 .000 
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Appendix 3 (Continued): 
LSD t-tests (Following Task*Time Interaction) 
Predicted vs. 
Actual Time 
(Log Data) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
3-disk Task -.575 .612 -6.576 48 .033 
4-disk Task .494 .832 4.244 49 .000 
Analysis of Variance (ANQVA) on the Completion Time Data 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Task 156.179 1 156.179 723.953 .000 
Task* Incentive .134 2 .007 .310 .735 
Error (Task) 20.710 96 .216 
Incentive 2.545 2 1.272 3.041 .052 
Error (Incentive) 22.454 93 .418 
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Appendix 3 (Continued): 
Levene Tests 
F df 1 d f 2 Sig. 
Log Completion 
Time (3-disk 
Task) 
.224 2 96 .800 
Log Completion 
Time (4-disk 
Task) 
.983 2 96 .378 
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Appendix 4: Test Statistics From Experiment 4 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the Data From the First Task 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Time 8.903 1 8.903 27.886 .000 
Time*Task 12.134 1 12.134 38.004 .000 
Error (Time) 27.374 92 .319 
Task 120.897 1 120.897 226.697 .000 
Error (Task) 49.063 92 .533 
Levene Tests 
F df 1 d f 2 Sig. 
Log Time 
Prediction 
.663 1 92 .418 
Log 
Completion 
Time 
1.889 1 92 .173 
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Appendix 4 Continued): 
LSD t-tests (Following Time*Task Interaction) 
Predicted vs. 
Actual Time 
(Log Data) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
3-disk Task .943 .795 8.069 46 .000 
4-disk Task -.007 .802 -.630 46 .532 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the Data From the Second Task 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig-
Time 6.042 1 6.042 20.920 .000 
Time* Experience 12.134 1 12.134 25.204 .000 
Error (Time) 25.993 92 .289 
Experience 148.269 3 49.423 120.643 .000 
Error (Experience) 36.870 92 .410 
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Appendix 4 Continued): 
Levene Tests 
F df 1 d f 2 Sig. 
Log Time 
Prediction 
1.102 3 90 .353 
Log 
Completion 
Time 
.925 3 90 .432 
Scheffe Tests 
Task Experience Conditions Mean Difference Sig. 
3-disk Task Twice 
5- Then 3-disk Task -.4751 .006 
5-disk Task Twice -2.144 .000 
3- Then 5-disk Task -1.782 .000 
5- Then 3-disk Task 
3-disk Task Twice .457 .006 
5-disk Task Twice -1.669 .000 
3- Then 5-disk Task -1.306 .000 
5-disk Task Twice 
3-disk Task Twice 2.144 .000 
5- Then3-disk Task 1.669 .000 
3- Then 5-disk Task .363 .068 
3- Then 5-disk Task 
3-disk Task Twice 1.782 .000 
5- Then 3-disk Task 1.310 .000 
5-disk Task Twice -.363 .068 
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Appendix 4 Continued): 
LSD t-tests (Following Time*Experienc€ Interaction) 
Predicted vs. 
Actual Time 
(Log Data) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
3-disk Task 
Twice 
Condition 
.434 .793 2.683 23 .013 
5- Then 3-
disk Task 
Condition 
1.417 .678 10.250 23 .000 
5-disk Task 
Twice 
Condition 
-.001 .784 -.053 22 .959 
3- Then 5-
disk Task 
Condition 
-.409 .781 -2.509 22 .020 
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Appendix 5: Test Statistics From Experiment 5 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the Data From the First Task 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Time 2.333 1 2.333 21.391 .000 
Time*Task 1.530 1 1.530 14.033 .000 
Error (Time) 5.235 48 .109 
Task 75.884 1 75.884 501.718 .000 
Error (Task) 7.260 48 .151 
Levene Tests 
F df 1 d f 2 Sig. 
Log Time 
Prediction 
.492 1 48 .486 
Log 
Completion 
Time 
.412 1 48 .524 
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Appendix 5 (Continued): 
LSD t-tests (Following Time*Task Interaction) 
Predicted vs. 
Actual Time 
(Log Data) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
3-disk Task .553 .494 5.593 24 .000 
5-disk Task .004 .442 .479 24 .637 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the Data From the Second Task 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Time 1.969 1 1.969 16.597 .000 
Time*Task 5.795 1 5.795 48.838 .000 
Error (Time) 5.682 48 .119 
Task 65.624 1 65.624 424.125 .000 
Error (Task) 7.4327 48 .155 
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Appendix 5 (Continued): 
Levene Tests 
F df 1 d f 2 Sig. 
Log Time 
Prediction 
.764 1 48 .386 
Log 
Completion 
Time 
1.306 1 48 .259 
LSD t-tests (Following Time*Task Interaction) 
Predicted vs. 
Actual Time 
(Log Data) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
3-disk Task .762 .517 7.368 24 .000 
5-disk Task -.201 .454 -2.212 24 .037 
Independent-Groups t-test on Time Predictions (Log Transformed) From the 3-disk Task 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
First Trial 3.960 .521 
.239 48 .812 
Second Trial 3.995 .534 
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Appendix 6: Test Statistics From Experiment 6 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Time 38.164 1 38.164 625.010 .000 
Time* Order .139 1 .139 2.280 .136 
Error (Time) 3.603 59 .061 
Task .166 1 .166 1.353 .249 
Task* Order .362 1 .362 2.947 .091 
Error (Task) 7.237 59 .123 
Time*Task 3.731 1 3.731 86.654 .000 
Time*Task* Order .197 1 .197 4.575 .037 
Error (Task*Time) 2.540 59 .043 
Order 1.217 1 1.217 3.228 .077 
Error (Order) 22.245 59 .377 
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Appendix 6 (Continued): 
Levene Tests 
F df 1 d f 2 Sig. 
Log 
Prediction 
(Short Task) 
5.291 1 59 .025 
Log 
Completion 
Time 
(Short Task) 
.016 1 59 .900 
Log 
Prediction 
(Long Task) 
.341 1 59 .561 
Log 
Completion 
Time 
(Long Task) 
.013 1 59 .910 
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Appendix 6 (Continued): 
LSD t-tests (Following Time*Task Interaction) 
Predicted vs. 
Actual Time 
(Log Data) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
Short Task .193 .457 3.295 60 .002 
Long Task .300 .368 -6.366 60 .000 
LSD t-tests (Following Time*Task*Order Interaction) 
Predicted vs. 
Actual Time 
(Log Data) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
Short Task 
First 
.061 .509 .671 30 .508 
Short Task 
Second 
.329 .356 5.058 29 .000 
Long Task 
First 
-.279 .404 -5.321 30 .000 
Long Task 
Second 
-.320 .356 -3.786 29 .001 
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Appendix 7: Test Statistics From Experiment 7 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the Data From the Second Task 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Time .284 1 .284 2.517 .117 
Time* Experience 2.076 3 .692 6.122 .001 
Error (Time) 8.591 76 .113 
Experience 269.354 1 89.785 637.662 .000 
Error (Experience) 10.701 76 .141 
Levene Tests 
F df 1 d f 2 Sig. 
Log 
Prediction 
6.413 3 76 .001 
Log Completion 
Time 
1.025 3 76 .386 
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Appendix 7 (Continued): 
Schefife Tests 
Task Experience Conditions Mean Difference Sig. 
Short Then Long 
Long Then Short 3.126 .000 
Medium Then Long -.091 .758 
Long Then Medium .826 .000 
Long Then Short 
Short Then Long -3.126 .000 
Medium Then Long -3.217 .000 
Long Then Medium -2.230 .000 
Medium Then Long 
Short Then Long .091 .758 
Long Then Short 3.217 .000 
Long Then Medium .917 .000 
Long Then Medium 
Short Then Long -.826 .000 
Long Then Short 2.230 .000 
Medium Then Long -.917 .000 
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Appendix 7 (Continued): 
LSD t-tests (Following Time* Experience Interaction) 
Predicted vs. 
Actual Time 
(Log Data) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
Short 
Task 
.321 .651 1.590 19 .128 
Medium 
Task 
.294 .339 3.886 19 .001 
Long Task 
(Short First) 
-.292 .529 -2.466 19 .023 
Long Task 
(Medium 
First) 
.104 .293 1.583 19 .130 
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Appendix 7 (Continued): 
Independent-Groups t-tests on Time Predictions (Log Transformed) From the Short and 
Medium Tasks 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
Short Task 
First 
3.470 .628 
1.674 38 .102 
Short Task 
Second 
3.132 .650 
Medium 
Task First 
5.793 .407 
2.612 38 .013 
Medium 
Task Second 
5.463 .392 
Analvsis of Variance (ANOVA) on the Data From the First Task 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Time 1.212 1 1.212 13.786 .000 
Time* Experience .453 3 .151 1.674 .216 
Error (Time) 6.683 76 .088 
Experience 271.886 3 90.629 464.122 .000 
Error (Experience) 14.840 76 .195 
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Appendix 7 (Continued): 
Levene Tests 
F df I d f 2 Sig. 
Log 
Prediction 
2.526 3 76 .064 
Log Completion 
Time 
1.001 3 76 .397 
Scheffe Tests 
Task Experience Conditions Mean Difference Sig. 
Short Then Long 
Long Then Short -3.205 .000 
Medium Then Long -2.456 .000 
Long Then Medium -3.140 .000 
Long Then Short 
Short Then Long 3.205 .000 
Medium Then Long .749 .000 
Long Then Medium .065 .933 
Medium Then Long 
Short Then Long 2.456 .000 
Long Then Short -.749 .000 
Long Then Medium -.684 .000 
Long Then Medium 
Short Then Long 3.140 .000 
Long Then Short -.065 .933 
Medium Then Long .684 .000 
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Appendix 8: Test Statistics From Experiment 8 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the Data From the Long Plavmobil Task 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Time 4.532 1 4.532 61.814 .000 
Time* Experience .022 1 .022 .302 .585 
Error (Time) 3.959 54 .073 
Experience .000 1 .000 .003 .958 
Error (Experience) 5.965 54 .110 
Levene Tests 
F df 1 d f 2 Sig. 
Log 
Prediction 
.061 1 54 .806 
Log Completion 
Time 
.191 1 54 .664 
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Appendix 8 (Continued): 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the Data From the Short Tasks 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Time 18.064 1 18.064 45.731 .000 
Time*Task 7.746 1 7.746 19.609 .000 
Error (Time) 21.331 54 .395 
Task 10.039 1 10.039 15.556 .000 
Error (Task) 34.851 54 .645 
Levene Tests 
F df 1 d f 2 Sig. 
Log 
Prediction 
.663 1 54 .419 
Log Completion 
Time 
15.562 1 54 .000 
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Appendix 8 (Continued): 
LSD t-tests (Following Task*Time Interaction) 
Predicted vs. 
Actual Time 
(Log Data) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
Short 
Playmobil® 
Task 
.277 .914 1.605 27 .120 
3-disk 
Tower of 
Hanoi Task 
1.329 .863 8.153 27 .001 
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Appendix 9: Test Statistics From Experiment 9 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the Data From the Second Task 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Time .623 1 .623 9.918 .002 
Time*Experience 1.020 3 .340 5.412 .002 
Error (Time) 5.404 86 .063 
Experience 2.861 3 .954 6.489 .001 
Error (Experience) 12.640 86 .147 
Levene Tests 
F df 1 d f 2 Sig. 
Log 
Prediction 
1.268 3 86 .290 
Log Completion 
Time 
5.611 3 86 .001 
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Appendix 9 (Continued): 
SchefFe Tests 
Task Experience Conditions Mean Difference Sig. 
3-disk Task 
6-disk Task .064 .886 
7-disk Task -.085 .776 
Playmobil*" Task .235 .044 
6-disk Task 
3-disk Task .064 .886 
7-disk Task -.021 .996 
3-disk Task ,299 .005 
7-disk Task 
Short Then Long .085 .776 
6-disk Task .021 .996 
PlaymobirTask .320 .003 
Playmobil®Task 
3-disk Task -.235 .044 
6-disk Task -.299 .005 
7-disk Task -.320 .003 
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Appendix 9 (Continued): 
LSD t-tests (Following Time*Experiencc Interaction) 
Predicted vs. 
Actual Time 
(Log Data) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
3-disk Task 
First 
Condition 
-.362 .410 -4.237 22 .000 
6-disk Task 
First 
Condition 
-.120 .238 -2.417 22 .024 
7-disk Task 
First 
Condition 
.012 .409 .133 21 .895 
Playmobir 
Task Twice 
Condition 
-.001 .335 -.008 21 .993 
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Appendix 9 (Continued): 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on the Data From the First Tasks 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Time .347 1 .347 2.705 .104 
Time*Task 15.623 3 5.208 40.541 .000 
Error (Time) 11.047 86 .128 
Task 216.925 3 72.308 164.596 .000 
Error (Task) 37.780 86 .439 
Levene Tests 
F df 1 d f 2 Sig. 
Log 
Prediction 
10.434 3 86 .000 
Log Completion 
Time 
15.072 3 86 .000 
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Appendix 9 (Continued): 
SchefFe Tests 
Task Experience Conditions Mean Difference Sig. 
3-disk Task 
6-disk Task -2.210 .000 
7-disk Task -2.650 .000 
PlaymobirTask -2.610 .000 
6-disk Task 
3-disk Task 2.210 .000 
7-disk Task -.440 .024 
3-disk Task -.399 .050 
7-disk Task 
Short Then Long 2.650 .000 
6-disk Task .440 .024 
Playmobil*^ Task .041 .994 
Playmobil®Task 
3-disk Task 2.610 .000 
6-disk Task .399 .050 
7-disk Task .041 .994 
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Appendix 9 (Continued): 
LSD t-tcsts (Following Time*Task Interaction) 
Predicted vs. 
Actual Time 
(Log Data) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
t df Sig. 
3-disk 
Task 
1.030 .529 9.333 22 .000 
6-disk 
Task 
-.174 .577 -1.443 22 .163 
7-disk 
Task 
-.561 .511 -5.145 21 .000 
Playmobil** 
Task 
-.060 .385 .690 21 .498 
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Appendix 10: Copy of Published Journal Article 
Applied Cognitive Psychology. 17. 6. 655-673 (2003) 
Exploring the Time Prediction Process: The Effects of Task Experience and Complexity on 
Prediction Accuracy 
Kevin E. Thomas, Stephen E. Newstead, and Simon J. Handley 
University of Plymouth, Devon. UK. 
Abstract 
Whilst considerable research shows that people tend to underestimate their task completion 
times, there is little research concerning factors that mediate the time prediction process. In 
Experiments 1 to 3 a simple, well structured task, the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi, showed no 
evidence of underestimation; in fact, participants consistently overestimated the duration of 
this task. However, predictions were more accurate among participants who acquired some 
task experience beforehand. Task complexity was also found to be an important factor 
since the more cognitively complex 4- and 5-disk versions produced less biased 
predictions. Using a cognitively undemanding disk movement task, we found a general 
temporal overestimation in Experiment 4, thus suggesting that task duration might be 
responsible for the general lack of underestimation in the present studies. These results 
have implications for the planning of tasks in everyday life, and also suggest conditions 
under which time prediction accuracy can be improved. 
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Introduction 
At the time of writing, one of the present authors is having a house extension built. 
The initial builder went bankrupt with the project half completed as a result of having 
underestimated the time a previous very large job would take to complete. The current 
builder is now four weeks over the scheduled completion date with no sign of things 
coming to an end. This scenario is a commonplace example of the planning fallacy, which 
is the tendency to underestimate how long a task will take to complete (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). There is no shortage of other examples of temporal underestimation, 
ranging from students failing to complete college assignments on schedule to massive 
delays (and overspend) on government projects such as the Strategic Defence Initiative and 
the Channel Tunnel. 
The consequences of such underestimation can be enormous. At a personal level, the 
ability to effectively plan daily activities and make accurate predictions about task 
performance is of considerable importance in terms of the enhancement of feelings of self-
efficacy and professional and personal achievement (Taylor & Brown, 1988). In the 
workplace, failure to complete a project as planned might lead to loss of rewards (e.g., 
bonus payments) or even job losses and business closure. At governmental level, there may 
be electoral and financial implications of delays. Thus, there are sound practical reasons 
for investigating the time prediction process: Such research not only provides important 
information concerning why so many tasks are completed later than anticipated, but can 
also aid in the development of strategies for improving the accuracy of time predictions. 
The present research focuses on several potentially important factors that might 
mediate the accuracy of people's time predictions. These factors are the cognitive 
complexity, duration and prior experience of tasks that are well structured (i.e., comprise 
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sequential components), and on which objective measures of completion time can be 
obtained (e.g., performed in a laboratory environment). 
The planning fallacy was identified by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), who found 
that experts made over-optimistic lime predictions despite being aware that previous 
similar tasks had taken longer than anticipated. They suggest that two types of data are 
available to task planners: Information that is specific to the task at hand (i.e., singular 
information); and information about previous similar tasks (i.e., distributional 
information). Kahneman and Tversky propose that, when planning a task, people tend to 
focus attention on factors concerning the current task (e.g., amount of work involved) 
rather than on information about why previous tasks were completed later than predicted 
(e.g., unexpected setbacks). Thus people tend to ignore distributional information (e.g., 
performance on previous tasks) and concentrate instead on singular information (e.g., 
unique aspects of the current task), which leads to the construction of mental scenarios 
about how task performance will proceed smoothly. 
The process of predicting task duration has been the focus of much research (e.g., 
Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994; 1995; Byram, 1997; Koole & Van't Spijker, 2000; Newby-
Clark, Ross, Buehler, Koehler, & Griffin, 2000). In these studies participants have 
predicted their completion time on various tasks ranging from assembling furniture 
(Byram, 1997) to submitting a college thesis (Buehler et al., 1994). Findings have 
consistently revealed that predictions are optimistically biased, leading to the conclusion 
that the planning fallacy is a robust cognitive bias applicable to both short (Buehler, 
Griffin, & MacDonald, 1997; Byram, 1997) and long duration tasks (Buehler et al., 1994). 
However, much previous research has not directly addressed the issue of distributional 
information, a major component of the planning fallacy. Specifically, much research (e.g., 
Buehler et al., 1994) has employed tasks that participants had no previous experience of 
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performing (e.g., completing a college thesis), meaning that participants possessed no 
distributional information when predicting task duration. 
To explore the impact of distributional information on prediction accuracy it seems 
prudent for research to employ tasks on which participants have (or can acquire) some 
experience. This issue is addressed in the present research where participants performed 
different versions of the same task, or experienced a task before making a prediction. Such 
measures helped ensure that participants had some kind of information about their 
performance on previous similar tasks when they predicted their completion time. 
Various techniques aimed at debiasing people's time predictions have been examined 
previously, but have not in general been successful in improving prediction accuracy. For 
example, Byram (1997) found that task experience did not reduce prediction bias, as 
participants who viewed task instructions twice before making a prediction were no less 
optimistic than participants who read the instructions once. Byram employed other 
debiasing techniques such as encouraging participants to divide a furniture assembly task 
into discrete portions and predict their completion time for each part, and encouraging the 
listing of potential pitfalls. Neither of these techniques resulted in less biased predictions. 
Byram suggests that people may inaccurately predict task duration because of their 
use of the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). There is empirical support 
for this assertion as it has been demonstrated that predictions tend to be based on 
information about how a task will proceed without impediments (Buehler et al., 1994). 
Thus it seems feasible that people attend to such information because it is available to 
them, and use it as a basis for making a time prediction, Byram also suggests that the use 
of the anchoring and adjustment heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982) might result in a 
-281 
failure to recognise possible setbacks because predictions are anchored on plans of success 
and adjusted accordingly. 
Buehler, MacDonald, and Griffin (1994, as cited in Buehler et al., 1995) found that 
participants anchored on a pre-determined initial prediction and failed to adjust their own 
time estimate accordingly. In the present studies, the impact of the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristics on the time prediction process is explored by manipulating the order 
in which participants perform different versions of the same task. For example, performing 
a longer duration task after a shorter one might result in over-optimism i f the duration of 
the shorter task serves as an anchor for predictions concerning the longer task. 
Although there is compelling empirical evidence that people tend to be over-
optimistic when predicting task duration (e.g., Byram, 1997), several factors that might 
mediate the accuracy of time predictions have not been fully investigated. The present 
research aims to explore several of these factors. Perhaps the most important factors 
concern the effects of the nature of the task, including its cognitive complexity and 
duration. Other important factors might concern people's previous experience of a task. 
These factors will be considered in turn. 
Various factors concerning the task itself have been studied, but seem to have little 
effect in reducing the extent to which time predictions are biased. Previous research has 
used both real life tasks such as writing an essay or completing a tax form, and artificial 
laboratory tasks such as solving anagrams (e.g., Buehler et ai, 1997). As we have seen, 
over-optimism seems to be prevalent in both these contexts. Likewise, the planning fallacy 
appears to be present on tasks ranging in duration from a few minutes (Byram, 1997, Study 
1) to several weeks (e.g., Buehler et al., 1994, Study 1). However, no attempt has been 
made to directly assess the extent of time prediction bias as a function of task duration. 
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Similarly, the impact of the cognitive complexity of a task on time predictions has not been 
investigated previously. 
Interestingly, considerable research (e.g., Fischhoff & MacGregor, 1982; Suantak, 
Bolger, & Ferrell, 1996) has found that people are more overconfident when judging their 
performance on complex (rather than easy) general knowledge test questions, a 
phenomenon known as the difficulty effect (Griffin & Tversky, 1992). Perhaps over-
optimism is more pronounced on cognitively complex tasks because people are unable to 
mentally represent the components necessary for successftil completion when making a 
time prediction. Whatever the reasons for any potential relationship between time 
prediction bias and the cognitive complexity of a task, the existence of the difficulty effect 
emphasises the need to investigate this issue fiirther. 
Many of the tasks used in previous research do not seem to lend themselves to the 
study of the time prediction process. That is, many of the tasks employed do not consist of 
sequential components, thus making it difficult for participants to construct a plan before 
making a prediction (Hayes-Roth, 1980). Whilst some research has employed tasks with 
well defined components that can be performed sequentially (e.g., Byram, 1997, Study 1), 
most other studies have used tasks that are less well structured. For example, Buehler et al. 
(1997, Study 2) used an anagram task, but research by Kelley and Jacoby (1996) suggests 
that such tasks are i l l structured and solved using the intuitive mode of cognition associated 
with insight problems. Thus it seems unlikely that participants in Buehler et al. 's study 
would perceive the components necessary for successftil completion when predicting task 
duration. If, as seems feasible with certain tasks, people cannot construct a plan, it is not 
clear what information they use as a basis for predicting their completion time. 
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It is therefore important for research to use tasks with well defined components to 
investigate whether over-optimistic predictions prevail on such tasks. The need to employ 
well structured tasks is fiirther emphasised by the fact that people perform them in life 
(e.g., cooking a meal fi-om a recipe). Thus, investigating factors that might mediate the 
accuracy of predictions on well structured tasks has potentially important implications for 
improving the calibration of people's everyday temporal judgements. For example, i f prior 
task experience is found to improve the accuracy of predictions on subsequent tasks then 
such findings could be used to help task planners use distributional information to reduce 
prediction bias (e.g., recognising the elements that are common to both previous and 
current tasks). However, i f research is to accurately measure the extent of time prediction 
bias, the need to obtain objective measures of task duration is also paramount. Thus it 
seems prudent to employ a well structured task that is performed in a laboratory 
environment where objective measures of duration can be obtained. 
A classic example of a well structured laboratory task, which has also been the 
subject of research concerning planning processes (e.g., Davies, 2000; Kotovsky, Hayes, & 
Simon, 1985), is the Tower of Hanoi. This task comprises different-sized disks that are 
moved across three vertical pegs to complete a specified pattern using only permitted 
moves. On the basis of previous research (e.g., Byram, 1997) one would expect that 
predictions on this task would be optimistically biased, but this is not yet known. Indeed, 
Lesgold (1988) found that, on well defined problems (i.e., ones with clearly defined initial 
and end states), people were able to form a mental representation of the problem structure 
and the actions needed for successful completion. Thus we might expect predictions on the 
Tower of Hanoi to be more accurate as people have a mental representation of what the 
task entails, whereas on i l l structured tasks predictions might be more biased as people 
cannot construct such a representation. A key aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate the 
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direction (i.e., optimistic or pessimistic) and extent of prediction bias on the Tower of 
Hanoi task. 
The impact of task experience on the time prediction process has also been explored. 
Byram (1997) found no evidence that task experience reduced over-optimism (or improved 
prediction accuracy), but the manipulation used (i.e., briefly viewing the task instructions 
on two separate occasions) may not have been adequate to induce familiarity with the 
origami task. Research into other judgement and decision making processes supports the 
notion that experience (or familiarity) might be an important factor in improving time 
prediction accuracy. 
Research by King, Zechmeister, and Shaughnessy (1980) found that predictions 
concerning the recall of memory test items were more accurate as task experience 
increased. Likewise, Smith and Kida (1991) report that experts' (auditors') judgements 
were fairiy accurate and less biased than those of novices (students). Smith and Kida 
attribute this finding to the experts' greater familiarity with the job-related tasks they 
performed, and suggest that increased task experience yields judgements that are less 
contaminated by cognitive biases and heuristics. In relation to time predictions it seems 
feasible that task experience might equate to distributional information, which could form 
the basis of temporal estimates that are less biased. Thus task experience would appear to 
be a potentially important determinant of time prediction bias and was investigated in 
Experiment 1. 
In Experiment 1 task experience was manipulated by permitting some participants to 
mentally plan or actively practise the Tower of Hanoi task before making a prediction and 
performing a target trial. Consistent with Smith and Kida's findings it was hypothesised 
that task experience would be inversely related to prediction bias. Thus we anticipate that 
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predictions will be more accurate among participants who have some immediate 
experience of the task. 
Experiment 1 
This study examined the accuracy of time predictions on a well structured laboratory 
task, the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi. Task experience was investigated by using three different 
types of experience with the task before completion times were predicted. 
Method 
Participants. Sixty (53 female and 7 male) psychology undergraduates at the 
University of Plymouth participated in partial fulfilment of a course requirement. 
Materials. The Tower of Hanoi task consists of three wooden disks of different sizes 
(with a hole in the middle of each one) and a flat wooden board containing three 
equidistantly-spaced vertical pegs of equal length. In the starting position the three disks 
were stacked in descending order of size on the lef^-hand peg and the aim of the task was 
to transfer them to the same position on the right-hand peg by moving one disk at a time, 
but without placing a larger disk on top of a smaller disk. 
Design and Procedure. A 2 (time: predictions vs. task completion times) x 3 
(experience: active practice vs. mental planning vs. no experience) mixed factorial design 
was used. Participants were tested individually, and af^er being briefed about the 
experimental rationale, were asked to remove their watches and place them out of sight. 
The task instructions were presented, and the researcher demonstrated the permissible and 
nonpermissible disk moves. There then followed a two-minute period that was different for 
the three groups. 
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For the no experience group the Tower of Hanoi apparatus was placed out of sight 
and a word association task (Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1990) was presented. The mental 
planning group were told that they had a short period of time to think about how to 
complete the task, but were instructed not to move any disks during the planning period. 
The active practice group were informed that they had a short period of time to practise 
performing the task before the target trial. All participants in this group completed the task 
at least once during the practice period. Following this two-minute period, the Tower of 
Hanoi apparatus was placed in front of all participants and they were asked to predict how 
much time it would take to complete. Participants then performed the task. Task 
completion time was measured using a stopwatch. Each testing session lasted 
approximately 15 minutes. 
Results 
As a measure of prediction accuracy, prediction discrepancy scores were calculated 
for participants in all experiments. These scores were calculated by subtracting actual from 
predicted time, thus a positive discrepancy score reflected a temporal overestimation 
whereas a negative score reflected a temporal underestimation. Descriptive statistics can be 
seen in Table I . 
The mean discrepancy scores were all positive, suggesting that there was a general 
tendency to overestimate time. The standard deviations indicated considerable variability 
within the data, and Levene tests were significant (p < .05), suggesting a lack of 
homogeneity of variance. Histograms revealed that the prediction and completion time data 
were positively skewed. Thus, these data were subjected to a logarithmic transformation, 
which improved homogeneity of variance and normality of distributions. 
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Table 1 
Predicted and Actual Completion Times, and Discrepancy Scores Per Task Experience 
Condition (in Seconds) 
Actual Time Predicted Time Discrepancy Scores 
21.70 61.65 39.95 
No 
(14.15) (42,77) (39.78) 
Experience 
n = 20 n = 20 n = 20 
14.80 23.90 9.10 
Active 
(56.41) (11.09) (10.81) 
Practice 
n = 20 n = 20 n = 20 
12.25 19.20 6.95 
Mental 
(5.48) (14.78) (12.02) 
Planning 
n = 20 n = 20 n = 20 
Note: The figures given here and in Tables 2 - 4 are means with SDs in parentheses. 
A time (predicted vs. actual) x experience (active practice vs. menial planning vs. no 
experience) mixed design ANOVA produced a main effect of time, F(l,57) = 38.37, MSE 
= .24, p < .001, with predictions (M = 34.92 seconds) exceeding completion times (M = 
16.25 seconds). There was also a main effect of experience, F(l,57) = 13.11, MSE = .51, p 
< .001, with overall time being higher for the no experience group. The interaction was 
also significant, F(2,57) = 5.39, MSE = .24, p < .01, and suggested that the difference 
between actual and predicted time was higher for the no experience group than for the 
other two groups. Planned comparisons (LSD) revealed a significant difference between 
predicted and actual times for the active practice and no experience groups (ps < .05). 
However, there was no significant difference between predicted and actual times for the 
-288-
mental planning group (p > .10). These findings suggest that having some experience of 
the task beforehand resulted in predictions that were less pessimistically biased (i.e., more 
accurate). 
Discussion 
The present results support the hypothesis that task experience is positively related to 
prediction accuracy, a finding consistent with Smith and Kida's (1991) research. 
Participants who mentally planned or actively practised the task before making a prediction 
overestimated their completion time to a lesser extent than participants who undertook an 
unrelated task beforehand. Presumably, participants in the mental planning and active 
practice groups had the opportunity to mentally represent the correct solution of the task 
during the pre-exposure period (Lesgold, 1988), which may have enabled them to make 
predictions that were less biased. 
The pre-exposure period might have given these participants time to consider (and 
reject) potential setbacks that could impede optimal task performance such as incorrectly 
moving a disk. However, those participants without prior experience might have engaged 
in defensive pessimism in order to maintain self-esteem (Norem & Cantor, 1986). Indeed, 
the high variability within the prediction data of the no experience group might suggest 
that these participants provided 'off-the-cuff guesses (Byram, 1997) about task duration. 
There was no evidence of the planning fallacy in participants' time predictions on the 
3-disk Tower of Hanoi task, hi fact, there was a general tendency to overestimate time, a 
finding that contrasts with much previous research (e.g., Buehler et aL, 1994). A possible 
explanation for this finding would appear to be that a relatively simple task was used in the 
present study. The 3-disk Tower of Hanoi task can be correctly completed by making a 
minimum of only seven disk moves, and took on average less than 20 seconds to finish. 
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Thus it was not only a simple task, but was also of much shorter duration than the 
laboratory tasks used previously. For example, Buehler et al. (1997) used laboratory tasks 
that took in excess of five minutes to complete, whereas the duration of the tasks used by 
Byram (1997) ranged from 15 minutes to one hour. As such tasks took more time they 
presumably comprised more components and may have involved greater cognitive effort. 
Participants may have been overconfident (i.e., over-optimistic) on these previous tasks 
because of cognitive processing limitations. 
Support for this assertion comes fi-om Sniezek, Paese, and Switzer (1990), who found 
that overconfidence was reduced when participants were encouraged to consider all 
possible alternative answers to complex multiple choice questions, thus increasing the 
amount of information being cognitively processed. Sniezek et al. suggest that 
overconfidence is positively related to task complexity, and occurs because people are 
unable or unwilling to devote sufficient cognitive resources to predicting their performance 
on more complex test questions. Such research gives credence to the notion that the greater 
complexity of the tasks used in previous studies could be responsible for the general over-
optimism that has been observed previously. 
Experiment 2 
This study fiirther explored the relationship between task experience and prediction 
accuracy on the Tower of Hanoi task. Specifically, all participants performed the 4-disk 
task in addition to the 3-disk, which enabled us to investigate whether experience with a 
different version affects the accuracy of predictions on the second task. Moreover, by using 
the 3- and 4-disk versions we were able to manipulate the cognitive complexity of the task. 
The Tower of Hanoi is well suited to the manipulation of cognitive complexity as different 
versions vary in the number of subgoals, which are established whenever a disk cannot be 
placed in its final location or goal state (cf Goel & Graftnan, 1995). 
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Cognitive complexity also differs because the number of disks that must be moved 
varies between different versions of the task (Davies, 2000). That is, as the number of disks 
increases, people's ability to mentally represent all relevant disk moves is constrained by 
limited working memory capacity, thus increasing the cognitive complexity of the task. For 
example, optimal performance on the 3-disk task involves a minimum of seven disk moves 
whereas the 4-disk version requires a minimum of 15 moves. Thus, the minimum number 
of moves on the 3-disk task can feasibly be retained in working memory whereas this is 
unlikely to be the case with the 4-disk version. 
Consistent with the difficulty effect (Griffin & Tversky, 1992), we predicted a 
relationship between cognitive complexity and the calibration of time predictions. That is, 
time predictions were expected to be less pessimistic (or more accurate) on the more 
complex 4-disk task. Task performance order was manipulated to examine whether the 
anchoring and adjustment heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982) are applicable to the 
time prediction process. It was anticipated that participants would anchor their prediction 
concerning the second task on the duration of the preceding task. Thus, predictions on the 
4-disk task should be over-optimistic when preceded by the 3-disk, whereas predictions on 
the 3-disk should be pessimistic when preceded by the 4-disk. 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-three (29 female and 4 male) students and staff at the University 
of Plymouth participated either in partial fulfilment of a course requirement or for payment 
of £1.50 each. 
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Materials. These were the same as those used previously except that the Tower of 
Hanoi apparatus contained four different-sized disks, with the largest one being removed to 
form the three-disk task. 
Design and Procedure. A 2 (time: predicted vs. actual) x 2 (task: 3-disk vs. 4-disk) x 
2 (order: 3-disk first vs. 4-disk first) mixed factorial design was used. Time and task were 
repeated measures. Participants performed both versions of the task in a fully 
counterbalanced order. Task performance order was manipulated between groups with 
participants being randomly assigned to one of two groups. As the group who mentally 
planned how to complete the 3-disk task made the most accurate predictions in Experiment 
1, this method of task pre-exposure was used for all participants. 
Participants were tested individually, and the instructions and procedure were almost 
identical to those for the mental planning group in Experiment 1. The only difference was 
that two versions of the Tower of Hanoi task were presented. Each testing session lasted 
approximately 15 minutes. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 2. The discrepancy score means on the 3-
disk task were positive, suggesting that time was overestimated. However, on the 4-disk 
task discrepancy scores differed according to task performance order, with time being 
overestimated when this task was performed first, but underestimated when it was 
performed second. 
-292 
Table 2 
Predicted and Actual Completion Times, and Discrepancy Scores Per Task and Task 
Performance Order Condition (in Seconds) 
Actual Time Predicted Time Discrepancy Scores 
14.84 21.24 6.35 
3-disk task first (7.46) (19.79) (16.22) 
n = 17 n = 17 n = 17 
10.06 26.31 16.25 
3-disk task second (2.98) (26.56) (26.17) 
n = 16 n = 16 n = 16 
70.25 109.25 39.00 
4-disk task first (51.78) (80.54) (76.45) 
n = 16 n = 16 n = 16 
86.59 44.29 -42.29 
4-disk task second (45.10) (26.27) (42.76) 
n = 17 n = 17 n = 17 
Because the prediction and completion time data were skewed with high variability, 
they were subjected to a logarithmic transformation. A 2 (task) x 2 (order) x 2 (time) 
mixed design ANOVA produced a main effect of task, F(l,31) = 225.77, MSE = .31, p < 
.001, with overall time being higher on the 4-disk task. The time by order interaction was 
also significant, F(l,31) = 15.01, MSE = .33, p < .01. Planned comparisons (LSD) revealed 
a significant difference between predicted and actual times for the group who performed 
the 4-disk task first (p < .05), but not for the group who performed the 3-disk first (p > 
.10). 
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The task by time interaction was also significant, F(l,31) = 10.99, MSE = .25, p < 
.01, and revealed that the difference between predicted and actual times was greater on the 
3- disk (Ms = 47.55 vs. 24.90 seconds) than on the 4-disk task (Ms = 153.54 vs. 156.84 
seconds). Planned comparisons (LSD) revealed that the difference between predicted and 
actual times was significant on the 3-disk task only (p < .05). Thus it seems that 
predictions were more accurate on the more cognitively complex 4-disk task. Specifically, 
a significant temporal overestimation was evident on the 3-disk task, whereas the tendency 
to underestimate the duration of the 4-disk was not significant. The ANOVA produced no 
other significant interactions or main effects (Fs < 2.50, ps > .10). 
To investigate the effect of task experience on time predictions we analysed the log-
transformed data from the second task only. A 2 (time) x 2 (task) mixed design ANOVA 
produced no significant main effect of time or task (Fs < 2, ps > .10). However, the 
interaction approached significance, F(l,31) = 3.15, MSE = .87, p < .09. This suggested 
that predictions exceeded completion times on the 3-disk task (Ms = 26.31 vs. 10.06 
seconds), whereas completion times exceeded predictions on the 4-disk (Ms = 86.59 vs. 
44.29 seconds). Planned comparisons (LSD) revealed that the difference between predicted 
and actual times was significant on both tasks (p < .05). These findings provide some 
evidence of anchoring effects as predictions were over-optimistic on the 4-disk task when 
preceded by the 3-disk, but were pessimistically biased on the 3-disk when preceded by the 
4- disk. 
Discussion 
Consistent with the findings of Experiment 1, there was evidence of a general 
tendency to overestimate the duration of the 3-disk task in the present study. This effect 
was independent of task performance order, and further supports the notion that time 
predictions on such simple tasks do not seem to be subject to the planning fallacy. There 
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was also evidence that participants were more accurate at predicting the duration of the 4-
disk task, a finding that is consistent with the expected positive relationship between 
prediction calibration and the cognitive complexity of the task. This finding also suggests 
that the difficulty effect (Griffin & Tversky, 1992) might apply to the process of estimating 
task completion times, as participants made less biased predictions on the more complex 
task. 
There was no evidence that previously performing an easier or more complex version 
of the Tower of Hanoi differentially affected the accuracy of dme predictions on the 
second task. However, previous experience seemed to influence the direction in which 
predictions were biased on the second task. Specifically, the planning fallacy was evident 
on the 4-disk task, whereas completion times were generally overestimated on the 3-disk. 
This finding suggests that participants used the anchoring and adjustment heuristics when 
estimating the duration of the second task. That is, participants seem to have used the 
duration of the first task as the basis for their predictions concerning the second task. 
The present findings provide some support for the notion that the planning fallacy 
might be only be evident on tasks that are more cognitively complex than the 3-disk Tower 
of Hanoi. However, the order in which the more complex 4-disk version was performed 
seemed to affect whether or not participants made over-optimistic predictions about the 
duration of this task. The lack of general over-optimism on the 4-disk task could be 
explained by the fact that it still took less time to complete than the laboratory tasks used in 
previous research. Specifically, the 4-disk task took less than two minutes to complete, 
whereas the tasks used previously have taken at least five minutes (e.g., Buehler et aL, 
1997). Thus the 4-disk task may have been too simple to induce overconfidence in 
participants, a notion that is consistent with the difficulty effect. A key aim of Experiment 
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3 was to investigate this issue by increasing the cognitive complexity of the Tower of 
Hanoi task. 
Experiment 3 
This experiment fiirther explored the relationship between cognitive complexity and 
prediction accuracy by employing the 5-disk Tower of Hanoi task alongside the 3-disk 
version. Following the findings of Experiment 2, we anticipated that there would be a 
positive relationship between prediction accuracy and the cognitive complexity of the task. 
Thus the difference between predicted and actual completion times was expected to be 
reduced on the 5-disk task. 
Task performance order was also manipulated, and we hypothesised that predictions 
on the second task would be anchored on the duration of the preceding task. Thus 
predictions should be over-optimistic on the 5-disk task when preceded by the 3-disk, 
whereas predictions should be more pessimistic on the 3-disk task when preceded by the 5-
disk. Task experience was also manipulated, and involved some participants performing 
the same Tower of Hanoi task twice, whilst others performed both the 3- and 5-disk 
versions. It was predicted that experience with the same (as opposed to a different) version 
would improve prediction accuracy on the second task. Thus predictions on the 5-disk task 
should be more accurate when performed for a second time rather than when preceded by 
the 3-disk. Likewise, predictions should be more accurate on the 3-disk task when 
preceded by the 3-disk rather than the 5-disk. 
Method 
Participants. 
Ninety-four (88 female and 6 male) psychology undergraduates at the University of 
Plymouth participated voluntarily in partial ftilfilment of a course requirement. 
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Materials. 
These were the same as those used previously except that the Tower of Hanoi 
apparatus contained five different-sized disks, with the two largest being removed to form 
the 3-disk task. 
Design and Procedure. 
A 2 (time: predicted vs. actual) x 2 (task: first vs. second) x 4 (experience: 3-disk 
twice vs. 5-disk twice vs. 3- then 5-disk vs. 5- then 3-disk) mixed factorial design was 
used. Time and task were repeated measures. The order in which tasks were performed was 
determined by random assignment to a level of the task experience factor. Task experience 
was manipulated between groups with participants being randomly assigned to one of four 
groups. 
The experimental procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 2 except that 
participants had only 20 seconds (after reading the task instructions) to make a prediction 
on each task. Each testing session lasted approximately 20 minutes. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 3. The majority of discrepancy score 
means were positive, suggesting that there was a general tendency to overestimate time. 
However, there was evidence that participants used the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristics when predicting their completion time on the second task. The largest 
underestimation occurred on the 5-disk task when preceded by the 3-disk, whereas the 
largest overestimation occurred on the 3-disk task when preceded by the 5-disk. 
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Table 3 
Predicted and Actual Completion Times, and Discrepancy Scores Per Task and Task 
Experience Condition (in Seconds) 
First Task Second Task 
Actual Predicted Discrepancy Actual Predicted Discrepancy 
Time Time Scores Time Time Scores 
32.71 93.54 60.83 19.17 30.63 11.46 
3-disk task 
(23.11) (49.88) (57.17) (13.93) (22.33) (27.51) 
twice 
n = 24 n = 24 n = 24 n = 24 n = 24 n = 24 
5-disk task 248.75 243.96 -4.97 18.00 82.50 64.50 
then (135.14) (169.01) (189.03) (10.03) (52.29) (50.88) 
3-disk task n = 24 n = 24 n = 24 n = 24 n = 24 n = 24 
247.22 268.70 21.48 203.87 204.57 0.70 
5-disk task 
(109.18) (160.41) (155.86) (117.57) (121.85) (140.49) 
twice 
n = 23 n = 23 n = 23 n = 23 n = 23 n = 23 
3-disk task 31.09 71.96 40.87 169.39 120.22 -47.19 
then (19.66) (46.65) (44.14) (85.17) (77.00) (11.28) 
5-disk task n = 23 n = 23 n = 23 n = 23 n = 23 n = 23 
Because the prediction and completion time data were skewed with considerable 
variability they were subjected to a logarithmic transformation. The task experience 
hypothesis was tested by analysing the log-transformed data fi-om the second task only. A 
2 (time) x 4 (experience) mixed design ANOVA produced a main effect of time, F(3,90) = 
20.92, MSE = .29, p < .001, with predictions (M = 109.48 seconds) exceeding completion 
times (M = 102.61 seconds). There was also a main effect of experience, F(3,90) = 120.64, 
MSE = .41, p < .001. LSD (t-test) pairwise comparisons revealed that overall time was 
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significantly shorter for the two groups who performed the 3-disk task (ps < .05). The 
interaction was also significant, F(3,90) = 25.20, MSE = .29, p < .001. This revealed that, 
on the 5-disk task, there was evidence of underestimation among the 3- then 5-disk group 
only, whereas completion times tended to be overestimated by both groups who performed 
the 3-disk task. 
Planned comparisons (LSD) on the 5-disk task data revealed a significant difference 
between predicted and actual times for the 3- then 5-disk group only (p < .05). However, 
on the 3-disk task, the difference between predicted and actual times was greater for the 5-
then 3-disk group (p < .01) than for the group who performed the task twice (p < .05). 
Taken together, these findings are consistent with the task experience hypothesis, as 
participants who performed the same task twice tended to predict the duration of the 
second task more accurately than participants who undertook a different task initially. 
Likewise, these findings support the anchoring hypothesis, as predictions seem to be 
anchored on the duration of the preceding task. Specifically, predictions on the 3-disk were 
more pessimistic when this task was preceded by the 5-disk, whereas predictions on the 5-
disk task were over-optimistic only when the 3-disk was performed first. 
The cognitive complexity hypothesis was tested by analysing the log-transformed 
data fi-om the first task only. These data were partially collapsed across task experience and 
performance order by combining the two groups who performed the 3- or 5-disk task. A 2 
(time) X 2 (task) mixed design ANOVA produced a main effect of time, F(3,90) = 27.87, 
MSE = .32, p < .001, with predictions (M = 169.54 seconds) exceeding completion times 
(M = 139.94 seconds). There was also a main effect of task, F(3,90) = 226.70, MSE = .53, 
p < .001, with overall time being lower on the 3-disk. The interaction was also significant, 
F(3,90) = 38.00, MSE = .32, p < .001, and revealed that completion times were 
overestimated to a greater extent on the 3-disk task. Planned comparisons (LSD) revealed a 
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significant difference between predicted and actual times on the 3-disk task (p < .05), but 
not on the 5-disk (p > .10). These findings suggest that cognitive complexity is positively 
related to prediction accuracy, as predictions were more accurate on the 5-disk task. 
Discussion 
Consistent with the task experience hypothesis, we found that predictions on the 
second task were more accurate when participants had previously performed the same 
(rather than a different) version of the Tower of Hanoi. I f participants were able to 
mentally represent the task components whilst performing the first task, it seems likely that 
such a representation would form the basis of their second time prediction. Thus one would 
expect participants who performed the same task twice to be fairly accurate when 
predicting their completion time on the second task. Likewise, i f some kind of mental 
representation was constructed, participants who performed different versions of the Tower 
of Hanoi should base their second prediction on the duration of the just-completed task. 
There is empirical support for this assertion, as we found that the direction in which 
predictions were biased on the second task differed according to the cognitive complexity 
of the first task. This finding suggests that participants used the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristics when predicting the duration of the second task. Consistent with the anchoring 
hypothesis, we found that predictions on the 5-disk task were over-optimistic only when 
preceded by the 3-disk, whereas predictions were more pessimistic on the 3-disk task when 
preceded by the 5-disk rather than the 3-disk. 
The present findings suggest that completion times were predicted with greater 
accuracy on the more complex 5-disk task. However, in relation to the first task, there was 
a general tendency to overestimate time, which was more pronounced on the 3-disk task. 
As was the case in Experiment 2 we found no evidence of general over-optimism on the 
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more complex version of the Tower of Hanoi. In fact, the planning fallacy was only 
evident on the 5-disk task when it was preceded by the 3-disk. 
Task duration could explain the disparity between the present findings and those of 
previous research where the planning fallacy was evident (e.g., Byram, 1997). Specifically, 
whilst the average duration of the 5-disk task was more than twice that of the 4-disk in 
Experiment 2 (Ms = 217.31 vs. 78.42 seconds respectively) it still took less time than the 
laboratory tasks used previously. Thus the 5-disk task might have been too short to induce 
feelings of overconfidence in participants. Likewise, i f duration is a positive fiinction of 
the cognitive complexity of the task, the absence of over-optimism could be due to 
participants' ability (or willingness) to devote sufficient cognitive resources to the process 
of predicting the duration of the 5-disk task (Sniezek et al., 1990). Whatever the reasons 
there is further evidence that prediction accuracy is positively related to task complexity, a 
finding that suggests that the difficulty effect might be applicable to the time prediction 
process. 
Experiment 4 
Thus far, we have assumed that the difference between the 3-disk task and the 4-disk 
and 5-disk task is one of cognitive complexity. However, as the latter task also take more 
time to complete it is possible that duration alone can explain the present findings. This 
study investigated whether the duration or cognitive complexity of the task is responsible 
for the general tendency to overestimate time on well structured laboratory tasks such as 
the Tower of Hanoi. To achieve this goal we examined the accuracy of predictions on a 
repetitive manual disk movement task, which used the same apparatus as the 3- and 5-disk 
tasks. Unlike the Tower of Hanoi there were few restrictions on disk movement in the 
repetitive task, which is thus cognitively undemanding and simple to perform. Moreover, 
because there are few restrictions on disk movement (e.g., larger disks can be placed on top 
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of smaller disks) there is no need for participants to create subgoals in order to complete 
either version of this task. Thus the two repetitive tasks do not vary in cognitive 
complexity but differ only in the amount of time needed for successftil completion. 
I f cognitive complexity is an important factor in determining the time prediction 
process, participants might be over-optimistic about their ability to complete such a simple, 
repetitive task. Alternatively, i f task duration is an important factor, then the same general 
temporal overestimation will be found with this task as was found with the Tower of Hanoi 
in Experiments 1 to 3. Task performance order was also manipulated to explore whether 
participants used the anchoring and adjustment heuristics when predicting the duration of 
the second task. 
The repetitive task involved moving the disks one at a time fi-om the left-hand peg to 
the centre peg to the right-hand peg and back again in reverse order. This process was 
repeated until all disks had been placed on the pegs a certain number of times. The two 
repetitive tasks were designed to be of similar duration to the 3- and 5-disk Tower of Hanoi 
tasks (when performed first) in Experiment 3 (Ms = 31.90 and 247.99 seconds 
respectively). These mean completion times served as a benchmark for the number of pegs 
on which the disks had to be placed. A pilot study indicated that eight pegs could be 
covered in 32 seconds on the 3-disk task, whereas 36 pegs could be covered in 248 seconds 
on the 5-disk. Thus these were the criteria for successful task completion. 
Method 
Participants. 
Fifty (44 female and 6 male) psychology undergraduates at the University of 
Plymouth participated voluntarily in partial ftilfilment of a course requirement. 
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Materials. 
These were identical to those used in Experiment 3. 
Design and Procedure. 
A 2 (time: predicted vs. actual) x 2 (task: 3-disk vs. 5-disk) x 2 (order: 3-disk first vs. 
5-disk first) mixed factorial design was used. Task and time were repeated measures, 
whereas task performance order was manipulated between groups. The experimental 
procedure was identical to that of Experiment 3 except that the researcher recorded the 
number of pegs on which disks were stacked, and told participants when each task was 
completed. Each testing session lasted approximately 20 minutes. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 4. The majority of discrepancy score 
means were positive, suggesting that there was a general tendency to overestimate time. 
This overestimation was greatest on the 3-disk task when preceded by the 5-disk, whereas 
over-optimism was only evident on the 5-disk task when preceded by the 3-disk. Thus it 
seems that participants used the anchoring and adjustment heuristics when predicting time 
on the second task. However, as there was no general evidence of the planning fallacy it 
seems that task duration (rather than cognitive complexity) is responsible for the general 
temporal overestimation on such laboratory tasks. 
Because the prediction and completion time data were skewed with high variability 
they were subjected to a logarithmic transformation. To explore the issue of cognitive 
complexity versus task duration we analysed the log-transformed data fi"om the first task 
only. A 2 (time) x 2 (task) mixed design ANOVA produced a main effect of time, F(l ,48) 
= 21.39, MSE = .11, p < .001, with predictions (M = 157.60 seconds) exceeding 
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completion times (M = 129.42 seconds). There was also a main effect of task, F(l,48) = 
501.72, MSE = .16, p < .001, with overall time being higher on the 5-disk task. The 
interaction was also significant, F(l,48) = 14.04, MSE = .11, p < .001, and suggested that 
completion times were overestimated to a greater extent on the 3-disk task. Planned 
comparisons (LSD) revealed that predictions were significantly higher than completion 
times on the 3-disk task (p < .05), but not on the 5-disk (p > .10). 
Table 4 
Predicted and Actual Completion Times, and Discrepancy Scores Per Task and Task 
Performance Order Condition (in Seconds) 
Actual Time Predicted Time Discrepancy Scores 
30.48 59.60 29.12 
3-disk task first (4.62) (30.92) (29.92) 
n = 25 n = 25 n = 25 
26.08 63.20 37.12 
3-disk task second (6.72) (41.05) (40.61) 
n = 25 n = 25 n = 25 
228.36 255.60 27.24 
5-disk task first (47.44) (106.46) (108.62) 
n = 25 n = 25 n = 25 
210.68 184.00 -26.68 
5-disk task second (38.89) (74.89) (83.12) 
n = 25 n = 25 n = 25 
To investigate the impact of task performance order on prediction accuracy we 
analysed the log-transformed data fi-om the second task only. A 2 (time) x 2 (task) mixed 
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design ANOVA produced a main effect of time, F(l,48) = 16.60, MSE = .12, p < .001, 
with predictions (M = 123.60 seconds) exceeding completion times (M = 118.38 seconds). 
There was also a main effect of task, F(l,48) = 424.13, MSE = .16, p < .001, with overall 
time being higher on the 5-disk task. The interaction was also significant, F(l,48) = 48.84, 
MSE = .12, p < .001, and suggested that predictions exceeded completion times on the 3-
disk task, whereas predictions were lower than completion times on the 5-disk. Planned 
comparisons (LSD) revealed a significant difference between predicted and actual times on 
both tasks (ps < .05). These findings are consistent with the anchoring hypothesis, as 
predictions on the 5-disk task should be over-optimistic i f based on the shorter duration of 
the just-completed 3-disk. Likewise, predictions on the 3-disk task should be 
pessimistically biased i f anchored on the longer duration of the just-completed 5-disk. 
Discussion 
The present findings suggest that task duration rather than cognitive complexity is 
responsible for the general overestimation of time on such laboratory tasks. In general, 
participants tended to make pessimistically biased predictions about the duration of this 
repetitive disk movement task, which suggests that the absence of the planning fallacy here 
could be due to the shorter duration of the tasks used in the present studies. 
These findings also indicate that participants used the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristics when predicting the duration of the second task. Specifically, predictions on the 
3-disk task were pessimistically biased when preceded by the 5-disk, whereas predictions 
on the 5-disk task were over-optimistic when preceded by the 3-disk. The latter finding 
suggests that the planning fallacy was evident on the 5-disk task, but is mediated by the 
order in which this task is performed. Thus there is evidence that completion times were 
underestimated only when participants had just performed a shorter duration version of the 
repetitive disk movement task. 
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General Discussion 
The present findings provide a remarkably consistent picture concerning the process 
of predicting the duration of the Tower of Hanoi task. It is clear that, on the 3-disk version, 
the planning fallacy does not occur and is in fact reversed. In Experiments 1, 2, and 3 (and 
indeed in every cell in every condition in these experiments) participants overestimated the 
amount of time that this task would take to complete. This simple finding is of 
considerable importance since the planning fallacy has previously been found in virtually 
all published studies and with a variety of different tasks. It indicates that the planning 
fallacy is not as prevalent as previously suspected, and that there is at least one task on 
which it definitely does not occur. 
We suspect that what makes the 3-disk task different to those tasks that have been 
used in previous research is its simplicity. It can be performed in a few seconds, involves a 
minimum of only seven disk moves, and has a very well defined structure. Support for this 
notion comes from Experiments 2 and 3, which used the 4- and 5-disk versions of the 
Tower of Hanoi. Although these tasks are still well structured they involve more than twice 
(4-disk) or four times (5-disk) as many minimum disk moves as the 3-disk version. In 
Experiments 2 and 3 we found consistent evidence that the amount of temporal 
overestimation was significantly reduced on these more cognitively complex tasks. Thus it 
seems that the cognitive complexity of the task is an important factor in the time prediction 
process, and there is evidence that the difficulty effect (Griffm & Tversky, 1992) 
generalises to people's judgements of their task completion times. 
There was also evidence that in general participants tended to overestimate the 
duration of all versions of the Tower of Hanoi task. Likewise, there was a tendency for 
participants to overestimate the duration of the 3- and 5-disk versions of the simple 
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rq^etitive task used in Experiment 4. Taken together, these findings suggest that people 
tend to make pessimistically biased predictions on well structured tasks, which range in 
duration from less than 15 seconds to four minutes. However, there was a hint of the 
planning fallacy in Experiments 2, 3, and 4, but participants' over-optimism seemed to be 
mediated by the order in which they performed the 4- and 5-disk tasks. That is, participants 
tended to underestimate their completion times on these tasks only when they had 
performed either the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi or the 3-disk repetitive task beforehand. 
Our experiments also demonstrate that task experience is an important determinant of 
the time prediction process. In fact, we have investigated two distinct types of task 
experience. Firstly, we examined the effects of task practice on prediction accuracy 
(Experiment 1), and found that two minutes mentally planning or actively practising the 3-
disk Tower of Hanoi led to less temporal overestimation. In other words, having the 
opportunity to acquire some kind of experience of this task increased the accuracy of 
participants' time predictions. 
Secondly, in Experiment 3 we examined the effects of previous experience with the 
same or a different version of the Tower of Hanoi, and found that predictions were more 
accurate on the second task when it was identical to the first task. It seems feasible that 
acquiring prior task experience enabled these participants to mentally represent what the 
task entailed, which resulted in them making a more realistic single (Experiment 1) or 
second prediction (Experiment 3). Similarly, in Experiments 2 and 3 we found that 
previous experience of an easier or more difficult version of the Tower of Hanoi affected 
the direction in which predictions were biased on the second task. This effect was also 
evident in Experiment 4, suggesting that the duration of the first repetitive task affected the 
direction of prediction bias on the second version of this task. 
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The latter findings suggest that participants used the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristics (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982) when predicting the duration of the second task. 
In relation to the time prediction process, evidence of anchoring effects impHes that 
participants based their predictions about their task performance on what happened on the 
just-completed task. Thus those participants who performed the 3-disk Tower of Hanoi or 
the 3-disk repetitive task second tended to overestimate their completion times even more, 
and participants who performed the 4- and 5-disk tasks second tended to underestimate 
time. In fact, the only real evidence of the planning fallacy in the present studies occurred 
on the 4- and 5-disk tasks when they were preceded by the 3-disk tasks. Specifically, in 
Experiments 2, 3, and 4, prior performance of the 3-disk tasks led to an underestimation of 
how long the 4- and 5-disk tasks would take to complete. 
i f the present findings are applicable to more everyday tasks then people's use of 
the anchoring and adjustment heuristics could explain why the planning fallacy is evident 
on many large scale projects. That is, people who perform large scale projects will 
typically have previous experience of undertaking similar but less complex tasks. 
Moreover, as large scale projects (e.g., the Channel Tunnel) are inevitably undertaken only 
infi-equently, estimates of their duration can only really be based on the duration of similar 
but less complex (or shorter duration) tasks. I f anchoring on the duration of less complex 
tasks occurs, such estimates will inevitably err on the side of optimism. 
Extrapolating fi-om the present findings, organisations might thus benefit fi'om 
training employees to overcome the various cognitive biases that contaminate the decision 
making process. For example, highlighting the prevalence of the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristics might lead to less biased predictions and the attenuation or elimination of the 
planning fallacy. Although the somewhat artificial nature of the present tasks makes this 
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assertion rather speculative, the fact that many everyday tasks are also well structured 
provides support for the potentially important practical implications of the present findings. 
Our experiments also seem to highlight the importance of distributional information 
in the time prediction process; that is, the effect of task experience on prediction accuracy. 
We found that predictions were more accurate when participants had some prior 
experience of the same task (Experiments 1 and 3), suggesting that these participants might 
have used distributional information (e.g., previous performance on the same task) to good 
effect. However, the immediacy with which task experience was acquired could explain 
why these participants made more accurate predictions. For example, when predicting the 
duration of the second task in Experiment 3, some participants had just completed the same 
task. Thus they might have recalled information about the just-completed task (i.e., 
distributional information), which they then used as a basis for their second time 
prediction. Support for this assertion comes from Buehler et al, (1994), who found that 
prediction bias was reduced when participants were encouraged to recognise the 
similarities between previous tasks and the task they were about to undertake. 
The temporal distance between previous and current tasks could thus explain the well 
established link between the planning fallacy and the failure to use distributional 
information. Specifically, in many everyday situations the temporal distance between 
previous and current tasks is likely to be considerably longer than was the case in the 
present studies. For example, marking students' examination scripts is a task that many 
academics perform at the end of each semester, meaning that there is a period of at least 
five months until this activity is undertaken again. It seems feasible that a lengthy temporal 
distance is likely to impede the recall of distributional information (e.g., duration of 
previous examination script marking tasks). Thus in such instances the person can only 
really estimate their completion time using information about the current task (e.g., the 
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number of examination scripts to be marked). On the basis of previous research (e.g., 
Buehler et ai, 1994) one would expect such predictions to be over-optimistic because of 
the person's reliance on singular information (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
The fact that the present tasks were well structured could explain the general absence 
of the planning fallacy in our experiments. Specifically, as these tasks comprised 
sequential components it seems feasible that participants could have based their time 
predictions on some kind of task-related information (e.g., the amount of time needed to 
cover one peg with three disks). 
Consistent with this assertion we found evidence of a positive relationship between 
task experience and prediction accuracy, suggesting that participants might have used task-
related information as the basis for estimating their completion times. However, as 
previous research has tended to use less well structured tasks it is possible that participants 
in previous studies had to base their time estimates on some kind of non-task information. 
For example, as several of the previous tasks were of considerable importance to 
participants (e.g., completing a college thesis), they might have given over-optimistic 
predictions in order to bolster self-esteem (Norem & Cantor, 1986). Likewise, as some 
studies used tasks with a deadline (e.g., Buehler et ai, 1994), over-optimism could be due 
to participants trying to enhance feelings of self-efficacy (Taylor & Brown, 1988) 
regarding their ability to complete such tasks on time. 
The present experiments have perhaps raised more questions than they have 
answered: Will the same findings occur with other simple tasks? Is the planning fallacy 
only evident on longer duration tasks? And how cognitively complex must a task be in 
order to produce optimistically biased predictions? Nonetheless, we have provided 
evidence that the planning fallacy is not as pervasive as previously thought, and the 
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sources of its absence (and indeed reversal) on simple laboratory tasks are thus in need of 
fijrther study. Moreover, the potentially important role of task duration (rather than 
cognitive complexity) in explaining the present general overestimation of time is also 
worthy of ftirther investigation. We have also highlighted the importance of task 
experience in mediating the extent to which people's time predictions are biased, thus 
emphasising the need to understand the way in which distributional infomation can be 
used to improve prediction accuracy. Given the cost of underestimating the duration of 
major projects and the potential gains of accurately predicting task completion times, we 
need to understand more fully these effects. 
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